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 This dissertation addresses the question: under what conditions do regional and national 
high courts matter in the promotion and domestic incorporation of international human rights 
law? In order to address this question, I argue that domestic high courts can proactively adopt 
international human rights laws through their interpretation of the law and resulting case 
decisions. Regional courts promote international law, particularly through their requirement of 
domestic legal reforms in their judgments. I examine the extent of state compliance with these 
requirements, where compliance consists of these changes in the domestic legal system thereby 
institutionalizing international laws and transforming them into enforceable law. These arguments 
are evaluated through original data consisting of the universe of compliance records of Latin 
America to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights from 2001-2015 and Latin American high 
court cases. I find that domestic high courts successfully and unilaterally institutionalize 
international human rights laws and a much higher compliance rate with even such stringent 
regional court requirements as domestic legal reform. The influence of regional and national high 
courts is much higher then traditional scholarship credits.  
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How does international law, particularly human rights law, become domestic law? This 
question carries legal and practical implications that remain understudied yet crucial for 
effective human rights policy and successful international human rights regimes. While 
scholars and practitioners increasingly observe legal internationalization, or domestic 
laws emerging in the international arena (see Mitchell and Powell 2013; Sikkink 2011; 
Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998),1 the question of to what 
extent international laws2 influence domestic politics, behavior, and law remains 
contentious. The majority of scholarship that asks this question focuses on the influence 
of international law on state (leadership) behavior. While this is an obviously important 
perspective, especially in terms of human rights violations, the legal perspective is 
equally important. Laws influence behavior by creating incentive structures and 
expectations for people and their behavior, setting national political discourse, 
establishing the relationships between governments and people (as well how people 
interact with each other), creating categories of political identities and conferring 
                                                           
1 These phenomena are not only discussed by academics but also by policy makers and justices—see, for 
example, “The Internationalization of Law” lecture with Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Dr. Mireille Delmas-
Marty, Vivian Curran (hosted by Brookings Institution). 
 
2 International law is defined as law that is binding to international organizations, states, and (sometimes) 
individuals, where law is a “series of rules regulating behavior, and reflecting, to some extent, the ideas and 
preoccupations of the society within which it functions” (Shaw 2008, 1). 
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responsibilities, freedoms, and powers to these categories (and determining the selection 
of people within each category), and regularizing behavior, expectations, and identities. 
Laws formally institutionalize each of these identities and relationships, define behaviors 
and norms, and do so in through a transparent, consistent, predictable legalistic process 
that confers legitimacy. Furthermore, laws influence behavior over time in that it affects 
behavior and identities contemporaneously as well as future behavior, identity affiliation, 
political discourse, and normative expectations. Hence, evaluating the degree to which 
international law catalyzes changes in domestic human rights laws provides insight into 
international law’s ability to effectuate comprehensive, long-term or permanent changes 
in domestic politics. As such, examining the role of international law in redefining 
domestic political contexts lends itself as a more stringent and more comprehensive way 
to evaluate the importance and influence of international law, especially compared to 
evaluations relegating its influence to instigating immediate changes in state government 
behavior exclusively. 
 This dissertation thus offers an important perspective of to what extent do 
international human rights laws influence domestic laws. It does so in two broad 
manners. The first addresses the relationship between international law with states’ 
domestic high courts to identify the role of these high courts in translating and 
implementing international law as domestic, legally enforceable law. This section 
examines the influence of strong, independent courts on domestic rights practices and 
provides preliminary evidence on the extent to which high courts have been in proactive 
in promoting human rights protections consistent with existing international law. The 
second manner in which this dissertation addresses the influence of international law on 
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domestic legal systems is through the compliance records of states with the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. I evaluate the influence of international law 
specifically through regional court jurisprudence by its ability to effectuate domestic 
legal changes within states. These two approaches enable a more comprehensive 
understanding of how international law influences domestic law and practice and 
emphasize the roles of national and supranational courts in this process. 
 
How does international law influence state behavior? 
This dissertation builds upon previous research examining the influence of 
international law on state behavior. Previous research on this topic, however, has evolved 
substantially. Realist international relations scholars originally asserted that international 
law, similar to other international institutions,3 do not exert an independent influence on 
states. States, the argument goes, choose to participate in institutions that already reflect 
their behavior and preferences (Byers 1999; Mearsheimer 1994; Downs, Rocke, and 
Barsoom 1996). In other words, international legal institutions should be understood as 
states choosing to follow the rules they created rather than states choosing to become 
constrained by independent, external rules (Mearsheimer 1994). Similarly, Downs, 
Rocke, and Barsoom (1996) argue that states only enter into international agreements 
when they are already complying with them. As such, these legal rules do not facilitate 
‘deep’ agreements, or exert any influence on member states.4 Hence international legal 
                                                           
3 Institutions are defined as a relatively stable set or structure of identities, interests, rules, and norms that 
stipulates how actors should interact with each other, prescribe acceptable forms of behavior. 
 
4 These authors also address the problems of selection bias, which provides spurious inferences as to how 
frequently states comply and how ‘deep’ the agreements are. In essence, the lack of accounting for why 
sates enter into the agreements leads to systematic overstating the effect of international legal agreements 
and institutions. Von Stein (2005) uses this argument to reexamine Simmons’ (2000) work on IMF 
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institutions are epiphenomenal, simply reflecting existing states preferences and power 
dynamics. As such, international legal institutions are argued to not have an independent 
agency and thus do not exert any external or independent influence on state preferences 
or behavior.5  
Additionally, international human rights institutions typically have difficulty in 
credibly arguing and effectively implementing enforcement mechanisms because the 
desired behavior (as well as the deviant behavior) occurs strictly domestically (see 
Moravcsik 2000). Since the behavior the international institution attempts to control is 
not on the international level but rather state actions towards domestic individuals, 
monitoring procedures and enforcement mechanisms must be different than those 
typically used in agreements in other international regimes. Essentially, the only credible 
enforcement mechanism is the empowerment of individuals and the creation of outlets 
such as international courts (Moravcsik 2000).6 Yet the influence and effectiveness of 
supranational judicial bodies remains contentious in that while commitment problems can 
be solved by third-party adjudication (Morrow 1999), these bodies frequently lack 
                                                                                                                                                                             
compliance, arguing that once selection biases are accounted for—that is once the factors that cause joining 
the agreement in the first place—the international laws do not issue much constraining force on state 
behavior. In other words, compliant behavior is not induces by the legal rules themselves but rather the 
original factors or reasons that led the state to make the legal commitment in the first place. More 
generally, von Stein (2005) asserts that this selection bias accounts for between 31% and 95% of the results 
typically produced without accounting for these selection factors. 
 Of course, Simmons and Hopkins (2005) responded to von Stein (2005) theoretically and 
empirically asserting that treaties can both constrain and screen simultaneously and showing that ‘selection 
bias’ does not account for the differing results between Simmons (2000) and von Stein (2005). They further 
replicate Simmons; (2000) results using preprocessing matching to reduce model dependency. 
 
5 Although even the prominent critic Hans Morgenthau (1954) concedes that “to deny that international law 
exists as a system od legally binding rules flies in the face of all of the evidence.” 
 
6 Mitchell and Hensel (2007) make a similar argument, where international institutions can actively 
promote compliance through supporting third-party settlement, but they also argue that international legal 
institutions can promote compliance passively through peer pressure. 
 
 5
enforcement mechanisms all together. Judicial or quasi-judicial bodies are often created 
in order to credibly argue for and implement treaty agreements (Moravcsik 2000), yet 
they suffer from the same lack of enforcement mechanisms as the original agreement. As 
such, some argue that these bodies similarly reflect existing power structures rather than 
exert independent influence. Garrett and Weingast (1993), for example, find that 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) is a “docile creature of state interest” that must cater to 
dominant member-states in order to preserve its independence and legitimacy (see also 
Garrett 1995, 1992; Garrett, Keleman, and Schultz 1998).7 Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla 
(2008) similarly find that the ECJ is sensitive to member-states’ threats of noncompliance 
and threats of override and therefore behaves strategically in their decisions applying 
international law.8 Furthermore, Carrubba (2005) questions the ability of these 
adjudicative bodies in enabling ‘deeper’ international agreements after finding limited 
support for supranational courts’ ability to help overcome enforcement problems in 
international agreements (so although courts generally facilitate cooperation they cannot 
promote deeper cooperation). Hathaway (2002) concludes that noncompliance to human 
rights treaties, specifically, is common due to the lack of enforcement and low or 
nonexistent costs for noncompliance but also finds that states that have ratified human 
rights treaties generally have better rights practices than states that haven’t ratified—
which, rather than being optimistic, implies that these treaties are ‘shallow’ agreements 
that only reflect the selection effects of ratification rather than influence of treaties 
                                                           
7 Alternatively, Alter (2009, 2001) argues that the threat to limit the ECJ’s jurisdiction is not credible 
because of the decision rules requiring a unanimous vote for such a treaty amendment. 
 
8 On the other hand, Mattli and Slaughter (1995) assert that ignoring legal precedent and bending to 
member-state political will would hurt the ECJ’s legitimacy more so than making a legally sound decision 
that a state ignores or contests. 
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themselves (Downs, Rock, and Barsoom 1996). Hafner-Burton (2005) similarly 
emphasizes the need for enforcement mechanisms in human rights agreements that 
explicitly tie agreement benefits to member compliance; as such, preferential trade 
agreements, due to their coercive enforcement mechanisms, are more effective at curbing 
rights violations than ‘softer’ human rights agreements. Hence, the lack of enforcement 
capabilities of adjudicative bodies and supranational courts, which were created to help 
solve enforcement problems inherent in the original international agreement, preclude 
independent influence of the institutions and relegate these agreements and bodies to 
reflect and cater to the same political power distributions that exist in the international 
system. 
Yet, if legal institutions are merely epiphenomenal of power distributions (Barnett 
and Finnemore 1999), then states would not rationally choose to create and maintain 
them (Keohane and Martin 1995). Hence states’ decision to create institutions implies 
that the states believe that such institutions will and do have an independent effect that 
merits their existence. The recent proliferation of these international agreements and 
supranational judicial bodies therefore implies that these international institutions are 
perceived as influential, effective, and desirable. While only six permanent international 
courts existed in 1985, today at least 25 permanent international courts and over 100 
quasi-legal and ad hoc systems that interpret international rules and assess compliance 
with international law exist (Mitchell and Powell 2013; Alter 2011). This proliferation, 
along with global judicialization or empowerment of courts and quasi-judicial 
institutions, is partly due to increased emergence and diffusion of democratic norms for 
third-party conflict adjudication in the international system (Mitchell 2002; Stone Sweet 
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2000; Tate and Vallinder 1995). In essence, the proliferation of judicial bodies originates 
in the belief that law engages with complex political issues in more neutral, “less overtly 
power-laden,” predictable, and consistent manner (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002). Still, 
this rapid emergence of these bodies globally as well as their increasing power suggests 
their ability to influence states—begging the question of how do these international legal 
institutions benefit states, and how can they be useful or influential without ‘hard’ or 
coercive enforcement mechanisms? 
One benefit of these institutions that merit their creation is that international legal 
institutions provide a means through which states can achieve certain end goals that states 
would not be able to achieve on their own—particularly cooperation (Abbott and Snidal 
1998; Keohane and Martin 1995; Keohane 1984). International legal institutions allow 
for the building of trust by enabling repeated interactions between states, enabling 
reciprocity, facilitating negotiations, monitoring and enforcing agreements, managing 
conflicts and resolving disputes, solving coordination problems, making commitments 
more credible, and reducing the transaction costs of cooperation (Stone Sweet 2000; 
Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Jervis 1999; Abbott and Snidal 1998; Keohane and Martin 
1995; Keohane 1984). More specifically, international legal institutions manage state 
expectations in terms of their interactions with other states and supranational legal 
institutions, solve coordination problems (through managing expectations and producing 
or reinforcing norms, through enabling the spread of information, and creating focal 
points), reduce transaction costs (by enabling coordination), monitor and enforce 
agreements across states, provide adjudication or remedies for conflict, issue political and 
legal identities, and does so through explicit, transparent, and legalistic processes. 
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Furthermore, international legal institutions provide this benefit because they are 
autonomous, having independent agency, rather than simply a process through which 
collective action problems can be solved (O’Neill, Balsiger, and VanDeveer 2004; 
Barnett and Finnemore 1999). In this sense, international legal institutions can transform 
state identities and interests (Wendt 1992) as well as codify, alter, socialize, 9 and enforce 
behavioral norms, defined as “standard[s] of appropriate behavior for actors with a given 
identity” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Hence, these institutions should be 
conceptualized not as epiphenomenal or mere tools of statecraft but as “a relatively stable 
set or structure of identities and interest, where such structures are often codified into 
formal rules and norms but these have motivational force only due to an actor’s 
socialization to and participation in collective knowledge” (Wendt 1992). Hence, while 
the degree of influence may differ across state actors, international legal institutions 
should be conceptualized as agents of change. As agents of change, that are 
fundamentally different from the sum of its component states, these legal institutions are 
autonomous entities that create actors, specify responsibilities and authority, define the 
work of these actors, given meaning and normative value to such work, and constitute 
and construct the social world (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). 
International legal institutions are thus created and granted authority over the 
states—including the states that participated in their creation. The authority granted to 
these institutions grows over time as the institution gains technical and specialized 
knowledge that is not easily accessible to the member states as well as accrues related 
                                                           
9 Socialization is defined as “the process by which actors acquire different identities, leading to new 
interests through regular and sustained interactions within broader social contexts and structures” (Bearce 
and Bondanella 2007). 
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skills (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). Thus, international legal institutions become “global 
governor[s],” or “authorities who exercise power across borders for purposes of affecting 
policy and creating issues, setting agendas, establishing and implementing rules or 
programs, and evaluating and adjudicating outcomes” (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). 
Indeed, international legal organizations create and act upon their own agendas 
independently of member states, and their legitimacy arises from their perception of 
impersonal rule-makers and enforcers (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; see also Nielson and 
Tierney 2003).  
Not only do international legal institutions influence state behavior by providing 
solutions to the problems of cooperation, enabling and constraining state behavior, and 
setting independent agendas, these legal institutions increase interdependence, thereby 
making relationships more costly for each party to forego (Baldwin 1989). This increased 
interdependence changes the cost-benefit structure analyses for each member state as 
well as changes these calculations for those outside of the institution. Additionally, 
increased interconnectedness and interactions between states can, in and of itself, alter 
state identities, values, interests, and thus behavior through processes of socialization that 
occur through repeated interactions and dialogues across states enabling norms to diffuse 
throughout the international community and become internalized by sates (Risse, Ropp, 
and Sikkink 1999; Greenhill 2010; Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Checkel 2005; 
Pevehouse 2005, 2002; Simmons 2000; March and Olsen 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998; Meyer et al. 1997; Koh 1996; Wendt 1992).  
Hence, international legal institutions offer solutions to collective action problems 
as well as induce cooperation through their roles as agents of change, influencing state 
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interests and behavior despite the lack of binding obligation, lack of “overarching 
monopoly of force,” and lack of “strong sense of community” (Gemkow and Zürn 2012). 
These benefits and influence appear to exist functionally and theoretically despite the 
absence of traditional coercive enforcement mechanisms.10 So how are these legal 
institutions influential without enforcement mechanisms? 
 Two pathways provide alternative enforcement mechanisms through which 
influence and compliance can be induced: international pathways and domestic pathways. 
At the international level, international law may be part of self-sustaining international 
institutions that benefit all members even if members must comply with unwanted 
decisions occasionally (Abbott et al. 2000; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001).11 In 
this sense, rationalist states gain more from these institutions than without them, even 
taking into consideration occasional unwanted decisions. Constructivist arguments add to 
this rationalist approach by asserting that these laws are further substantiated by 
internalized norms and community bonds exist in the international realm that enable 
persuasion, learning, acculturation, and socialization (Goodman and Jinks 2004; Byers 
1999; Finnemore and Toope 2001; Koh 1996, 1997; Franck 1988, 1990). Hence, 
international reputation, reciprocation, and norm observation and internalization enable 
                                                           
10 Not all scholars think these traditional enforcement mechanisms are necessary, effective, or desirable. 
Chayes and Chayes (1993) argue that “managerial” models of international law that deemphasize formal 
compliance definitions, are transparent, and include technical and financial assistance are more likely to 
induce compliance than traditional enforcement models with strict standards of compliance (because 
noncompliance will occur due to ambiguity in the agreement, the lack of state capacity to comply in 
affirmative obligations, and the necessity of transition periods and inevitable changes over time rather than 
due to states decisions to not comply). 
 
11 The repeated nature of the interactions, rather than a one shot game, can also lead to state behavior 
consistent with international obligations without necessarily implying that the law influenced national 
behavior (Guzman 2002). However, these results only hold if the game is finite and sanctions and/or 
reputations costs either do not exist or are sufficiently small to not alter the equilibrium. 
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international legal institutions to exert influence and induce compliance (Henkin 1979).12 
However, the internalization of international norms extends beyond state leadership to 
their domestic political contexts—creating a domestic political pathway where domestic 
political forces reinforce international legal pressures and provide the necessary 
enforcement mechanism. Thus, alternative enforcement mechanisms exist that allow 
these legal institutions to influence states and invoke compliance and highlight the nature 
of the two-level or nested games state leadership must simultaneously play (Putnam 
1988; Tsebelis 1991).13 I discuss these mechanisms briefly below. 
 
Reputational Costs  
International laws set expectations for appropriate state behavior and obligates 
states to fulfill commitments. They determine the rules of interactions between states 
within the international system and/or the international or world society (Checkel 2005; 
Lechner and Boli 2005; Meyer et al.1997; Bull 1977). States incur reputational costs 
when other states and political actors perceive that the state has failed to honor a 
commitment. Hence, because states derive benefits from their reputation, states hesitate 
in compromising their reputation. Noncompliance signals that a state’s commitments are 
not credible, which can be costly for states. Thus, reputational costs can induce state 
                                                           
12 Henkin (1979) is perhaps most famous for his aphorism that “almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” He further argues 
that this widespread compliance almost all of the time induces scholars to bias the selection of analyses to 
noncompliant cases. 
 
13 Compliance is defined as a “state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behavior and a specified 
rule” (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002). It is important to note also that international law can influence states 
in manners other than compliance. Legal rules can alter state behavior even when states fail to comply. 
Alternatively, compliance could also occur exogenously of the international legal rule or agreement; for 
instance the fall of the Soviet Union led to systematic compliance with several environmental laws 
(Raustiala and Slaughter 2002). 
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compliance to international legal obligations. In her evaluation of compliance to IMF 
legal rules and agreements, Simmons (2000) asserts that these laws induce compliant 
state behavior by the increased reputational costs of reneging instilled by the institution 
and due to the related “peer pressure” from other states in the region. Guzman (2002) 
similarly finds that international law is influential only when it commits a state to an 
obligation in the eyes of other states, thereby inducing reputational costs for 
noncompliance, and that these agreements are most effective with repeated, multilateral 
interactions with small stakes for direct sanctions.14 Hence, even for rationalist states, 
inducing reputational costs can promote compliance with international laws. 
 
Socialization 
Socialization15 consists of changes in ideas, values, identities (and thereby 
behaviors) due to repeated interactions with other actors, such as through international 
institutions, focal points, or epistemic communities. 16 Increased and repeated exposure to 
legal norms through interactions with other states can lead to norm convergence, where 
actors that may not have agreed with or shared a normative belief eventually converge in 
their acknowledgment and support of the legal norm. These norms influence the identities 
and policy interests of states, thereby influencing state behavior (Greenhill 2010; 
                                                           
14 The issue for small stakes is that if noncompliance requires direct sanctions like military force, these 
sanctions are not credible as they are contrary to the self-interest of the sanctioning state(s) (Guzman 2002). 
 
15 Socialization is similar to Goodman and Jink’s (2004) concept of acculturation, the “general process by 
which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.” Acculturation, like 
socialization, includes mimicry and identification (among others) and is effective when groups generate 
varying degrees of cognitive and social pressures, real or imagined, to conform.  
 
16 Epistemic communities are defined as “a network of professional with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992). 
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Pevehouse 2005, 2002; Simmons and Elkin 2004; Bearce and Bondanella 2003; Mitchell 
2002; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Koh 1996; 
Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996; Gaubatz 1996; Chayes and Chayes 1993; 
Keohane and Martin 1995; Wendt 1992; Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990).17 The influence 
of socialization has been observed for legal norms (Koh 1998, 1997, 1996; Chayes and 
Chayes 1995, 1993); human rights practices (Greenhill 2010), human rights norms 
(Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), democracy ratings 
(Pevehouse 2002, 2005), and general interest convergence (Bearce and Bondanella 2007) 
as well as serves as the primary mechanism for the observed diffusion of international 
legal and human rights norms (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006).18 For example, 
Mitchell (2002) finds that non-democracies behave more similarly to democracies in their 
participation of peaceful third-party settlements of territorial disputes as the proportion of 
democracies in the international system increases (making democratic norms more 
prevalent). Simmons (2000) concludes that commitments to international law by regional 
neighbors exert a positive influence on state compliance to international law. In other 
words, states are more likely to comply when their neighbors are complying. These social 
pressures induce states to conform in complying with international legal rules and norms. 
 
                                                           
17 As with most aspects of the domestic-international linkages, norms move from the domestic to 
international arena as well as move from the international to domestic arena, working their influence 
through each arena’s institutions (Risse, Ropp, and Sikking 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). 
 
18 Socialization processes resembles the isomorphism literature (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991). Organizational isomorphism occurs when organizations in the same field tend to adopt 
similar practices and structures. Generally speaking, this literature only recognizes three types of 
isomorphism: 1) coercive isomorphism, where organizations “respond to direct demands or pressure from 
outside actors,” 2) normative isomorphism, where organizations draw on shared cultural or value 
orientations, and 3) mimetic isomorphism, where organizations duplicate behaviors of others within their 




Finally, international legal institutions exert influence and induce compliance by 
altering the domestic politics within a state. Specifically, these laws exert influence 
through characteristics of electoral politics and domestic legal systems. For example, 
liberal democracies are more likely to comply with international law than other regimes 
(Checkel 2001; Gaubatz 1996; Jacobson and Weiss 1995; Dixon 1993).19 One reason for 
this is that domestic constituencies can influence national compliance through electoral 
leverage when domestic constituents are informed of the status of compliance (Dai 2005). 
Cingranelli and Filippov (2010) add that electoral competition can only induce 
compliance and constrain rights violations if politicians are in a political situation where 
monitoring and exposing violations by the incumbent public official are beneficial; such a 
situation is more likely to occur in low magnitude proportionally represented districts that 
and where voters can vote for individual candidates. Without these properly aligned 
incentives, compliance and rights violations are easily ignored. Hence, international law 
alters the domestic political environment where some actors may gain while other may 
lose if the state government does not comply. When actors victimized by noncompliance 
have leverage over the government, then compliance can be rational for states provided 
they have incentives to monitor and expose violators (Cingranelli and Filippov 2010; Dai 
2005; see also Linos 2011). 
 The rule of law and domestic legal systems are even more important perhaps than 
electoral leverage. In this case, domestic legal systems serve as enforcement mechanisms 
for international agreements (Simmons 2009; Alter 2009, 2001; Powell and Staton 2009; 
                                                           




Powell and Mitchell 2007; Simmons 2000; Koh 1998, 1997, 1996; Slaughter 1995).20  In 
general, there are four domestic legal factors that induce and enforce compliance: a) 
domestic legal norms themselves, b) the degree of congruence in the international laws 
and domestic laws (and legal norms), c) the degree of independence the national judiciary 
enjoys, and d) internalization of international legal (and human rights) norms. For 
instance, the pervasiveness of domestic legal norms like pacta sunt servanda21 increases 
the likelihood of compliance with international law (Mitchell and Powell 2013; Powell 
and Mitchell 2007). This legal norm is paramount in Islamic law states, which leads to 
Islamic law states having the most durable commitments (Mitchell and Powell 2013). On 
the other hand, because pacta sunt servanda is significantly weaker in common law states 
and because of their adherence to stare decisis legal norms where precedent in binding, 
common law states to enter into highly precise, specific, and detailed commitments and 
place the most reservations on their commitments. The norm of stare decisis does not 
exist in Islamic law and does not formally exist in civil law countries, although civil law 
states do abide by an informal consistency rule where trends of similarly decided cases 
are considered in legal decision-making. Hence, civil law countries are likely to enter into 
agreements that are less precise and specific than common law countries. These legal 
norms are important because they provide the framework or context within which a 
commitment is made, what the commitment entails and requires, and under what 
                                                           
20 These legal institutions ad legal norms may be what drive liberal democracy results in evaluations of 
compliance (Simmons 2000; Gaubatz 1996). O’Donnell (2001) suggests that democracies should be 
defined in relation to the state legal system, since the legal system is what enacts and supports the 
fundamental aspects of democracy. As such, ‘democracies’ implies certain basic freedoms, related to the 
legal and moral principles of the community, exist , are effectively enforced, and equally applied across the 
population (O’Donnell 2001).  
 
21 This norm denotes that agreements must be kept.  
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conditions the commitment is completed or nullified (Mitchell and Powell 2013; Powell 
and Mitchell 2007). 
The degree of similarity or congruence between these domestic legal norms with 
international commitments similarly influences both the acceptance of international 
obligations and compliance with these commitments (Mitchell and Powell 2013; Powell 
and Mitchell 2007). This congruence is important because it reduces the requirement of 
obtaining new information and skills, makes translating the international law into 
enforceable domestic law easier since it is legally consistent with existing rules, and lends 
legitimacy to the international agreement. States with domestic legal norms and 
procedures similar to those utilized in the international law are more familiar with the 
technical information, norms, and legal procedures (Powell and Mitchell 2007). Hence, 
these states already have the capacity, resources, and experience to participate in this 
system and adhere to the commitments. Legal congruence also lends legitimacy to the 
international legal agreement since they use the same normative legal framework as 
existing domestic laws. In both of these cases novelty creates uncertainty, so the level of 
congruence between the international and domestic laws reduces uncertainty and 
minimizes the need for acquiring new information, skill, and capabilities in order to 
participate and fulfill legal commitments. For example, when international laws and 
supranational courts that adhere to legal procedures most similar to domestic civil law 
systems, civil law states are more likely to enter into commitments and comply. Powell 
and Mitchell (2007) find this to be the case for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
where civil law states are the most likely to accept ICJ jurisdiction compared to common 
law or Islamic law.  
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 Domestic judicial independence levels and rule of law development similarly 
influence compliance with international laws. States with independent national courts are 
more likely to comply with international law than states without independent judiciaries 
(Powell and Staton 2009; Keith 2002; Slaughter 1995).22 Judicial independence, where 
judges are insulated from improper private or partisan influence and from other 
governmental branches, is crucial for courts to hold the state government accountable for 
the obligations. Effective, independent courts further enable litigation and new litigation 
strategies where victims created by noncompliance may seek judicial remedies—
particularly in the context of human rights—since the courts are perceived as impartial 
and even receptive to their cases as well as willing and able to constrain or sanction 
noncompliance violations (Simmons 2009; Moravcsik 2000). Furthermore, independent 
courts are often emboldened after states commit to international (human rights) 
agreements and thus more likely to constrain and sanction violators (Powell and Staton 
2009). Effective judiciaries create ex post costs for states considering violating the 
agreement, thereby incentivizing the state to comply. Effective judiciaries even create 
sufficiently high ex post costs for noncompliance that they moderate noncompliance with 
torture commitments in dictatorships (Conrad 2014; see also Conrad and Ritter 2013).23 
Kelley (2007) similarly finds that domestic rule of law has an independent effect on 
decisions to keep international agreements where domestic rule of law norms influence 
the decision to keep rights agreements rather than the decision to enter into the 
                                                           
22 However, states with strong, independent judiciaries are less likely to enter into international obligations 
because of this domestic enforcement of the obligations (Powell and Staton 2009; Hathaway 2007; Von 
Stein 2005; Moravcsik 2000; Helfer and Slaughter 1997). 
 
23 Conrad and Ritter (2013) additionally suggest that effective judiciaries provide sufficient ex post cost to 
incentive compliance provided the leadership is secure in his or her position (but not for insecure 
leadership). 
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agreement, contrary to the arguments of Hathaway (2002) and Downs, Rocke, and 
Barsoom (1996). Additional evidence of international law’s influence through domestic 
courts emerges in the inability of states to ignore or reject European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) rulings without countering their own courts through allegations of violating the 
rule of law domestically (Burley and Mattli 1993), and compliance occurs due to the 
ability of the ECJ to foster links with European national courts who are able and willing 
to work with the ECJ, thereby ‘hooking’ international and domestic law (Mattli and 
Slaughter 1995; Alter 1998). On the other hand, when national courts cannot be invoked 
states are more likely to ignore or contest international commitments like supranational 
court decisions (Alter 2009, 2001). Thus, domestic judiciaries serve as domestic sources 
of enforcement (Simmons 2009; Dai 2005; Alter 2009, 2001). 
Finally, the internalization of international legal and human rights norms requires 
that these norms penetrate the state and enter the domestic political and legal systems. 
Internalization or institutionalization requires that these norms have been “incorporated 
into [a party’s] own value system” and legal system (Koh 1997, 1998) and have 
“acquire[d] a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality and are no longer a matter of broad public 
debate” (Finnermore and Sikkink 1998). As such, full internalization or 
institutionalization induces “obedience” or rule-induced compliant behavior rather than 
behavior induced by the anticipation of (coercive) enforcement (Koh 1997, 1998). Hence, 
norms that are institutionalized by the state by definition affect the domestic political 
context (Powell and Staton 2009; Collins, Jr. et al. 2008; Shaw 2008; Vreeland 2008; 
Seider, Schjolden and Angell 2005; Hafner-Burton 2005; Neumayer 2005; Friedman and 
Perez-Perdono 2003; Donnelly 2003; Moustafa 2003; Hathaway 2002; Pevehouse 2002; 
 19
Russell and O’Brien 2001; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; 
Koh 1996, 1997; Poe and Tate 1994). The norms then diffuse and infiltrate domestic 
politics, including the domestic legal system and judges, non-governmental organization 
and lawyers, and citizens. The incorporation of these values and identities garners legal 
standing to victim generated by noncompliance, influence litigation strategies and 
judicial decision-making,24 and instigates the mobilization of citizens and organization 
politically (Simmons 2009). More specifically, international human rights norms and 
their associated legal norms infiltrate domestic politics and identify victims with legal 
standing who are now informed about their rights, have expectations about appropriate 
and inappropriate behavior, and now have legal standing, access to legal remedies 
(domestically and/or internationally), and legal support from international and domestic 
human rights organizations and non-governmental institutions. Simmons (2009) shows 
that international treaty laws instigate domestic mobilization of citizens and rights 
advocates to formalize and demand their own liberation (7). 
Yet, the degree to which these domestic enforcement mechanisms induce 
compliance depends upon qualities of the international legal obligation as well. Franck 
(1988) emphasizes the importance of legitimacy in inducing compliance, where 
legitimacy is the combination of clarity and transparency of the commitment, symbolic 
validation, coherence (referring to the consistence of application and context of the rule), 
and adherence (or the degree to which a rule fits within a normative hierarchy of rule-
making). International laws that are clear, transparent, coherent, and consistent with 
                                                           
24 Not only does the internalization of these norms influence sincere behavior, but it induces strategic 
behavior as well. For example, lawyers could alter litigation choices and strategies through sincere changes 
in their beliefs but could also alter these strategies because they now have additional legal rules to support 
their case and new frames to argue their case (see Wedeking 2010 for lawyer’s strategic use of frames). 
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exiting rule-making and legal applications are more likely to induce compliance that laws 
without these characteristics (see also Chayes and Chayes 1993). Carey (2000) argues 
that parchment’ rules, or rules that are explicitly written down, contribute to international 
agreement effectiveness because its written nature enhances its “focalness” that facilitates 
communication and aligns the member expectations about outcomes. Furthermore, 
international obligations that are perceived as legitimate to domestic constituents within 
states are more likely to exert domestic political pressures through citizen mobilization 
and litigation (Simmons 2009) as well as through electoral pressures (Dai 2005).25 Hence, 
international law does not automatically influence states nor necessarily influence states 
in precisely the same manner.26  
Hence, this dissertation asks: under what conditions does international law 
become domestic law, and what roles do domestic and regional judiciaries play in 
domestic incorporation of international law? I examine these questions by analyzing the 
incorporation of international human rights laws into domestic law in Latin America, 
specifically examining the roles of domestic high courts and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework under which these 
questions are examined. The empirical chapters that follow (Chapters 3 and 4) evaluate 
                                                           
25 However, in order for these obligations to enjoy legitimacy, citizens must be informed of them. While 
some legal institutions are relatively obscure, like the Court of Justice of the European Communities, they 
still enjoy public support and legitimacy through its connection with the European Union more generally—
which induces state compliance (Caldeira and Gibson 1995). 
 
26 Organizational structure is similarly important in the likelihood of compliance, evidence by the 
constraining effect of international law on military lawyers during times of war (Dickinson 2010) and 
United States legal advisors (Scharf 2009). In particular, formal contracts influence the organization’s 
cultural norms regarding compliance; the organization’s hierarchical structure in terms of the location of 
decisions, monitoring, and administration; and the existence of a compliance unit (Dickinson 2010). 
Compliance is most likely when compliance agents within an organization when a) these agents are 
integrated with each other and other operational employees, b) they have a strong understanding of, and 
commitment to, the rules being enforced, c) they operate within an independent hierarchy, and d) they can 
confer benefits and impose penalties based upon compliance (Dickinson 2010). 
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the questions: a) under what conditions do domestic high courts promote human rights 
consistent with international law, and b) to what extent and under what conditions do 
regional courts matter in domestic rights protections and the domestic incorporation of 
international human rights laws? Chapter 5 offers some concluding remarks and 
addresses to what extent can regional courts pressure or aide domestic high courts in the 




THE ROLE OF COURTS IN THE ADOPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
This dissertation fundamentally argues that international law matters. More specifically, I 
argue that international human rights laws matter despite the absence of enforcement. 
International law matters and exerts influence in similar ways to domestic laws (Staton 
and Moore 2011), especially with an increasingly globalized and interdependent world. 
International laws influence behavior by creating incentive structures for people and 
behavior—thereby constraining behavior—and by serving as focal point that coordinates 
expectations and interaction among actors (Carey 2000; Vanberg 1998; Weingast 1997). 
They can contribute to the establishment and maintenance of political order by 
coordinating expectations among political actors about the limits of state authority (Carey 
2000; Weingast 1997), and international laws can coordinate citizen beliefs about when a 
government has transgressed domestic and international limits of state authority (Vanberg 
1998). Beyond coordination, international laws similarly alter expectations regarding 
states’ behavior when the government publicly commits itself to be legally bound to a 
specific set of rules (Simmons 2009, 14). Laws also set political agendas and discourse, 
issue political and legal identities, and establish legal remedies and adjudicative processes 
as well as provide support for litigation (Simmons 2009). Hence, international laws, 
especially within the human rights regime, are influential since they establish political
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order and processes, provide identities, create and coordinate expectations, and alter cost-
benefit incentive structures and expectations regarding behavior.  
I examine the incorporation of international human rights law27 rather than other 
areas of law for three reasons. The first is that international human rights law is 
normatively28 and politically important, yet scholarship has provided mixed results in 
terms of the degree to which rights violations can be reduced, particularly through 
international agreements (see, for instance, Fariss 2014; Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009; 
Simmons 2009; Kelley 2007; Neumayer 2005; Hathaway 2002; Downs, Rocke, and 
Barsoom 1996; Mearsheimer 1994). The protection of human rights, especially by 
effective courts and legal systems, is crucial in constraining state behavior and 
maintaining legal accountability (Apodaca 2004; Domingo 1999). Such legal 
                                                           
27 I define international law broadly as law that is binding to international organizations, states, and 
(sometimes) individuals, where law is a “series of rules regulating behavior, and reflecting, to some extent, 
the ideas and preoccupations of the society within which it functions” (Shaw 2008, 1). This definition 
includes treaty agreements as well as customary law rules, which consist of state practices that are 
recognized by the international community “as laying down patterns of conduct that have to be complied 
with” (Shaw 2008, 6). These customary rules establish behavioral norms that are binding to all states unless 
the state explicitly dissents and protests from the start of the custom (Shaw 2008, 89). Perhaps the most 
prominent area of international customary law is international human rights law where most human rights 
have moved beyond treaty law and into customary law due to widespread state practice (Shaw 2008, 275I). 
I therefore include customary law and norms because, since international customary law remains binding to 
all parties, research including only international treaty law essentially ignores a substantial and influential 
portion of international law and thus underestimates the effects of international law on state behavior and 
legal institutionalization. 
 
28 Some criticize that international law is a Western concept that does not easily translate to non-Western 
states (Freeman 2002). More extremely, some argue that the ‘universality’ of human rights serves merely as 
a disguise for cultural imperialism (Freeman 2002, 102). However, universal human rights includes the 
obligations of Westerners to respect the rights of non-Westerners where such universalism insists that some 
human rights apply in all cultures despite their diversity and/or by requiring diverse interpretations and 
applications of human rights rules in different cultural contexts (Freeman 2002, 104). Indeed, “international 
human-rights institutions have generally accepted that universal human-rights standards ought to be 
interpreted differently in different cultural contexts” (Freeman 2002, 104). Hence, the application of these 
human rights may differ (and should differ) across cultural contexts but the inherent protections embodied 
by the rights are universal.  
In terms of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights more specifically, most of the cases that 
reach the court involve “gross violations of basic human rights upon which all legal systems and societies 
would agree” so “there has yet been little occasion for the application of specifically American standards or 
for the cultural relativism otherwise to become an issue” (Harris 2004, 12). 
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accountability underpins the establishment of the rule of law, in which governments are 
held accountable to the law, and is key to democratic consolidation (Apodaca 2004; 
Domingo 1999). Thus, enhancing our understanding of which policies effectively reduce 
rights violations and expand right protections has significant real-world, political 
implications that affect people around the world.  
 The second reason is that human rights law is unique in that it necessarily creates 
tensions between international and domestic law and questions the degree to which law 
guides behavior.29 Because rights violations and protections are strictly domestic in 
nature, international laws must violate the historically paramount norm of state 
sovereignty that dictates that states have complete and exclusive control over their 
people, property, and territory. Such a violation of state sovereignty puts international 
law and domestic law in competition. International laws further create tensions with 
domestic law by making the international system accessibly to individuals. These laws 
provide legal standing and remedies outside of the sovereign state’s legal system, where 
states are committed to abiding these supranational institutional decisions. Furthermore, 
uncertainty remains in the degree to which legal rules and norms guide or determine 
behavior in the first place. In no other issue area are the discrepancies between law and 
behavior as observable as within human rights, and few other areas of law catalyze these 
tensions between international and domestic law. 
 The third reason is that examining the incorporation of international human rights 
laws into domestic law contributes to unraveling the constructivist arguments of 
                                                           
29 Obviously law is not a necessary or sufficient condition for behavior or changes in behavior. Changes in 
laws could produce little to no effect or even contrary effects on behavior. It is also possible to observe 
behavioral changes without changes in law. 
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transnational legal processes, norm ‘life cycles,’ and ‘spiral models’ of norm 
socialization (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Finnnemore and Sikkink 1998; Koh 1996, 
1997). As research has increasingly observed the diffusion, or spread, of human rights 
norms across the international system, scholars have recently asserted several models to 
explain this diffusion. Koh (1996, 1997) proposes a ‘transnational legal process,’ defined 
as the “complex process of institutional interaction whereby global norms are not just 
debated and interpreted, but ultimately internalized by domestic legal systems” [italics in 
original].  Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) expand Koh’s (1996, 1997) thesis by arguing 
that human rights norms evolve in a patterned ‘life cycle’ consisting of three phases: a) 
norm emergence where “norm entrepreneurs” attempt to persuade a critical mass of states 
to embrace these new norms, b) norm cascade where states socialize other states to 
become norm followers, and c) norm institutionalization which occurs when these norms 
“acquire a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate” 
(Finnermore and Sikkink 1998). Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999) further build upon 
these theories of norm socialization and offer a five-phase “spiral model’ of human rights 
norms socialization that emphasizes the importance of transnational advocacy networks 
in the diffusion of these norms. 
 Despite the significant contributions of these models, however, the models lack 
clear theoretical mechanisms for the final stage: norm internalization or 
institutionalization where the norms become incorporated into the domestic political 
structures and identity—which is necessary to “depersonalize norm compliance” and to 
ensure implementation regardless of individual beliefs (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, 
17). My examination of the mechanisms through which states incorporate international 
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human rights law within their domestic legal systems thus unravels some of this 
internalization process. The codification of international human rights laws into the 
domestic body of law validates and legitimizes international human rights laws, 
incorporates them into domestically enforceable law, creates legal focal points that aligns 
expectations and centers national discourse, and redefines the relationship between the 
government and its constituents, and issues legal identities to constituents. Hence, the 
incorporation of international law fundamentally alters the state’s legal identity as a 
whole. Examining the influence of international law on domestic laws therefore addresses 
these processes of internalization to contribute a better understanding of the degree to 
which human rights laws and norms are becoming internalized, under what conditions 
does internalization occur, and whether national high courts or regional courts influence 
this process. 
This dissertation also fundamentally argues that courts matter in the enforcement 
and incorporation of international law and the development of the human rights. National 
and supranational courts have crucial roles within the promotion, implementation, and 
success of international human rights laws. Courts clarify the meaning of commitments 
and identify violations, thereby providing hidden information about whether actors are 
behaving consistently with their commitments and maintaining a system of reputation 
(Guzman 2008). National and supranational courts constrain state government behavior 
and hold it accountable,30 inducing credible commitments (Alter 2009; Moravcsik 2000; 
                                                           
30 Supranational and national courts face similar problems in terms of enforcement mechanisms since both 
are dependent upon other political actors to enforce their decisions—and often the actor required to 
implement the decision is the same actor whose behavior is under review (Staton and Moore 2011). One 
assumption that I make throughout the dissertation is that supranational courts and domestic courts can be 
studied in similar ways, following Staton and Moore (2011).  
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North and Weingast 1989; see also Moustafa 2007). They also serve to ‘lock-in’ policies 
and political norms from future losses of power, such as newly won domestic democratic 
norms (Moravcsik 2000; see also Helmke 2005).  Most basically, courts are necessary to 
move laws from  “parchment barrier” to effective constraints on state rights violations 
(Keith, Tate, and Poe 2009).31 
 In terms of incorporation, regional courts help apply international law within 
particular cultural contexts and thereby clarifying the commitment and obligations. 
Supranational courts interpret international law and apply it to specific cases leading to 
specific domestic policies and remedies. They grant legal access to individuals who may 
be disenfranchised domestically and lend legal identities to victims of rights abuses. They 
enforce human rights agreements as well as provide monitoring resources to identify 
noncompliance to international law. These resources and pressures enable domestic 
incorporation through their decisions requiring domestic change, including changes in 
domestic laws. 
Domestic courts are particularly well suited to initiate internalization by 
validating, codifying, and institutionalizing international human rights laws and norms 
into domestic law. This institutionalization legitimizes the international law as well as 
transforms the law into an enforceable domestic law that forms part of state’s legal 
identity. Such institutionalization of international human rights laws is necessary for the 
establishment of the rule of law by constraining state behavior so as to prevent human 
rights violations and to hold the state legally accountable for such violations. Hence, the 
courts, through institutionalizing international human rights laws domestically, 
potentially have the power to establish the rule of law in states that had previously ruled 
                                                           
31 These arguments assume independent, effective courts not merely the presence of a court. 
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by law, abusively using the law as merely another tool of government (Ginsburg and 
Moustafa 2008; Kleinfeld 2006; Tamanaha 2004). 
Even anecdotally, domestic courts seem to play an important role in the 
incorporation of international human rights laws. In several cases, domestic courts appear 
to serve as leaders in promoting domestic legal change so as to expand human rights 
protections, making domestic laws more consistent with international law. For example, 
the Indian Supreme Court ordered parliament to come up with suitable legislation to 
conform with the principles outlined in the (then ratified) Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in order to address sexual 
harassment in the workplace (Simmons 2009: 255). Similarly, in Botswana, a court of 
appeals declared the 1987 Citizenship Act, which stripped Botswana female citizens 
married to foreigners of their right to pass on their Botswana citizenship (and thus 
political rights, such as the right to vote) to their children, unconstitutional (Simmons 
2009: 255).   
In other cases, domestic courts seem to require the aid of international law in 
promoting human rights. For instance, in Japan, women had attempted to use the courts 
to improve employment protections since the 1960s, albeit unsuccessfully until the 
passage of CEDAW (Simmons 2009: 255).32  
                                                           
32
 Yet, even in other cases courts appear to hinder (sometimes actively) domestic legal changes so as to 
preclude the development of human rights protections. In Chile, for example, the Supreme Court hindered 
human rights development and protection regarding torture—despite the ratification of the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)—by holding 
international treaties to be inapplicable retroactively (thereby upholding the national amnesty laws for 
government officials accused of torture), refusing to allow civilian courts to hold trials for military officers 
(thereby granting these officers the protection of ‘in-house’ justice), and preventing the prosecution of 
crimes under international law (Simmons 2009: 292). 
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Despite these anecdotes, however, little systematic analysis exists on the role of 
domestic courts and the legal community in the incorporation and implementation of 
international human rights laws. Yet, recent global judicialization along with the 
establishment (and reestablishment) of constitutional courts with judicial review powers, 
combined with the rapidly growing international judiciary has lead to previously 
unknown levels of ‘new constitutionalism’ that “establishes fundamental human rights as 
substantive constraints on legislators and administrators, and provides for judicial 
protection of these rights against abuses by public authority” (Shapiro and Stone Sweet 
2002; Seider, Schjolden, and Angell 2005; Moustafa 2003; Epp 1998; Tate and Vallinder 
1995). These processes further make domestic courts ideal actors for international law 
incorporation. 
Hence, I argue that international laws, supranational courts, and national high 
courts matter in the incorporation and effectiveness of international law as well as in the 
development, promotion, and implementation of human rights protections. I examine 
these relationships by evaluating the influence of international human rights laws, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and national high courts in Latin America. I use 
Spanish-speaking, civil law countries in Latin America and the regional court so as to 
take advantage of a most similar system design. These countries have similar histories, 
including experiences with being former colonies, the same language, and the same legal 
system. As such, this region is less diverse relative to member-states in European 
regional regimes like the European Court of Justice and to member-states of international 
courts like the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court. The 
most similar systems approach is designed to eliminate as much of the variation across 
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states that might lead to spurious conclusions about the relationships between legal 
institutions and the influence of international law.  
 
2.1 Latin American National High Courts and International Human Rights Law 
Incorporation 
 
In 2013, the United Nations awarded the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice 
(Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación or SCJN) the UN Defense of Human Rights 
Award. This extremely prestigious award has been received by, among others, Malala 
Yousafzai (2013), Nelson Mandela (1988), Jimmy Carter (1998), Eleanor Roosevelt 
(1968), Dr. Martin Luther King (1978), the International Committee of Red Cross (1978), 
and Amnesty International (1978).33 Yet this was the first time a court received the 
award.34 This international recognition of a domestic court’s promotion of human rights 
is striking in that it represents the first time a court receives such recognition—and in that 
this accomplishment does not corroborate the widespread assumption that courts do not 
play an important, systematic role in the promotion of human rights.  
This event is perhaps also surprising in that it appears in the midst of escalating 
violence within Mexico between the federal government, organized crime, and drug 
cartels. Indeed, the increased militarization of the war on drugs has left Mexican citizens 
vulnerable to rights violations such as disappearance and torture. Perhaps most 
prominently, international news and rights organizations shunned the federal government 
for not effectively protecting the rights of, or investigating the disappearance of, forty-
                                                           
33 See Appendix A for the full list of recipients. 
 




three students from the state of Guerrero and the murders of people nation-wide.35 For 
example, Human Rights Watch chides the Mexican government for making little progress 
in prosecuting the widespread killings, enforced disappearances, and torture committed 
by soldiers and police in the effort to combat organized crime.36 From 2007 to 2013, 
more than 26,000 people had been reported disappeared or missing, and Mexico’s 
security forces have participated in these enforced disappearances since the launch of the 
‘war on drugs.’ In June of 2013, the Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission 
(CNDH) said it was investigating 2,443 disappearances in which it found evidence of the 
involvement of state agents.37 Hence, the awarding of the Mexican Supreme Court for 
promoting human rights despite the seemingly contradictory trend of right violations due 
to cartel violence reemphasizes the importance of determining under what conditions do 
courts matter in the promotion of human rights consistent with international human 
rights law. 
Yet, this anecdote exhibits the increasing reality that domestic courts can—and do—
take the lead in promoting human rights. Through trends of judicialization, courts have 
grown in power and are starting to exert their influence in adopting international human 
rights laws and legal norms unilaterally. I argue that courts matter in promoting human 
rights—even, in some cases, when they do not enjoy high levels of judicial independence. 
However, the roles that courts play differs across rights—specifically between physical 
integrity rights and empowerment rights. Furthermore, I argue that judicial independence 
is not the most important domestic political factor determining the degree to which 







human rights laws are enforced. I also argue that the Mexican Supreme Court anecdote is 
not a single, isolated event. Latin America, albeit to differing extents, is experiencing 
trends where their national high courts are behaving proactively in promoting domestic 
laws that are consistent with international law and frequently derived directly from 
international laws. 
Domestic courts should matter in the incorporation or adoption38 of international 
human rights laws for several reasons. First, increasing judicialization enables courts to 
exert substantial influence over policy decisions. Judicialization, or the global expansion 
of judicial power, means that courts are playing a more integral part in policy decisions 
that were originally exclusively determined by legislative and executive bodies (Tate and 
Vallinder 1995). These trends of court empowerment are evident worldwide and occur in 
common law countries and civil law countries alike, including Latin America, Western 
and Eastern Europe, India, Malta, the Philippines, Egypt, Israel, Canada, Australia, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Namibia, and the United States (Seider, Schjolden, and Angell 
2005; Moustafa 2003; Shapiro and Stone Sweet 2002; Stone Sweet 2000; Epp 1998; Tate 
and Vallinder 1995). Hence, courts are increasingly able to assert their preferences in 
policy determinations that previously excluded them. In other words, courts are able to 
influence a wider set of national policy decisions.  
Judicialization has also led to stronger, more powerful courts. Partially due to 
democratization trends and the influence of American jurisprudence and power, 
judicialization trends incorporate the creation of stronger judiciaries in transitioning or 
                                                           
38 I use the terms “incorporation,” “adoption,” and “institutionalization” interchangeably to refer to the 
codification of international laws into domestic law, either through executive order, legislation or court 
decisions. Hence, an international law is adopted/incorporated/institutionalized when it has become 
enforceable domestic law. 
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new regimes. Particularly in Latin America, for example, democratization processes have 
included the creation of more insulated judiciaries with fixed salary and tenure. Courts 
have thus become increasingly autonomous and independent from other government 
agencies (although to varying degrees). Increased judicial power, combined with the 
access to policy making originally prohibited to them, has set a stage for court activism—
especially in regards to international human rights laws. 
Courts are further able to promote international human rights laws domestically 
because of the growing norm that courts are the appropriate bodies to address grievances, 
especially with increasing accessibility of courts. Increasing numbers of judicial and 
quasi-judicial bodies have emerged in the international arena, partly due to (and 
contributing to) the legitimacy of human rights regimes where judicial bodies play the 
crucial role of the distributor of justice. Increased numbers of judicial bodies (especially 
within human rights regimes) expand the accessibility of courts to individuals, which 
leads to more individuals seeking justice through courts, and encourages the growth and 
interactions of transnational epistemic communities39 of human rights advocates and 
judicial/legal communities. These communities not only socialize40 members (and 
perhaps other actors with whom they interact), but these networks of communities enable 
transnational coordination for international pressure, media attention, and litigation 
                                                           
39 Epistemic communities are defined as “a network of professional with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992). 
 
40 Socialization is defined as “behavioral changes that presumable come about through changes in the 
actors' interests” where these changes arise through the process of interaction with other actors, leading to 
individuals copying or learning from the behavior exhibited by others (Greenhill 2010). Socialization is 
similar to Goodman and Jink’s (2004) concept of acculturation, the “general process by which actors adopt 
the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.” Acculturation, like socialization, includes 
mimicry and identification (among others) and is effective when groups generate varying degrees of 
cognitive and social pressures, real or imagined, to conform. 
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strategies. Each of these processes sets the stage that enables and empowers courts to 
play an active role in promoting human rights.  
On the few occasions courts make an appearance in rights discourse, existing 
scholarship asserts that, at best, domestic courts matter only when they enjoy a high level 
of judicial independence. I argue that a high level of judicial independence is not 
necessary for courts to promote human rights and that the need for judicial independence 
differs across rights. Namely, I argue that while courts may need high levels of judicial 
independence in order to protect physical integrity rights, such high levels of judicial 
independence are not necessary for the promotion (and expansion) of empowerment 
rights. The reason for this distinction is that courts a play different role between these 
types of rights. Courts primarily serve as constraints to government behavior for physical 
integrity rights; yet, because courts have the responsibility to define and apply 
empowerment rights through their legal interpretations and their application of the law, 
courts can unilaterally promote and expand empowerment rights.  
Hence, for physical integrity rights (PIR), like freedom from torture, political 
imprisonment, forced disappearance, and extrajudicial killing,41 domestic courts must 
hold the government accountable for violations and/or deter the government from 
engaging in these behaviors by generating the credible expectation that violators will be 
held accountable. Thus, judicial independence, conceptualized as the insulation of the 
court (and its judges) from undue external or internal pressure that enables the court to 
produce decisions reflective of sincere court preferences,42 plays a crucial role in the 
                                                           
41 The definition of physical integrity rights is derived from Cingranelli and Richard’s (2010) definitions. 
42
 This definition is thus a de facto judicial independence, distinct from de jure judicial independence, 
which focuses only on the formal rules designed to insulate judges from undue pressure. This 
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protection of these rights. The extent to which members of a court are insulated from 
government pressure largely determines the degree to which a court is able and willing to 
confront it. In other words, in order for a court to effectively constrain government 
behavior, it must be (at least somewhat) independent from political control. Since the 
perpetrators of physical integrity rights are often government agencies or representatives, 
unless courts have some degree of insulation, they will be unlikely to rule against their 
political benefactors—or even hear the case in the first place. Hence, courts must enjoy 
relatively high levels of judicial independence in order to credibly hold a government 
agency accountable or to deter rights violations. 
On the other hand, domestic courts have the opportunity to promote empowerment 
rights rather than simply constrain executive behavior. Empowerment rights consist of 
the freedoms of speech, assembly, association, religion, foreign and domestic movement, 
worker’s rights, and electoral self-determination.43 Courts can unilaterally expand 
empowerment rights protections by generating new rights and by expanding the 
application of existing rights to new situations and/or to new groups of people. Courts 
have much more power to determine empowerment rights because these rights are often 
already embedded in existing domestic laws. Hence, courts can expand the application 
and enforcement of these laws through their interpretation of the law and through their 
decisions. The fact that courts already have the power and responsibility to interpret and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
conceptualization includes judicial autonomy, where the decisions of the court are reflective of court 
preferences and decision-making. While this concept of judicial independence includes both external and 
internal pressures, I am mostly concerned with freedom from external pressures, i.e. horizontal 
accountability. As such I do not discuss the independence of lower court judges from superior court judges; 
rather, I am concerned with the degree to which high court judges are independent from pressure exerted 
from other government agencies and bodies. 
43 The definition of empowerment rights is derived from Cingranelli and Richard’s (2010) definitions. Later 
analyses introduce flexibility to the specific rights included in empowerment rights. 
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generate law enable them to enact these expansions legitimately. This institutional 
legitimacy also makes it difficult for executive to challenge the courts. 
Because of this unique role, judicial independence only matters up to a point. Judicial 
independence would be necessary to confront the government should it violate these 
rights, just as with physical integrity rights, but these rights do not always require 
governmental confrontation. For instance, high levels of judicial independence may not 
be necessary in order to resolve cases between private entities. Nonetheless, when a court 
is completely dependent upon a government, the court is not likely to hear rights cases or 
rule in ways that supports or enforces rights. Some degree of judicial independence is 
necessary in order for a court to choose to hear rights cases as well as resolve them in 
rights-affirming ways regardless of whether the government approves of the decisions. 
Hence, judicial independence is necessary in order for a court to play an active role in 
rights protections. Once this level of judicial independence is reached, opening the 
proverbial door for the court, the court does not need its level of independence to 
continue to expand in order to rule progressively.   
Regardless of the type of right, domestic courts can promote human rights through 
increasingly holding violators accountable and expanding rights protections to a larger set 
of situations or contexts for a larger proportion of society. Yet, if courts have the ability 
to promote human rights protections, then why would courts choose to promote these 
rights? Three broad reasons can answer this: 1) judges serving on courts sincerely belief 
promoting rights is morally right or makes good policy and/or are compelled by their 
perceived duty to promote rights, 2) principal-agent hierarchical relationships motivate 
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courts to apply laws congruent with regional courts, and 3) judges seeking to garner 
increased power for the court as an institution strategically choose to promote rights. 
 
Judicial Preferences: Attitudes and Role Conceptions 
The first possible mechanism inducing judges, and the courts they serve, to promote 
human rights laws and protections is that either their attitudes and sincere policy 
preferences are congruent with rights promotion and/or they perceive their duty and role 
as a judge obligates them to promote rights. If judges’ decisions are a “function of what 
they prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to do, but constrained by what 
they perceive is feasible to do,” then the first two choices, representing the attitudinal and 
role theory models, may account for the choice to promote (Gibson 1983). Hence, their 
attitudes encompass what judges prefer to do while role orientations consist of what 
judges think they ought to do.44  
Attitudes congruent with rights promotion may lead judges to choose to promote 
human rights. Like other political actors, judges render decisions based upon their 
personal attitudes, values, and preferences (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 1993; Segal 1997; 
Segal and Cover 1989; Schubert 1965; Pritchett 1954). Hence, this mechanism asserts 
simply that judges promote rights protections because they prefer to. In this scenario, 
judges choose to promote rights because it moves national policy closer to the judge’s 
preferred policy location and/or because promoting rights makes ‘good’ law. 
                                                           
44 What judges think they ought to do also includes legal concerns. For example, a judge may want to apply 
the law a particular way congruent with his or her personal policy preference but the case facts may not 
allow such a decision. While I do not discuss these legal concerns here as I am primarily concerned with 
why judges would choose to promote human rights, I do not seek to imply the lack of consideration of legal 
factors. It is possible that judges choose to promote rights due to case facts, but I include these legal 
concerns within both the attitudinal and role theory models.  
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Role expectations could also interact with, mitigate, or constrain the translation of 
judicial attitudes into behavior. The role expectations consist of the norms of ‘proper’ 
behavior within a particular role or situation (Gibson 1983, 1978). The combination of 
sets of role expectations inherent within an identity or office creates a role orientation of 
the occupant with that identity or within that office. Role orientation is thus “a 
psychological construct which is the combination of the occupant’s perception of the role 
expectations of significant others and his or her own norms and expectations of proper 
behavior of a judge” (Gibson 1978). In essence, the perception of the appropriate 
behavior inherent within an office, position, or identity may influence the behavior and 
attitudes of the occupant. These perceptions include those created by the occupant but 
also by other judges, rights-related or legal epistemic communities,45 and the judicial 
‘audience’ in general (Baum 2006). Norms about judges and judging arising from each of 
these communities influence judicial decision-making through judges’ concerns about 
reputation, popularity, and respect at the individual and institutional levels (Baum 2006; 
Mishler and Sheehan 1996; Miceli and Cosgel 1994). In short, “judges, like other people, 
get satisfaction from perceiving that other people view them positively” (Baum 2006). 
For this reason, judges’ perceptions about themselves as well as perceptions about how 
other people view and respect them influence judicial decision making and the calculus to 
promote rights or not.  
Furthermore, the persistent interactions with these sets of norms across audience 
communities could also socialize the occupant to take on the identity defined by these 
norms perceived within the role of a judge (Glick 1992). Regular exposure to and 
                                                           
45 Epistemic communities are defined as “a network of professional with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992). 
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interactions with the rights-related and legal epistemic communities, including judges, 
lawyers, litigants, and other actors, not only provide normative expectations that inform 
the role orientation of a judge but socializes the judge to alter his or her own identity and 
expectations. Increased and repetitive exposure of legal and role norms can lead to norm 
convergence, where actors that may not have agreed with or shared a normative belief 
eventually converge in their acknowledgment and support of the legal norm. 
Additionally, epistemic communities may provide judges rationale for adopting new 
rights policy solutions as well as make contingent arguments that define policies as “right 
under certain circumstances” (see Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Dobbin and 
Sutton 1998; Glick 1992; Haas 1989; see also DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Hence, 
socialization can change judicial attitudes as well as role orientations. For instance, 
because courts are widely considered the cornerstone of human rights protections, judges 
may promote rights because they believe they should (due to their membership in the 
court) or because they want to. The point at which judges learn and take on the perceived 
role, identity, and obligatory behavior of a ‘judge’ is where role theory converges with 
the attitudinal model. Even judges that may not have sought to promote rights before 
becoming a judge, or even early in their career, may learn and become socialized to these 
norms, thereby changing their attitudes. In this sense, the role orientation no longer 
constrains behavior but redefines the judges’ attitudes and preferences.  
It is important to recognize that role orientations do not necessarily constrain attitudes 
since they may reinforce existing attitudes or redefine attitudes all together. As such, both 
mechanisms may influence judges to choose to promote human rights laws that are 
consistent with international laws. Judges may promote rights because they prefer to, 
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because they think they ought to, or because they have learned to want to. Indeed, Walker 
(2012) finds that the “pressures that judges feel to advance human rights are generally 
self-imposed [where] [t]hese social elites view human rights as fundamental rights.”46 
Hence, attitudes and expectations may determine the degree to which judges choose to 
promote rights. 
 
Principal-Agent Motivations  
Secondly, principal-agent hierarchical relationships motivate courts to apply laws 
congruent with regional courts.47 These relationships denote the superior court as the 
principal and lowers as the, presumably, faithful agents of the superior court. In general, 
this hierarchical relationship appears strong in American federal courts, where circuit 
courts faithfully comply with Supreme Court precedent and changes in jurisprudence 
with little to no agency loss due to lower court ideological preferences (Westerland et al. 
                                                           
46 Furthermore, often judges’ activities promoting rights “are relatively unobserved by both domestic and 
international actors.” Walker’s (2012) description of his findings in Central American courts continues to 
argue that, while the judges themselves may advance human rights, citizens also attempt to advance these 
human rights through the legislative arena. Yet, he similarly argues, the courts still play an important role 
as the center of “administration and enforcement of the legislative provision” (Walker 2012). 
 
47 At this point I do not distinguish between decision congruence where cases are decided similarly due to 
case facts versus responsiveness where lower courts respond to changes in principal court policy or 
decision changes (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994). This distinction, while important, tends to become 
problematic since these concepts converge in terms of regional court- high court hierarchical relationships 
within the human rights issue area. Supranational court human rights decisions infrequently change in any 
meaningful way due to the nature of the cases and rights violations. Even when court membership changes 
or institutional and political contexts shift, supranational courts tend to remain consistent in their 
application of human rights law. Hence, there is little opportunity to evaluate responsiveness in this 
manner. Domestic high courts, on the other hand, more frequently alter their decisions and policies, 
especially after changes in judge membership and political contexts. Responsiveness is thus more important 
and more easily identified for evaluation within the domestic judicial context. Hence, the evaluations in this 
dissertation deal primarily with congruence, while only partially accounting for responsiveness in terms of 
changes in domestic legal systems and court activity after regional court decisions. (In other words, 
responsiveness is only included to the extent that domestic legal changes occur after the presence of a 
regional court decision. The ‘response’ in this scenario is triggered by the presence of a supranational court 
decisions rather than changes in supranational court jurisprudence.) 
 
 41
2010; Songer, Segal, Cameron 1994; Songer and Sheehan 1990; Songer 1987).48 
Similarly, Randazzo (2008) and Baum (1980) find that superior appellate courts also 
constrain lower federal district courts in the United States.49  
There are four motivations where this hierarchical relationship will induce the 
incorporation or adoption of international law: a) fear of reversal due to corresponding 
reduction of personal recognition, respect, and/or reputation, b) fear of reversal due to the 
impeded inability to shape policy, c) advancing career and fear of reducing ability to 
advance, and d) compliance as a good in and of itself due to role conceptions, respect for 
authority, and desire to produce legally accurate and consistent decisions (Klein and 
Hume 2003).  
In terms of the first two motivations, fear of reversal can be caused by personal 
reputation motivations or policy-making motivations. For example, a national high court 
may comply with a regional court and international law in order to avoid international 
shaming and reprimand, thus incurring reputational costs. National high court judges 
could similarly comply in order to maintain their ability to influence and determine 
policy; if the court does not comply and its decision reversed, then the court has lost its 
ability to determine policy in that area.  
                                                           
48 Both find that the lower courts generally serve as faithful agents, although Westerland et al. (2010) find 
that lower court ideology does not influence its behavior while Songer, Segal, and Cameron (1994) finds 
that some room remains for agency loss due to lower court pursuing their own ideological preferences. 
 
49 Baum’s (1980) results are more similar to Songer, Segal, and Cameron (1994) rather than Westerland et 
al. (2010)—albeit perhaps less optimistic—in that superior courts “exert significant influence over the 
decisions of their subordinates” but that they do not completely determine lower court behavior or 
determine lower court behavior in “any absolute sense.” Hence, superior court influence, he argues, is one 
of several factors that determine lower court behavior and it may explain less than other factors not 
included in his analyses (such as judge preferences). 
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While fear of decision reversal is possible, however, national high court decisions are 
rarely considered by a regional court and therefore unlikely to be reversed. Hence, the 
likelihood of this event is so low that such a motivation is unlikely. This intuition is 
similarly addressed in American judicial scholarship where lower court fear of reversal is 
unlikely due to the fact that the Supreme Court hears only a tiny percentage of cases, 
rendering the likelihood that the Supreme Court will hear a case and reverse it extremely 
unlikely (Klein and Hume 2003).50 Indeed, Klein and Hume (2003) find that this 
motivation does not appear to explain lower court compliance51 to U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions. Thus, it seems that this motivation, while possible, is not particularly 
persuasive. It is even more unlikely to serve as a motivation since the regional court 
examined here, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, does not serve as an 
appellate court to national high courts as declared through its ‘fourth instance’ rule 
(Harris 2004, 12). 
The third motivation deals with judges’ career ambitions where compliance is 
motivated either by the desire to advance one’s career or by the fear of reducing one’s 
ability to advance. These motivations depend both on individual ambitions and the 
institutional structure of the judiciary. Put simply, national high court judges could 
strategically comply with regional court decisions and international law more generally 
                                                           
50 Note that this argument applies only terms of lower courts and the American Supreme Court. 
Hierarchical relationships between appellate and district courts may experience these motivations since 
there is a much greater likelihood that lower court decisions will be evaluated by the superior. Evidence 
exists suggesting that a stigma is attached to a judge’s reversal rate (Baum 1978; Caminker 1994), and 
Randazo (2008) finds that the anticipation or fear of negative responses by courts of appeal is the 
constraining force on U.S. federal district courts, inducing these lower courts to curtail their ideological 
influence (Randazzo 2008). However, this constraint applies to civil liberties and economic cases but not to 
criminal cases (Randazzo 2008). 
 
51 Compliance is defined here as the faithful application of existing higher court precedent and deciding 
cases as the higher court would be expected to (Klein and Hume 2003). 
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because it serves their personal career ambitions. For example, noncompliance could 
reduce a judge’s ability to advance his or her career due to the reputation of rights 
negligence or violation or due to ignoring existing legal standards. Alternatively, 
compliance where a judge rules against the state may reduce the judge’s ability to 
advance a career in politics within that home state. While these motivations are 
important, it is unclear the extent to which they occur at the institutional level. In other 
words, while an individual judge may behave according to these motivations, it is 
unlikely that this behavior would be observable or meaningful at the institutional level. 
Because courts consist of multiple judges with likely diverse career ambitions, it seems 
unlikely that as a whole these behaviors would influence court jurisprudence. 52 
The fourth motivation suggests compliance may occur simply because the national 
high courts view compliance as a good in and of itself that is desirable or beneficial. 
Judges may view their authority and position within a framework that dictates that they 
should comply in order to assure legal accuracy and consistency or to respect authority 
and the hierarchical legal structure.53 
 
 
                                                           
52 Looking specifically at the regional-national high courts hierarchical relationship, the IACHR is a part-
time body consisting of seven judges who serve six-year terms and are nominated by Convention parties 
and elected by the General OAS Assembly. While they all have legal backgrounds, few have ever served as 
a judge in their home state. The majority of judges were previously academics or had previous experience 
in diplomacy and politics (Harris 2004, 23). Hence, it seems unlikely that national high court judges are 
motivated to seek career advancement to the IACHR specifically. Obviously, this does not preclude career 
motivations in general since there are other judicial, political, and non-political careers that judges may 
seek. 
 
53 Yet the application of traditional principal-agent model to supranational and national court relationship 
may be problematic. Stone Sweet (2000) argues that this framework does not work well for European 
Union relationships since there is no clear hierarchy and the degree of oversight remains unclear. 




Empowerment of Court 
The final, third explanation for why courts may choose to incorporate international 
law and promote human rights consists of institutional motivations where judges seek to 
empower the court as an institution and seek to avoid reductions in judicial power.54 As 
such, judges are concerned with expanding public support and increasing legitimacy, 
which empowers the court, making it more capable and effective at constraining state 
behavior. Alternatively, they are also concerned with avoiding behavior that would 
delegitimize the court, reduce public support, and thereby weaken the court, making it 
vulnerable to institutional dependency, government attacks, and ignored decisions. In 
these cases, these concerns would predict that a court would prefer to appear as an 
impartial arbiter that is independent of political interests. This would lead to the 
incorporation of international human rights laws and compliance with regional court 
decisions since compliance signals the court’s impartiality, independence from state 
government influence, legal accuracy and consistency, and its advocacy of the public. In 
general, pro-human rights decisions consistent with international law would increase 
public support of the court, thereby empowering the court as an institution.55 Expanding 
human rights protections can improve court standing in the eyes of the public, which may 
increase the degree of (diffuse) public legitimacy the court enjoys. Increased legitimacy 
                                                           
54 This mechanism could be categorized another principal-agent motivation. 
 
55 Due process rights in particular may not lead to increased public support and legitimacy. While 
international human rights laws seek to protect criminal rights and trial rights, these laws can be extremely 
unpopular. The reason is that in some cases, the protection of due process rights leads to the perception that 
criminals are benefitting from international law rather than the victims of crimes. For instance, a convicted 
foreign national convicted of drug crimes and murder who is later released to the home country rather than 
serving his or her sentence would lead to public outcry and backlash since in this case international law’s 
protection of due process rights appears to benefit the convicted criminal rather than the victims of his or 
her crimes.  
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can translate into greater judicial power or effectiveness since improved public support 
for a court makes executive challenges to court decisions more costly politically. 
While this dissertation does not distinguish between these possible motivations for 
expanding human rights, these reasons make it plausible that courts might want to expand 
human rights if they are able to. Two main outcomes should appear if courts are deciding 
to promote human rights. First, courts with discretionary dockets should increase the 
proportion of rights cases within those dockets. Increases in human rights cases imply 
increased court attention to rights issues and the desire of the court to rule on these issues. 
Secondly, promoting courts should increase pro-individual (i.e. pro-rights protection) 
decisions. Increased attention to rights issues is insufficient for rights protections and 
expansion; courts must decide cases in a way that promotes human rights protections in 
order to support these arguments. 
Promoting courts, however, often must face possible repercussions for their decision 
to promote human rights—especially in non-democracies or transitioning countries. 
Often these decisions limit government behavior, which may lead to an executive 
choosing to ignore the court decision, thereby not enforcing it, and/or the government 
punishing the court through the removal or suspension of jurisdiction, impeachment or 
member removal, court packing, court dissolution, reduction of salary and funding, 
threats of harm, and so on. Hence, courts have incentives to behave strategically when 
incorporating international laws when the government may not be supportive. Namely, 
courts are unlikely to promote international law institutionalization if they believe that 
they will face significant punishment costs.  
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This intuition finds anecdotal evidence and mixed empirical support in even liberal 
democracies as illustrated in separation of powers models for the United States Supreme 
Court, legislative, and executive branches.  Take, for instance, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
court packing plan, which altered United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. More 
systematically, the Supreme Court typically defers to Congress when it is hostile toward 
the Court and lacks public support (Clark 2009) and avoids striking down laws when it is 
ideologically distant from Congress (Segal, Westerland, and Lindquist 2011). 56 Supreme 
Court judges may also switch their votes to align themselves to congressional 
preferences, although in a limited number of situations (Hansford and Damore 2000). 
Similar strategic court behavior determines the degree to which the Supreme Court defers 
to executive; for instance, the Supreme Court is more likely to defer to strongly backed, 
                                                           
56 Although Segal (1997) finds that the Supreme Court ”overwhelmingly” votes sincerely based upon their 
ideological preferences rather than engaging in sophisticated or strategic voting. More extremely, Sala and 
Spriggs (2004) reject separation of powers considerations outright. Yet, Bergara, Richman, and Spiller 
(2003) argue that Segal’s (1997) results are biases from economic issues, which, once correctly modeled, 
produce more support for separation of power constraints on the court. Zorn and Bowie (2010) similarly 
find support that ideological preference voting increases as one moves up the American judicial hierarchy. 
This postulate and corresponding evidence suggests that lower courts become increasingly constrained as 
one moves down the hierarchy (although these constraints include differing goals and ability to move 
policy). The influence of judicial hierarchy is further compounded by the interaction of hierarchical and 
collegial politics at lower court level, thereby increasing Supreme Court control (Kastellac 2011). Lax 
(2012) however also shows that this hierarchical structure informs Supreme Court decision-making and 
choice of doctrine, which enables it to strategically establish doctrines that allow or preclude strategic 
noncompliance by lower courts. This implies that lower courts are strategically constrained by its superiors. 
Thus, the degree to which the United States Supreme Court is constrained by their anticipation of 
legislative and executive response or reaction retains mixed support. 
Even the likelihood of congressional override and congressional attention received mixed 
conclusions. While much of the research assumes relative infrequency of congressional attention and 
override, Eskridge (1991) finds that from 1975 to 1990, each Congress has overridden on average twelve 
Supreme Court statutory decisions and half of the Court’s statutory decision “have been or will be the 
specific focus of congressional hearings. 
 Scholarship has also examined the incidence and causes of Congressional overrides. In particular, 
case-specific factors, electoral consideration of public opinion, age of the statute, ideological fragmentation 
of the Court, Court ignoring legislative signals and government positions all play a role in predicting 
Congressional override within the United States (Hettinger and Zorn 2005; Ignagni and Meernik 1994; 
Eskridge 1991).  
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popular executives and in cases involving foreign policy and military affairs (Yates and 
Whitford 1998).  
Outside of the United States, these separation of power dynamics also emerge. For 
example, Vanberg (1999) finds that Germany’s constitutional court is constrained in 
similar ways as the United States in that it must be attentive to the preferences of the 
governing majority since the ability of the court to advance goals depends upon their 
cooperation. Russia found significant constraints in its inability to induce government 
compliance with and enforcement of its decisions—even if it had congressional backing 
(Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2001). Cooter and Ginsburg (1996) similarly imply that 
legislatures constrain courts in their likelihood of override or repeal when they find that 
courts become much more activist when this likelihood decreases in a variety of countries 
(like the United States, United Kingdom, Israel, Japan, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Ireland, 
Germany, Sweden, Spain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Australia, and Luxembourg).  
Moving beyond established democracies, these constraints and negative 
governmental responses become increasingly severe. Between 1985 and 2008, Latin 
American judiciaries, for example, experienced increasingly frequent attacks by the 
government. In the late 1980s, these courts saw five attacks, which grew to fourteen in 
the early 1990s; since 1995, the average number of states sits at eleven every five years 
(Helmke and Staton 2011, 309). Most typically, these states experience threats of 
impeachment and purging most frequently, although individual level and institutional 
level attacks are roughly equal (Helmke and Staton 2011, 311; Helmke 2010). Ecuador, 
Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru experience the most frequent attacks on their 
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courts (Helmke and Staton 2011, 309). Peru, for example, ruled against the government, 
who then responded by ignoring the decision and firing the judges involved (Finkel 
2008). The courts of Argentina and Nicaragua have further experienced government 
attacks on their independence (Helmke 2010). Indeed, most countries in Latin America 
have either multiple attacks or none (Helmke and Staton 2011, 309). More troubling is 
that these attacks have become increasingly successful over the last decade. Where these 
attacks saw a 40% success rate between 1995-1999, the rate jumped to 57% in the 2000-
2005 and 83% from 2005-2008 (Helmke and Staton 2011, 309). Over this time frame, the 
courts’ experiences of institutional attacks remain relatively constant while individual 
level attacks have somewhat diminished. This credible, and frequent, threat of attack on 
the courts alters court behavior. For example, Argentine judiciary behaves strategically 
based upon the anticipated responses of the government that constrains it (Iaryczower, 
Spiller, and Tommasi 2002). 
Similar intuitions are evaluated in the international law literature where supranational 
courts must face possible repercussion from member-states. The combination of 
voluntary membership and absence of enforcement mechanisms has led some scholars to 
believe that these institutions must behave strategically in order to survive and remain 
independent.57 Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla (2008), for instance, find that the ECJ is 
                                                           
57 These are obviously the same arguments that the same scholars typically use to argue that institutions are 
ineffective and epiphenomenal. The main difference between these international courts versus domestic 
courts is the assumption of threat severity. In essence, because the international system is assumed to be 
anarchical while domestic politics are hierarchical, threats to supranational courts and threats of 
noncompliance are more severe than they would be for similar situations domestically. To put it plainly, 
this assumption implies that these threats are insurmountable in the international system and less 
problematic in domestic political contexts. As mentioned previously, I reject this assumption and implicitly 
argue that both international and domestic courts face similar pressures, institutional threats, and threats of 
noncompliance (see Staton and Moore 2011 for similar arguments). Moreover, these institutions may have 
similar solutions to these threats. 
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sensitive to member-states’ threats of noncompliance and threats of override, therefore 
behaving strategically in their decisions applying international law (see also Garrett and 
Weingast 1993).58 Keleman (2001) finds similar political constraints on the ECJ and 
GATT/WTO adjudication. Posner (2004) argues that the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) has declined due its continually bowing to member-states pressures and thus not 
applying the law impartially. 
Hence, even when courts seek to promote rights and international law, they are 
constrained by domestic political factors. However, these constraints can vary in 
intensity, likelihood, and avoidability. Institutional rules and judicial independence 
insulate these promoting courts to some degree from at least the most severe sanctions 
and determine the likelihood and costs of sanctioning in the first place. The degree of 
legitimacy and public support further induce ex post costs on a government that sanctions 
or attacks the court. Hence, it is unclear the extent to which and under what conditions 
courts seeking to incorporate international law in the face of constraints can do so 
effectively.  
Separation of powers scholarship offers four main factors that can determine court 
success or failure in this context: judicial independence, court legitimacy (referring to its 
public support), domestic political competition, and government fragmentation. In 
essence, court legitimacy and domestic political competition make government 
sanctioning of the court more costly (ex post) because the government would some of its 
political support which may lead to its loss of power should it get ousted by an opposing 
party. Additionally, the presence of domestic political competition, or opposition parties, 
                                                           
58 Stone Sweet and Brunell (2012) contest these results who assert that, even using the same data, the treat 
of override is not credible. 
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makes the loss of public support more costly in and of itself since they can mobilize 
citizens to response to the government action, which could lead to protests, rioting, and 
political instability (as well as regime change). Judicial independence and government 
fragmentation refer mainly to ex ante costs of sanctioning where judicial independence 
makes it more costly and less likely that the government can successfully sanction the 
court and where governments that are highly fragmented or fractionalized suffer from 
severe collective action problems in coordinating action among a large set of veto players 
with diverse preferences. In essence, these factors increase transaction costs for 
sanctioning. Yet, few studies—none to my knowledge—examine these factors together. 
It is therefore unclear how to prioritize these factors and determine which are necessary 
or sufficient for successful court incorporation of international human rights laws. 
These intuitions are evaluated in Chapter 3, which addresses the question: under 
what conditions do courts promote human rights, thereby incorporating international 
human rights law? Using original and secondary data from Latin America, Chapter 3 
evaluates the differing influence of judicial independence on physical integrity rights 
protections and empowerment rights protections and provides preliminary qualitative 
evidence of trends in national high court activism incorporating international human 
rights laws. I find that several Latin American high courts are effectively and unilaterally 
incorporating international human rights laws into their domestic legal systems. Finally, 
the chapter offers a game theoretic model that identifies the conditions under which a 




2.2 Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) and Human Rights Law 
Incorporation 
 
 One of the tensions generated by the simultaneous presence of domestic courts 
and regional courts is whether these institutions and their jurisprudence compete with or 
compliment each other. This dissertation argues that regional courts matter in the 
incorporation of human rights laws and that, while some competition is inherent,59 they 
primarily serve as a complement to domestic judiciaries. Just as domestic courts can 
provide enforcement to regional court decisions, regional courts can legitimize domestic 
jurisprudence, potentially serving as an enforcement mechanism to deter government 
attack by making negative government reactions more costly (ex post). In essence, the 
congruence of regional court decisions with domestic jurisprudence lends legitimacy to 
domestic courts that bolsters public support. These perceptions of legitimacy may be due 
to the policy or case outcomes themselves, the regional court’s independent and impartial 
                                                           
59 Competition is triggered when the policy preferences between these courts diverge. In other words, the 
greater the ideological distance between the regional court and domestic court, the more these institutions 
compete over policy. In terms of human rights policies, this occurs when the domestic court is more 
conservative (less receptive to human rights) than the regional court. 
Benvenisti (2008), however, makes an intriguing argument implying the unavoidable competition 
between international law and domestic law. He asserts that national high courts strategically cite and 
incorporate foreign and international law as a response to perceived threats to court power. In this scenario, 
democratic national courts only incorporate international law when they perceive external threats to the 
domestic democratic process and national sovereignty, which inherently threaten court power and 
independence. The intuition is that self-interested courts seek to protect their judicial power in the face of 
ever growing global regulations that increasing leaves national courts with dwindling opportunities to 
regulate and restrain domestic political institutions. Hence national courts use international law in order to 
regain national sovereignty and “empower domestic democratic processes by shielding them from external 
economic, political, and even legal pressures,” in order to regain their lost power or avoid losing their 
power to regulate domestic institutions. Incorporation, then, occurs not from deference to international law 
or norms but from the attempt to reclaim national sovereignty within a prisoner’s dilemma framework. 
Most simply, incorporation of international law is the strategy pursued by national courts who seek allies 
with whom to cooperate to maintain the balance of power between the court and government under 
perceived times of threat. Benvenisti (2008) asserts that this explains why high courts within democracies 
to not regularly incorporate or cite international law as they only do so when under threat. Furthermore, he 
argues that this similarly explains why national courts in non-democracies, which continually face these 
external economic, political, and legal pressures arising from globalization, are “frantically clinging” to 
international law.  
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procedures, legal accuracy, or independence from domestic political influences that 
contaminate domestic legal procedures.  
Secondly, regional courts can also help translate and apply international human 
rights laws within its particular region with unique cultural contexts. Regional court 
interpretation and application of the law readies the law to become incorporated 
domestically by clarifying the conditions under which it applies and how it should be 
implemented. For example, because Kosovo did not receive instructions on how to assess 
the compatibility of existing national laws with international human rights, judges were 
left with the task to interpret compatibility (Sannerholm 2012). Judges were thus faced 
with the arduous task of interpreting national laws (especially criminal codes) in light of 
international human rights law as well as other regulations from Yugoslav laws and the 
law promoted by the international organization working with Kosovo (namely, UN, EU, 
and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). This led to the de facto 
rewriting of previous laws. Judges could request clarifications from the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSC) on matters of implementation, but the 
binding status of such clarifications remained unclear (Sannerholm 2012). The lack of 
instruction combined with the undetermined legal framework that would be reinstated 
(and the legal exceptions that led to the application of the non-reinstated framework) led 
to legal chaos (Sannerholm 2012). Hence, domestic courts may need instruction on how 
to implement international human rights laws domestically or instruction as to the correct 
interpretation of these laws.  
Similarly, regional courts can provide information and create a focal point that 
identifies the shortcomings of the domestic legal system that can instigate legal reform 
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and mobilization. Because these courts often identify specific domestic laws that are 
inconsistent with international human rights law, they attract attention to that 
inconsistency and facilitate mobilization for legal reform. 
Finally, regional courts serve as members of the same legal and human rights 
epistemic communities and transnational advocacy network. Indeed, international legal 
institutions are the “primary vehicles for stating community norms and for collective 
legitimation” (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, 8). Shared membership within these same 
communities with similar socialized norms, values, role orientations, and goals help 
conform domestic and regional preferences, thereby enabling preference convergence. 
These social pressures can lead to convergence in both strictly legal procedural issues and 
human rights issues (as well as their interaction). Moreover, the ECJ and European 
national courts are members within the same “community” of courts where each court is 
a check on the other, each asserting their respective claims in a process of dialogue 
through incremental decisions signaling opposition or cooperation (Slaughter 2000).60 
Hence, this “dialogue of constitutionalism” enables socialization and domestic 
incorporation (Slaughter 2000). Furthermore, the ECJ is cited by national courts outside 
of Europe where is has no authority, such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the British 
Privy Council sitting as the Constitutional Court of Jamaica (Slaughter 2000), and its 
interpretative procedures and reasoning have often similarly been accepted by the 
IACHR and United Nation Human Rights Committee. This type of diffuse socialization 
                                                           
60 Not all European national courts treat the ECJ as a superior however. Germany’s Constitutional Court is 
the most vocal about it peer status with the ECJ, and Italy and Belgium have made similar claims 
(Slaughter 2000; see also Stone Sweet 2000). 
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and influence that leads to incorporation is consistent with shared membership within 
legal and rights-related epistemic communities.61 
Hence, regional courts are influential in that they participate in the “transnational 
legal process” consisting of the courts interacting with domestic legal systems and 
transnational epistemic communities, helping interpret international legal norms and their 
application, and enabling, pressuring, or socializing domestic internalization (see Koh 
1996). I know turn to a brief background of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
and its institutional mechanisms for inducing compliance and rights incorporation. 
 
Background of the IACHR 
 The Inter-American System of Human Rights, consisting of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights and the Commission on Human Rights, is derived from the 
overlapping regional agreements of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man (1948) and the American Convention on Human Rights (1969). The main function 
of the Court and Commission is to oversee compliance with the American Convention on 
Human Rights. 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is a permanent, part-time 
body headquartered in Washington, D.C., where it meets in regular and special sessions 
several times a year. The Commission consists of seven members, or commissioner, who 
are elected by the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly for four-
year terms. Elected commissioners have the possibility of re-election on one occasion, for 
a maximum period in office of eight years. They serve in a personal capacity and are not 
                                                           
61 These pressures similarly explain the decision o ratify international agreements (Wotipka and Tsutsui 
2008). 
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considered to represent their countries of origin but rather they represent "all the member 
countries of the Organization" (Art. 35 of the Convention). No two nationals of the same 
member state may be commissioners simultaneously, and commissioners are required to 
refrain from participating in the discussion of cases involving their home countries.  
The Commission is responsible for monitoring human rights situations within the 
hemisphere and, when necessary, publish country-specific reports. The Commission also 
conducts on-site visits to states to investigate a particular case or to more generally 
monitor general rights situations. It further holds conferences and seminars to encourage 
rights awareness, issues recommendations to member-states that would further right 
protection, issues precautionary measure requests to states in order to avoid serious harm 
in urgent cases, receives and investigates individual petitions alleging rights violations, 
and refers cases to the Court.  
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is a part-time institution composed of 
seven independent judges, headquartered in San José, Costa Rica. Judges are nominated 
by OAS member states and elected by the OAS General Assembly, and they serve six-
year terms with one possible reelection for another six-year term. All judges have legal 
backgrounds although only a limited number ever served as a judge in the home country. 
Most judges have been academics or have experience in diplomacy and politics (Harris 
2004). No member-state may have more than one representative judge serving on the 
Court at any time, although, unlike the Commission, judges are not required to recuse 
themselves from cases involving their home country. If a member-state is party to a case 
as a defendant and does not have a representative judge on the Court, the state is entitled 
to appoint an ad hoc judge to the Court for the case. 
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The IACHR serves two purposes: adjudicating contentious cases and issuing 
advisory opinions. States must be parties to the Convention and voluntarily submit to the 
IACHR’s jurisdiction for the Court to be competent to hear cases involving that state. 
States have the option of granting blanket compulsory jurisdiction or submitting for an 
individual case. Most of the region has granted blanket compulsory jurisdiction to the 
Court, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
Contentious cases can be referred to the Court by a state party or by the 
Commission. Unlike the European system, individual citizens are not allowed to take 
cases directly to the Court; however, individuals who believe their rights were violated 
submit a complaint to the Commission who will determine the admissibility of the claim. 
If the state is found at fault, then the Commission will serve the state a list of 
recommendations to make amends for the violation. If the state ignores the 
recommendations and/or if the case is particularly important then the Commission will 
refer the case to the IACHR. Hence, the IACHR serves as a measure of last resort in that 
it takes a case only after the failure of resolving the matter in a noncontentious way and 
after the exhaustion of domestic legal remedies. 
The right to lodge a complaint to the Commission applies to any person, group of 
people, or any non-governmental entity legally recognized in one or more OAS member-
states. In the majority of the cases submitted to the Commission, the applicant is typically 
the victim, family member of the victim, or representative of the victim (usually a lawyer 
from a nongovernmental human rights organization). The complaint or petition must be 
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in writing, include the name and signature of the petitioner (and legal representative), 
identify the act of violation, specify the location, date, and time of the alleged violation, 
as well as the identities of the perpetrators whenever possible. The petition must allege 
that a member-state or state agent is responsible by its action or inaction. The petitioner 
must also include whether the petitioner has attempted to exhaust domestic remedies and 
what the outcomes of these attempts have been. The failure to include certain information 
is not fatal to the petition, and the Commission will request the petitioner supply 
whatever further information is required. 
 As with other civil law legal systems, the IACHR does not include a rule of 
binding precedent, although both the Court and Commission generally refer to their 
earlier decisions, and the Commission follows the jurisprudence of the Court on both 
interpretation and its enforcement procedures. The Court requires a quorum of five 
judges, and its decisions are final and not subject to appeal, although judges may submit 
dissenting opinions. 
 
IACHR Institutional Mechanisms of Influence and Compliance 
 Unlike the European Court of Justice, the IACHR originally had no formal 
monitoring mechanism to identify compliance or noncompliance. However, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights now has several institutional mechanisms designed to 
induce compliance. In particular, the IACHR utilizes its publication of compliance 
reports and conventionality control, described below. 
In 1996, the IACHR took it upon itself to issue yearly compliance reports that 
monitor state compliance.  These compliance reports are based upon reports from 
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victims, from the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, and from the state. The 
IACHR can also request a private hearing in addition to these submitted reports. Based 
upon these reports identifying and evaluating state compliance to the specific reparations 
required by the IACHR judgment, the IACHR writes and publishes a compliance report 
summarizing these arguments and its evaluation of compliance and noncompliance with 
regard to each reparation order.62 
State parties challenged this practice in 2003, leading the IACHR to assert that the 
American Convention implicitly granted these procedures. The Court reasoned that 
although the practice is not explicitly authorized by the Convention, “the effectiveness of 
the judgments depends on compliance with them.”63 The IACHR has published 
compliance records since 1996 for each case pending compliance on a yearly basis. 
In addition to compliance reports, the IACHR has recently devised a new tool of 
“conventionality compliance” that essentially grants judicial review powers to national 
courts in that it compels national judges to uphold the American Convention on Human 
Rights and IACHR case law. In effect, this tool compels national judiciaries to review 
legislation under the parameters of the Convention as interpreted by the IACHR. 
Conventionality control was created with the context of Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile 
(2006)64 where the domestic courts did not nullify or set aside the legislation the IACHR 
                                                           
62 IACHR judgments of reparations determine the outcome of the case as well as the specific reparations 
the state must enact in order to remedy the violation. These reparations can include payment of damages, 
erecting monuments and plaques, creating scholarship funds, accepting responsibility for rights violations, 
delivering victim remains, establishing human rights training courses for the police or military, mental 
health support, the publication of the IACHR judgment, and domestic legal reform. Hence these 
compliance reports record when partial and full compliance occurs for each of these reparation orders. 
 
63 Baena Ricardo et al. Case (Panama) (2003), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 104, at para. 129, Annual 
Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 2003, OEA/Ser.L/V/III.61/Doc. 1 (2004). 
 
64 Almonacid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Judgment of 26 September 2006, Series C No. 154.  
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argued was contrary to the human rights protections granted in the American Convention 
(Candia 2012). The declaration of ineffectiveness is design to ensure consistency between 
domestic and international law. The framework of this tool allows for the IACHR and 
national courts to exercise control.65 
In a sense, conventionality control refers to judicial supervision of national 
legislation in general as well as declarations of ineffectiveness and declarations of 
nonconformity. The IACHR typically evaluates conventionality based upon the 
Convention, although it has recently expanded to other treaties and conventions (Castan 
2013). Conventionality control only enables the IACHR to rule on domestic legislation’s 
consistency with international law and state liability for failing to fulfill its obligations 
under the Convention. The Court cannot become a court of fourth instance.66  
In terms of conventionality control as exercised by national judiciaries, these 
courts should evaluate and declare inconsistency in domestic laws and norms and act 
according to their competencies and procedures to “disapply” the violating law (Castan 
2013). Conventionality control obliges domestic judges to disregard laws that fail to 
conform to the Convention when articulating their arguments in a human rights case. 
Hence, conventionality control is designed to expand domestic (legal) human rights 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
65 The Court uses the term ‘conventionality control’ to refer only to national court control while Latin 
American scholars use the term to address IACHR control as well (Castan 2013). 
 
66
 One should also note that conventionality control measures occur at the merits stage while reparation 
requirements of domestic legal reform occur at the reparations stage. This suggests a conceptual distinction 
between the two; reparations requiring legal reform are designed to remedy the violations while 
conventionality control with its declarations of ineffectiveness and inconsistency are obligations the state 
committed to through the Convention (Castan 2013). The IACHR explains in Garrido and Baigorria v. 
Argentina (Judgment on reparations of 27 August 1998, Series C No. 39, para. 72), that the “obligation to 
guarantee and ensure effective exercise is independent and different from the obligation to make 
reparation.” A reparation is “an attempt to erase the consequences that the unlawful act may have had for 
the affected person” and others; as such, the affected party retains the right to waive that right to reparation. 
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protections by inducing judges to decide case according to what is established in the 
Convention as interpreted by the IACHR. 
Conventionality control has been applauded by some for the superiority of 
international human rights law, compelling state compliance, and expanding rights 
protections at local levels—without having to go through the national legal process (the 
first, second, and third instances) until the victim can reach the IACHR. However, not 
only did its creation draw criticism from states whose judiciaries essentially received 
judicial review powers but also from scholars, who criticized the same aspects that 
received applause. In particular, these criticisms largely center on that fact that 
conventionality control removed domestic democratic processes and violates state 
sovereignty, unilaterally and undemocratically rendered domestic judiciaries supreme, 
and created public policy problems (see, for instance, Candia 2012). 
Yet, despite these mechanisms that suggest regional courts are (or can be) 
influential and important in incorporation, empirical evidence of compliance and 
international law incorporation have been—at best—mixed. Posner and Yoo (2005) 
argue that the IACHR has had “trouble securing compliance with its decisions,” apparent 
in the single case of full compliance and 5% overall compliance (including full and 
partial compliance). Hawkins and Jacoby (2010) provide a more comprehensive, yet 
descriptive, analysis of the IACHR finding that, in general, it secures 50% partial 
compliance and 6% full compliance. More importantly, however this is the first study 
that evaluates regional court influence on incorporation where they identify compliance 
with the IACHR order to reform domestic laws. Compliance to these orders occurs 7% of 
the time—which is the lowest compliance rate relative to other reparation requirements. 
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According to the Court itself, however, it secures, in general, an 18% full compliance rate 
and 62% partial compliance rate (reported in the 2014 Annual Report by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights).67 It does not, however, report individual 
reparation compliance. 
General compliance rates, however, can only provide indirect evidence that the 
IACHR, and regional courts more generally, influence the incorporation of international 
human rights laws domestically. Some of the reparations in which determine compliance 
rates are not likely representative of incorporation. For example, the return of victim 
remains, the erecting of a plaque or monument, or the creation of a scholarship does not 
alter domestic legal systems or identities. Some reparation may lead to incorporation but 
do not necessitate incorporation of international legal norms. For example, human rights 
training programs help disseminate information about rights protections and violations, 
which could instigate socialization to these norms domestically. The expunging of victim 
criminal records may set an informal legal standard upon which future judges refer. The 
only direct way to gauge incorporation that generates lasting change that influences the 
identity of the states and the interactions among all its citizens are changes in domestic 
laws themselves. Hence the only reparation demanded by the IACHR that directly 
produces these effects are when it demands that domestic laws are amended, repealed, or 
established. Hence, in order to most directly evaluate the influence of the IACHR on 
domestic incorporation of international human rights laws is to examine the extent to 
which states are altering their domestic legal systems, thereby complying with IACHR 
orders. 





Merging International Law and International Relations to Explain Compliance 
Additionally, while compliance rates serve as useful indicators (with important 
implications), they do not explain why or under what conditions compliance occurs. 
Compliance rates, in other words, offer no causal mechanisms or explanations for when 
compliance occurs or why it occurs at all. Fortunately, existing scholarship offers several 
theoretical mechanisms that may cause the incorporation of international human rights 
law and compliance; these mechanisms can be broadly summarized through categories of 
causal factors: domestic political costs and incentives, domestic legal system and the rule 
of law, regional ‘peer pressure,’ transnational advocacy network and mobilization, and 
entrenchment within the international human rights regime.  
 
Domestic Political Incentives 
The first mechanism broadly asserts that compliance occurs because of a cost-
benefit analysis by the state and court. While noncompliance is formally costless in that it 
does not induce ‘hard’ sanctions, compliance may be beneficial and/or noncompliance 
could be costly. In this scenario, the IACHR can induce or predict compliance based 
upon changes or conditions within the state. In terms of domestic political factors that 
make noncompliance costly, most theories postulate that these factors consist of the 
following: the ease with which political actors can alter policy (due to the number of veto 
player and level of government fractionalization), domestic political competition and the 
presence of opposition parties, state capacity, foreign aid, foreign direct investment, and 
regime type. 
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The ease with which political actors can alter domestic laws likely informs state 
decisions to comply. States where there are few constraints or veto points in changing the 
law per IACHR request are more likely to be able to comply than states where legal 
policy change is difficult and heavily constrained. In essence, the greater the number of 
veto players and the greater their ideological distance, the higher the transaction costs to 
comply. As change in laws require more political actors with veto power, the more 
difficult collective action agreements become. Similarly, as government fractionalization 
or the more divided political actors’ preference become, the higher the transaction costs 
and less likely legal reform is possible.  
Domestic electoral or political pressure on the incumbent should similarly inform 
decisions to comply. When political competition is intense, the higher the likelihood that 
the decision to not comply will lead to ex post costs since the political opposition has 
incentives to mobilize the opposition. In other words, when political competition is 
intense, opposition parties are likely seeking to mobilize their supporters and gain new 
support. If an incumbent makes a ‘bad,’ unfavorable, questionable decision—like 
choosing to ignore international obligations to respect rights and issue reparations 
received by the IACHR—then the opposition will take that decision and run with it, 
mobilizing their supporters and erode incumbent support. Of course, this mechanism 
assumes that (at least) the opposition parties are aware of the IACHR reparation orders 
and that they care or find it strategically beneficial. 
State capacity highlights the dilemma some state may face where a state is willing 
to comply but lacks the resources to comply. The lack of resources could refer to the lack 
of economic resources, informational deficiency, or the need for skill acquisition. In 
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terms of all three, more developed countries may exhibit greater compliance because they 
not only have the will to but the capacity to comply. Economic development enables 
financial resources that that state can allocate to compliance, but improved economic 
conditions should also facilitate the proliferation of human rights organization and 
nongovernmental organizations as well as enable their work disseminating information 
through improved technology and increased access to it and supplying necessary skills 
for mobilization and litigation (Meernik et al. 2012).  
Foreign aid may influence the likelihood of compliance in that it represents 
external economic pressure to comply as well as increase international attention (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998, 6). However, Lebovic and Voeten (2009) find that governments lack 
the incentive to punish human rights violations bilaterally and that human rights 
violations have no effect on multilateral aid allocations. Other scholars similarly question 
whether human rights practices influence foreign aid policies (see Apodaca and Stohl 
1999; Poe 1990); nonetheless, states may feel pressure to comply with IACHR decisions 
in order to ensure the continuation of economic assistance. 
Foreign direct investments offer a similar consideration in the decision to comply. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) provides economic pressure that would induce a higher 
probability of compliance. Foreign investors seek to protect their investments and 
property from encroaching state governments. Hence, states must signal safe investment 
through their respect for the rule of law—not just through the existence of property rights 
but also through their respect for independent adjudication with possibility of unfavorable 
decisions with which the state will comply. If states do not comply with court decisions, 
then investors should have little faith that the state would respect other court decisions 
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that rule against the state in favor of the investors. This lack of credibility in terms of 
maintaining protected investments would lead to foreign investors to not invest, thereby 
reducing FDI. Furthermore, foreign investors are wary of investing in states publicly 
targeted by human rights organizations for rights violations, meaning that ‘naming and 
shaming’ strategies international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) impose real 
costs on states (Barry, Clay, and Flynn 2013). If a state is a party to an IACHR case, it is 
likely also the target of human rights ‘shaming’ campaigns, which would persuade a state 
to comply in order to salvage its investments (or the IACHR generates sufficient 
publicity to warrant similar effects). 
Finally regime type may be important in that it determines the incentive structures 
in the first place. More democratic regimes are more likely to comply with the IACHR 
decisions. However, the influence of regime retains little value in terms of micro-theory 
causal mechanisms. It is likely that the influence of regime simply captures the above 
mechanisms.  
 
Domestic Legal Systems and the Rule of Law 
Domestic legal system and the rule of law may similarly contribute to 
international law internalization and compliance. Regarding domestic legal norms and the 
level of congruence with the IACHR, no variation exists across selected Latin American 
states. All of these states have civil law systems and grant blanket compulsory 
jurisdiction to the IACHR. However, they differ in terms of their rule of law 
development. National high courts with higher levels of judicial independence may 
represent states that have a higher regard or respect for the rule of law. In this case, high 
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level of judicial independence proxies the state’ respect for the rule of law. States with 
high respect for the rule of law are more likely to comply with IACHR decisions. 
Effective judiciaries create ex post costs for states considering violating the agreement, 
thereby incentivizing the state to comply (Conrad 2014; Kelley 2007; see also Conrad 
and Ritter 2013). 
However, independent judiciaries that serve as effective constraints may lead to 
the state to decide to not comply with orders for legal reform precisely because the court 
will hold the state accountable to the commitment. In other words, states seeking to 
comply without being held accountable under the reformed laws would be less likely to 
comply if they know that they will be required to follow the law by the judiciary. This is 
the same intuition as that for the relationship between judicial independence and treaty 
ratification and compliance, where states only comply with treaty obligations if domestic 
legal enforcement is strong but are less likely to ratify treaties, thereby adopting new 
constraints, if domestic legal enforcement is strong (Powell and Staton 2009). The 
existence of independence courts that are able and willing to keep the government in 
check creates ex post costs for the government to amend the laws in ways that constrains 
it in the future.68  
Yet another possible scenario occurs when national courts enjoying high levels of 
judicial independence decide to unilaterally alter the domestic law, such as through 
conventionality control. Because these courts are independent, they face fewer, less 
                                                           
68 High level of judicial independence might also increase the likelihood of the IACHR to judge state 
remedies as compliant since part of their evaluation for full compliance is that they believe the violations in 
question will either not occur in the future or will be domestically enforced. The IACHR would have little 




severe, and/or less probable negative responses by the government. For example, in 
Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, the Guatemalan Supreme Court declared it “necessary 
to execute the nullity of the national resolution” that the IACHR declared “violates the 
universal legal principles of justice” and ordered new trial proceeding offering “an 
unrestricted respect of the rules of due process.” It further nullified the previous verdicts 
by the lower courts and declared the ‘self-enforceability of the Judgment issued by the 
Inter-America Court.” In this case, the courts unilaterally complied with the IACHR 
without the support or consultation from either the executive or legislative branches. 
Since independent courts are often emboldened after states commit to international 
human rights treaties and thus more likely to constrain and sanction violators, it seems 
plausible that the same effect would occur after an IACHR reparation order or 
conventionality control order (Powell and Staton 2009; Simmons and Danner 2010). 
The first two judicial independence mechanisms predict contradictory responses: 
one where judicial independence leads to compliance while the other leads to 
noncompliance. It is unclear which of these competing tensions would emerge victorious 
or if they would simply cancel each other out. The third mechanism moves the rational 
choice from the state government to the courts, which makes this mechanism 
fundamentally different in process from the other two mechanisms. However, its leads to 
predictions that higher levels of judicial independence would lead to increased likelihood 
of compliance as well as increased likelihood of conventionality control declarations and 





‘Peer pressure’ from neighbors or regional peers may also induce compliance to 
IACHR due to reputation costs.69 States incur reputational costs when other states and 
political actors perceive that the state has failed to honor a commitment. Since virtually 
all of Latin American share membership in the same institutions and have committed to 
the same obligations, reputational costs are likely to be high for noncompliance. 
Noncompliance signals that a state’s commitments are not credible, which can be costly 
for states—especially since all other states in the region are held accountable to the same 
commitments.70  
‘Peer pressure’ could also be induced through socialization where the reputational 
cost are incurred not from the loss of credibility in commitments but from lack of 
conformity to role orientations, norms, values, and goals shared by members within the 
same community. The motivations are difficult to distinguish and may occur 
simultaneously. For example, Simmons (2000) finds that commitments to international 
law by regional neighbors exert a positive influence on state compliance to international 
law. In other words, states are more likely to comply when their neighbors are 
complying, but we do not know whether the reputational costs were rationalist-economic 
or normative.  
 
 
                                                           
69 In addition to reputation costs, ‘peer pressure’ can induce compliance through economic competitive 
advantage strategies where states may compete for foreign aid, foreign direct investment, and trade 
agreements. 
 
70 This satisfies Guzman (2002)’s argument that international law is influential only when it commits a state 
to an obligation in the eyes of other states. 
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Transnational Advocacy Network and Mobilization 
Human rights organizations are crucial in the monitoring of rights violations, the 
publication and dissemination of this information, the mobilization of individuals and 
parties on these issues, and the presence of rights on political agendas through 
mobilization and lobbying for legal reform (Meernik et al. 2012; Brysk 1993). Human 
rights organizations with permanent locations with a state (rather than INGOs with 
temporary volunteers) are the most likely to aware of the lack of legal changes as well as 
the presence of IACHR cases still pending compliance,71 and they are the most likely to 
publish this information and push compliance onto the national agenda and mobilize 
opposition. These organizations are also crucial to the theory of international shaming 
where these are the organizations that demand international attention in order to initiate a 
‘shaming’ strategy and pressure the state regime domestically through mobilizing citizens 
and opposition groups. The presence of these organizations increases the potential costs 
for noncompliance; therefore increased presence of human rights organizations should 
increase the likelihood of compliance to IACHR decisions. 
 
Rights Regime Entrenchment 
The more entrenched a state is within the international rights regime, the more 
social, reputational, and normative pressures states face and the greater the associated 
costs should states fail to comply with IACHR decisions. The more international treaties, 
conventions, covenants, and protocols the state has ratified, including the supplementary 
                                                           
71 I assume that these organizations are aware of IACHR cases pending compliance because these cases 
typically have favorable decisions for the victims and HROs, and these decisions provide legitimation to 
HRO missions as well as increased relevancy of the organizations themselves (and the amount of attention 
on and funding for the organizations which are crucial for INGO survival).  
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and optional ones, the greater the states’ obligations to their rights commitments to the 
IACHR and other members within the regime community. Additionally, noncompliance 
for an entrenched state could be more costly in that it calls into question its credibility to 
a wider set of commitments. Thus, states that are more entrenched within the 
international human rights regime are more likely to comply with IACHR reparations to 
reform domestic law relative to less-entrenched states. 
 Chapter 4 addresses these sets of intuitions by examining to what degree IACHR 
jurisprudence influences domestic law. More specifically, it addresses the extent to which 
states comply with IACHR reparation orders requiring domestic legal reform as 
evidenced by its compliance reports. It further examines under what conditions 
compliance occurs, whether regional or neighborly “peer pressure,” domestic political 
factors, transnational advocacy network, international rights regime entrenchment, or 
case facts primarily induce compliance. I use compliance reports rather than 
conventionality control since compliance reports offer systematic and consistent 
evaluations of compliance by the IACHR itself. As such, it provides less speculative and 
subjective analysis of IACHR and international law influence.  I use an original dataset of 
the universe of publicly available compliance reports from 2001-2015, again evaluating 
the compliance of Spanish-speaking, civil law Latin American states. 
Chapter 4 also addresses the possibility of the IACHR issuing these reparation 
orders requiring domestic legal changes strategically. One of the main problems plaguing 
supranational courts in that it questions their relevance and influence it the observation 
that these court behave strategically based upon anticipated member-state reactions. 
Hence, it is possible that the IACHR is strategic in issuing decisions that require domestic 
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legal reform. If the IACHR believes that a state will not comply with its orders, then the 
Court may lose legitimacy. Hence, it is possible that the IACHR issues reparations that 
are likely to be complied with in order avoid the risk that its orders will be ignored in 




THE DOMESTIC LEGAL STRUGGLE: THE ROLE OF HIGH COURTS 
In 2013, the United Nations awarded the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice (Suprema 
Corte de Justicia de la Nación or SCJN) the U.N. Defense of Human Rights Award. This 
extremely prestigious award has been received by, among others, Malala Yousafzai 
(2013), Nelson Mandela (1988), Jimmy Carter (1998), Eleanor Roosevelt (1968), Dr. 
Martin Luther King (1978), the International Committee of Red Cross (1978), and 
Amnesty International (1978).72 Yet this was the first time a court received the award.73 
This international recognition of a domestic court’s promotion of human rights is striking 
in that it represents the first time a court receives such recognition—and in that this 
accomplishment does not corroborate the widespread assumption that courts do not play 
an important, systematic role in the promotion of human rights.  
This event is perhaps also surprising in that it appears in the midst of escalating 
violence within Mexico between the federal government, organized crime, and drug 
cartels. The increased militarization of the war on drugs has left Mexican citizens 
vulnerable to rights violations such as disappearance and torture. Perhaps most 
prominently, international news and rights organizations shunned the federal government 
for not effectively protecting the rights of, or investigating the disappearance of, forty-
                                                           
72 See Appendix A for the full list of recipients. 
 




three students from the state of Guerrero and the murders of people nation-wide.74 For 
example, Human Rights Watch chides the Mexican government for making little progress 
in prosecuting the widespread killings, enforced disappearances, and torture committed 
by soldiers and police in the effort to combat organized crime.75 From 2007 to 2013, 
more than 26,000 people had been reported disappeared or missing, and Mexico’s 
security forces have participated in these enforced disappearances since the launch of the 
‘war on drugs.’ In June of 2013, the Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission 
(CNDH) reported that it was investigating 2,443 disappearances in which it found 
evidence of the involvement of state agents.76 Hence, the awarding of the Mexican 
Supreme Court for promoting human rights despite the seemingly contradictory trend of 
right violations due to cartel violence and conflict militarization leads to the research 
question evaluated in this chapter: under what conditions do courts promote human 
rights, thereby incorporating international human rights law? 
This question is important to better understand recent observations of human rights 
diffusion, and it is necessary for understanding domestic high court roles in the 
incorporation of domestic legal systems. In short, this question’s implications address the 
broader debate of whether international law matters. Existing research primarily 
addresses this question by evaluating state compliance to international treaties. Courts 
rarely play a role in these discussions. This nearly exclusive focus on state executive 
actors, however, ignores the increasing reality that domestic courts can—and do—take 
the lead in promoting human rights. Through changes in both international and domestic 







politics, as well as the inception of conventionality control, courts have grown in power 
and are starting to exert their influence in adopting international human rights laws 
unilaterally. This chapter argues that courts matter in promoting human rights 
domestically and in internalizing international law—even when they do not enjoy high 
levels of judicial independence. However, the role that courts play differs across rights, 
specifically between physical integrity rights and empowerment rights. As such, this 
chapter fills the lacuna regarding the role of courts in the expansion and 
institutionalization of international human rights laws. 
 
3.1 When should domestic courts matter? 
 Courts should matter in the incorporation or adoption77 of international human 
rights laws for several reasons. First, increasing judicialization enables courts to exert 
substantial influence over policy decisions. Judicialization, or the global expansion of 
judicial power, means that the courts are playing a more integral part in policy decisions 
that were originally exclusively determined by legislative and executive bodies (Tate and 
Vallinder 1995). These trends of court empowerment are evident worldwide and occur in 
common law countries and civil law countries alike, including Latin America, Western 
and Eastern Europe, India, Malta, the Philippines, Egypt, Israel, Canada, Australia, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Namibia, and the United States (Seider, Schjolden, and Angell 
2005; Moustafa 2003; Shapiro and Stone Sweet 2002; Stone Sweet 2000; Epp 1998; Tate 
and Vallinder 1995). Hence, courts are increasingly able to assert their preferences in 
                                                           
77 I use the terms “incorporation,” “adoption,” and “institutionalization” interchangeably to refer to the 
codification of international laws into domestic law, either through executive order, legislation or court 
decisions. Hence, an international law is adopted/incorporated/institutionalized when it has become 
enforceable domestic law. 
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policy determinations that previously excluded them. In other words, courts are able to 
influence a wider set of national policy decisions.  
Judicialization has also led to stronger, more powerful courts. Partially due to 
democratization trends and the influence of American jurisprudence and power, 
judicialization trends incorporate the creation of stronger judiciaries in transitioning or 
new regimes. Particularly in Latin America, for example, democratization processes have 
included the creation of more insulated judiciaries with fixed salary and tenure. Courts 
have thus become increasingly autonomous and independent from other government 
agencies (albeit to varying degrees). Increased judicial power, combined with the access 
to policy making originally prohibited to them, has set a stage for court activism, 
especially with regard to international human rights laws. 
Courts are further able to promote international human rights laws domestically 
because of the growing norm that courts are the appropriate bodies to address grievances 
and distribute justice, especially with increasing accessibility of courts. Increasing 
numbers of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies have emerged in the international arena, 
partly due to the legitimacy of human rights regimes where judicial bodies play the 
crucial role of the distributor of justice.78 Increased numbers of judicial bodies—
especially within human rights regimes—expand the accessibility of courts to 
individuals, which leads to more individuals seeking justice through courts, and 
encourages the growth and interactions of transnational epistemic communities79 of 
                                                           
78 While only six permanent international courts existed in 1985, today at least 25 permanent international 
courts and over 100 quasi-legal and ad hoc systems that interpret international rules and assess compliance 
with international law exist (Mitchell and Powell 2013). 
 
79 Epistemic communities are defined as “a network of professional with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992). 
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human rights advocates and legal communities. These communities not only socialize80 
members and other actors with whom they interact, but these networks of communities 
enable transnational coordination for international pressure, media attention, and 
litigation strategies. Each of these processes sets the stage that enables and empowers 
courts to play an active role in promoting human rights.  
 
Judicial independence 
On the few occasions courts make an appearance in rights discourse, existing 
scholarship asserts that, at best, courts matter only when they enjoy a high level of 
judicial independence. I argue that courts can promote human rights without a high level 
of judicial independence and that the need for judicial independence differs across rights. 
Namely, I argue that while courts may need higher levels of judicial independence in 
order to protect physical integrity rights, such high levels of judicial independence are 
unnecessary for the promotion of empowerment rights. The reason for this distinction is 
that courts a play different role between these types of rights. Courts primarily serve as 
constraints to government behavior for physical integrity rights; yet, because courts have 
the responsibility to define and apply empowerment rights through their legal 
interpretations and application of the law, courts can unilaterally promote and expand 
empowerment rights. I discuss this distinction in more detail in the next section. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
80 Socialization is defined as “behavioral changes that presumable come about through changes in the 
actors' interests” where these changes arise through the process of interaction with other actors, leading to 
individuals copying or learning from the behavior exhibited by others (Greenhill 2010). Socialization is 
similar to Goodman and Jink’s (2004) concept of acculturation, the “general process by which actors adopt 
the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.” Acculturation, like socialization, includes 
mimicry and identification (among others) and is effective when groups generate varying degrees of 
cognitive and social pressures, real or imagined, to conform. 
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3.2 How do courts matter? 
 While I argue that domestic courts matter in the incorporation of international 
human rights laws through their expansion of domestic rights protections, the way in 
which courts matter depends upon the type of rights. In other words, courts do not play 
the same role across all rights. Specifically, courts either constrain government behavior 
in order to preclude rights violations and hold violators accountable or define, apply, and 
expand rights through their interpretation and application of law. Typically, courts serve 
primarily as constraints for physical integrity rights while they have more flexibility to be 
proactive with empowerment rights. I discuss each relationship below. 
 
Physical integrity rights versus empowerment rights 
Physical integrity rights (PIR) consist of an individual’s right of freedom from 
torture, political imprisonment, forced disappearance, and extrajudicial killing.81 For 
these rights, courts must hold the government accountable for violations and/or deter the 
government from engaging in these behaviors by generating the credible expectation that 
violators will be held accountable. Thus, judicial independence, conceptualized as the 
insulation of the court (and its judges) from undue external or internal pressure that 
enables the court to produce decisions reflective of sincere court preferences,82 plays a 
                                                           
81 The definition of physical integrity rights is derived from Cingranelli and Richard’s (2010). 
82
 This definition is thus a de facto judicial independence, distinct from de jure judicial independence, 
which focuses only on the formal rules designed to insulate judges from undue pressure. This 
conceptualization includes judicial autonomy, where the decisions of the court are reflective of court 
preferences and decision-making. While this concept of judicial independence includes both external and 
internal pressures, I am mostly concerned with freedom from external pressures, that is horizontal 
accountability. As such I do not discuss the independence of lower court judges from superior court judges; 
rather, I am concerned with the degree to which high court judges are independent from pressure exerted 
from other government agencies and bodies. 
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crucial role in the protection of these rights. The extent to which members of a court are 
insulated from government pressure largely determines the degree to which a court is 
able and willing to confront it. In other words, in order for a court to effectively constrain 
government behavior, it must be at least somewhat independent from political control. 
Since the perpetrators of physical integrity rights are often government agents or 
representatives, unless courts have some degree of insulation, they will be unlikely to rule 
against their political benefactors—or even hear the case in the first place. Hence, courts 
must enjoy relatively high levels of judicial independence in order to credibly hold a 
government agency accountable and/or to deter rights violations. 
For empowerment rights, however, courts have the opportunity to promote these 
rights rather than simply constrain executive behavior. Empowerment rights consist of 
the freedoms of speech, assembly, association, religion, foreign and domestic movement, 
worker’s rights, and electoral self-determination.83 Courts can unilaterally expand 
empowerment rights protections by generating new rights and expanding the application 
of existing rights to new situations and/or to new groups of people. Courts have much 
more power to determine empowerment rights because these rights are often already 
embedded in existing domestic laws. Hence, courts can expand the application and 
enforcement of these laws through their interpretation of the law and decisions. The fact 
that courts already have the power and responsibility to interpret and generate law 
enables them to enact these expansions legitimately. This institutional legitimacy also 
makes it difficult for executive to challenge the courts. 
                                                           
83 The definition of empowerment rights is derived from Cingranelli and Richard’s (2010) definitions. Later 
analyses introduce flexibility to the specific rights included in empowerment rights, such as women’s 
rights. 
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Because of this unique role, judicial independence only matters up to a point. Judicial 
independence would be necessary to confront the government should it violate these 
rights, just as with physical integrity rights, but these rights do not always require 
governmental confrontation. For instance, high levels of judicial independence may not 
be necessary in order to resolve cases between private entities. Nonetheless, when a court 
is completely dependent upon a government, the court is not likely to hear rights cases or 
rule in ways that supports or enforces rights. Some degree of judicial independence is 
necessary in order for a court to choose to hear rights cases as well as resolve them in 
rights-affirming ways regardless of whether the government approves of the decisions. 
Hence, some degree of judicial independence is necessary in order for a court to play an 
active role in rights protections. Once this level of judicial independence is reached, 
opening the proverbial door for the court, the court does not need any additional judicial 
independence to continue to expand in order to rule progressively.   
This leads to the first set of hypotheses: 
 
H1: Judicial independence has a positive influence on the protection of physical 
integrity rights. 
 
H2: Judicial independence has a positive influence on the protection of empowerment 
rights until some threshold. After this threshold, judicial independence is unnecessary 





I evaluate these hypotheses examining the role of judicial independence on the 
respect for human rights using data from Latin America from 1981-2010. I use Spanish-
speaking, civil law countries in Latin America since these countries provide a wide range 
of variation in rights protections and judicial independence levels while maintaining a 
most similar system design. These states share the same legal system, similar political 
histories (including colonial histories), and the same language. While not all idiosyncratic 
features of these states are accounted for, this design removes as much unwanted 
variation as possible so as to avoid spurious inferences and allow for comparison across 
these states. Specifically, the countries included are as follows: Mexico, Belize, 
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador, 
Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Cuba, and Haiti.  
The dependent variables are the respect for physical integrity rights (Fariss 2014) and 
for empowerment rights (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). While both dependent 
variables are derived from Cingranelli and Richards’ (2010) data and ordinal measures, I 
use Fariss’ (2014) latent variable of physical integrity rights in order to account for 
changing standards over time.84 Fariss (2014) uses a dynamic ordinal item response 
theory model that relaxes the assumption that standards of accountability have not 
changed over time. Substantive reasons to relax this assumption, including the fact that 
our ability to monitor rights abuses, gather information, and disseminate that information 
has changed significantly over time. Hence, over time our ability to identify rights 
                                                           
84 The Pearson correlation coefficient between Fariss (2014) and Cingranelli and Richard’s (2010) original 
physical integrity rights score is 0.854. 
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violations has improved and with it our expectations have become increasingly stringent 
(Fariss 2014). For this reason, Fariss (2014) transforms Cingranelli and Richard’s (2010) 
ordinal scale to a latent, standardized variable that allows for these changes in “standards 
of accountability” where higher values represent greater respect for these rights. Figure 
3.1 shows the latent respect for physical integrity rights (including torture, extrajudicial 
killing, political imprisonment, and disappearances) across countries over time.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Latent Respect for Physical Integrity Rights 
  
This type of variable is unfortunately unavailable for empowerment rights, leading to 
the use of the original Cingranelli and Richards (2010) data, which is an ordinal scale of 
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latent respect for rights consisting of an additive index of component rights. These 
empowerment rights incorporate foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of 
speech, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of religion, workers’ rights, and 
electoral self-determination.85 This measure is calculated by the sum of each category’s 
ordinal score, making the variable range from 0 to 14, where higher values represent 
greater levels of respect. Figure 3.2 depicts the ordinal levels of respect for empowerment 
rights across countries over time. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Ordinal Respect for Empowerment Rights 
 
                                                           
85 This conceptualization of empowerment rights derives directly from Cingranelli and Richards (2010). I 
introduce an alternative conceptualization in the analyses. 
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Both dependent variables measure the latent ‘true-value’ of government respect for 
these rights,86 encompassing the degree of government respect as well as legal 
protections and the enforcement of these legal protections. In this sense, these dependent 
variables include information of the degree of violations and the degree to which rights 
laws are effectively protecting individual rights. 
There are four main independent variables: judicial independence, court legitimacy, 
political competition, and political constraint (or fragmentation). The main independent 
variable of interest, of course, is judicial independence. I use Linzer and Staton’s (2012) 
latent measure of judicial independence, which is derived from several other indicators. 87 
This measure of judicial independence is preferable because it solves the other indicators’ 
problems of missing data, measurement error, temporal dependence, and other limitations 
(Linzer and Staton 2012). This measure ranges from zero to one, where higher values 
represent greater judicial independence. I predict that this variable will have a positive, 
significant, and linear relationship with respect for physical integrity rights while having 
a positive, significant, and nonlinear influence on respect for empowerment rights. More 
specifically, I hypothesize a threshold beyond which judicial independence become 
insignificant. Figure 3.3 depicts the variation in judicial independence levels of each 
country over time using data from Linzer and Staton (2012). 
 
                                                           
86 Note that Fariss (2014) provides a latent variable measure while Cingranelli and Richards (2010) 
measure is an additive index of the respective rights in an attempt to obtain government respect for rights 
(rather than counts of violations). 
 
87 This latent variable measure is derived from the following eight measures: Feld and Voigt (2003), 
Howard and Carey (2004), Cingranelli and Richards (2010), Marshall and Jagger (2010), Keith (2012), 
PRS Group (2013), Rios-Figueroa and Staton (2013), and Johnson, Souva, and Smith (2013). As such the 
variable ranges between zero and one, assuming that the latent judicial independence follows a Bayesian 




Figure 3.3: Judicial Independence by Country 
 
A second independent variable is the level of legitimacy the high court enjoys. 
However, such a measure is problematic since no such measure currently exists that is 
comparable across countries and over time. Hence, I proxy high court legitimacy with 
government institutional legitimacy.88 I use the International Country Risk Guide’s 
Indicator of Quality of Government scores spanning 1948-2008. These scores consist of 
the mean value of ICRG variables “corruption,” “law and order,” and “bureaucracy 
quality,” scaled from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate higher quality of government. 
                                                           
88 An alternative measure that would more appropriately represent perceived judicial legitimacy is the 
public approval of the court provided in the Latinobarómetro. However, this measure only exists from 
1995-2008 and provides relatively little variation. The World Values Survey also includes confidence in the 
justice system but similarly only exists for ta handful of countries and years. (It provides only 20 
observations in the entire dataset). 
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While measure is obviously a blunt tool, the intuition is that it will capture—if not 
underestimate—people’s trust of the courts as part of the larger governmental institution. 
The greater the degree of corruption and the lower the strength and impartiality of the 
legal system, in particular, should play into people’s faith in the judiciary. I include this 
variable because the more legitimacy a court enjoys, the more leverage it has when 
holding the government accountable. In essence, legitimacy derived from public support 
of the court creates costs for a government that chooses to violate the law, not enforce 
court decisions, and/or sanction the court for unfavorable decisions. Thus, the greater the 
legitimacy of a court, the better a court is able to hold a government accountable and 
pressure a government to respect and enforce its decisions. Hence, legitimacy should 
have a positive, significant relationship with respect for both PIR and empowerment 
rights. 
 Third, domestic political competition is included because the more competition a 
ruling party experiences, the more likely opposition will mobilize citizens to punish a 
government that does not respect human rights and the rule of law. Such punishments 
could be electoral, where the ruling party will not be reelected or, more severely, where 
the ruling party is ousted. This variable is measured using the Index of Political 
Competition developed by Vanhanen (2011), which measures the percentage of votes 
gained by smaller parties in parliamentary and/or presidential elections. More 
specifically, the measure is calculated by subtracting (from 100) the percentage of votes 
won by the largest party, multiplied by the percentage of the population that actually 
voted in the election. Hence, this measure ranges from 0 to 50, higher values representing 
greater levels of political competition. I predict that political competition has a positive 
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and significant relationship with respect for both PIR and empowerment rights. 
 Finally, political constraint addresses the degree of difficulty an actor experiences 
when attempting to enact a policy violating human rights and/or sanctioning a court for 
attempting to hold the government accountable or for promoting rights. The intuition is 
that the easier it is for a government to enact such policies, the less likely rights will be 
effectively protected or promoted. This variable is measured by institutional difficulty, by 
using Henisz’s (2006; 2000) Political Constraints data from 1960-2007. This index 
measures the feasibility of policy change, or the extent to which a change in preferences 
of any one political actor may lead to a change in government policy. The measure 
incorporates the number of independent branches of government with veto power over 
policy change (including the judiciary) as well as legislative alignment, measuring the 
extent of alignment across the branches of government (as measured by the extent to 
which the same party or coalition of parties control each branch and the extent of 
preference heterogeneity within the legislative branch). Hence, the greater the number of 
branches and veto players and less these actors are ideologically aligned, the higher the 
transactions costs to move policy, thereby constraining political actors. The index scores 
are derived from a spatial model and ranges from 0 to 1, where higher scores indicate 
more political constraint (that is, policy change becomes less feasible due to higher 
transaction costs coordinate the policy change).89 Thus, I predict a positive, significant 
relationship between institutional costs and the degree of respect for PIR and 
empowerment rights. 
                                                           
89 I also model iterations using Henisz’s (2006; 2000) political alignment between the executive and upper 




 Control variables are included in model iterations, but the substantive effects of 
the main variables remain the same, thus, for the sake of simplicity, I have omitted the 
control variables in the tables below. (Please see Appendix B, however, for those results 
including controls). The control variables include foreign direct investment as a net 
inflow percentage of GDP, provided by the World Development Indicators by the World 
Bank. I also include GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (in 2005 
international dollars), derived from the World Development Indicators by the World 
Bank. Regime type is also included, measured as Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton’s 
(2010) Unified Democracy Score (UDS) posterior means which models regime type as a 
latent variable. I control for population as well, as provided by the World Development 
Indicators. War is also included as a dummy indicating presence (interstate, internal, and 
internationalized internal), derived from the UCDP/PRIO Conflict Database (2013).90  
Because I am using panel data (cross-sectional time-series data), I use panel-
corrected standard error models (Beck and Katz 1995) to evaluate the influence of 
judicial independence on physical integrity rights and empowerment rights, respectively. 
Since OLS standard errors are typically inaccurate for panel data, panel-corrected 
standard errors correct for this, providing accurate estimates of the variability of the OLS 
estimates by taking into account the contemporaneous correlation of the errors 
(heteroskedasticity).91 However, any serial correlation of the errors must be eliminated 
                                                           
90 There are no periods of extra-state war for these countries during this time period; hence this variable is 
excluded. I also checked oil export, foreign aid, and the distribution of income among 
individuals/household (Gini Index) each with no significant effect.  
 
91 OLS estimates are optimal for panel data when the errors are known (or assumed) to be spherical; 
however this assumption is quite strong given the likely temporal and spatial correlation, panel 
heteroskedasticity (which is more complicated than both time-series and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity), 
and temporal dependence common in panel data. Feasible generalized least squares, first described by 
Parks (1967) transforms the errors to make them spherical and more appropriate for OLS, although it 
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before the calculation of panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995). My data 
shows no autocorrelation in the errors and homoskedastic panel errors. In this case, where 
panel variance is homoskedastic and shows contemporaneously independent errors, OLS 
standard errors are accurate. Indeed, fixed effects models provide the same substantive 
results as panel-corrected standard error models.92 However, Beck and Katz (1995) show 
that panel-corrected standard errors still perform just as well as OLS standard errors in 
these cases, even though the errors become less spherical. Hence, because there is 
virtually no cost and substantial benefit to using these PCSE, Beck and Katz (1995) 
recommend always using PCSE for panel data. Nonetheless, I provide both panel-
corrected standard error and fixed effects models. I account for temporal trends by using 
autoregressive lags of the dependent variables and of the main independent variable of 
interest: judicial independence.93 
Before turning to the results of these models, however, even descriptive statistics 
imply the different influence of judicial independence across these rights. Figure 3.4 
reveals a linear relationship between judicial independence and respect for physical 
integrity rights (see the blue line). Intuitively, the more judicial independence a court 
enjoys, the more it can effectively constrain state executive behavior. On the other hand, 
judicial independence has a nonlinear relationship with respect for empowerment rights 
(see the red line). Increased judicial independence improves empowerment right 
protections only up to a point, after which judicial independence has no effect. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
assumes that the error structure and process are known. It has also been shown that FGLS produces less 
efficient estimates than OLS, especially in small samples, and produce extremely overconfident standard 
errors producing misleading results (Beck and Katz 1995). 
 
93 While empowerment rights are an additive index of categorical variables, there are sufficient categories 




Figure 3.4: Judicial Independence on Human Rights 
 
Yet, these descriptive statistics are insufficient. Thus, I test the influence of judicial 
independence on respect for human rights using panel-corrected standard error and fixed 
effects models for Latin America from 1981 to 2010. Since I expect a nonlinear 
relationship between judicial independence and respect for empowerment rights, I 
include a quadratic term of judicial independence. I also center judicial independence 
scores by subtracting the mean from each judicial independence score before squaring. I 
center these scores for two reasons: a) centering reduces the correlation 
(multicollinearity) between the linear and quadratic terms, and b) centering shows the 
separate contribution of the linear and quadratic terms. Table 3.1 provides the empirical 
results for the panel-corrected standard error models while Table 3.2 provides the fixed 
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effects models with robust errors. (Full models with control variable coefficients are 
provided in Appendix B under Table1B and Table 2B, respectively).94 
 
Table 3.1: Panel-Corrected Standard Error Model of PIR and Empowerment Rights in 
Latin America, 1981-2010 
 Physical Integrity Rights Empowerment Rights 














Judicial Independence2 -- -6.953*** 
(2.005) 
















Two year lag, Rights -.376*** 
(.057) 
-- 
                                                           
94 I check for issues due to multicollinearity in the fixed effects models using uncentered variance inflation 
factors. While perfect collinearity violates the assumptions of classical linear regression models, severe 
multicollinearity leads to large variances and standards errors as well as wide confidence intervals, which 
makes statistical significance difficult to determine. Hence, this could lead a false conclusion that a variable 
has no statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable (Type II error). Despite 
multicollinearity, however, estimates remain BLUE although unreliable. None of these models show 
perfect or severe multicollinearity. 
For the physical integrity rights model, moderate collinearity exists between GDP, political 
competition, institutional legitimacy, and political constraint (with variance inflation factors between 10 
and 18).     
For the (original) empowerment rights fixed-effects model, the mean variance inflation factor is 
8.85, with moderate collinearity (VIF between 10 and 20) between judicial independence, lagged 
empowerment rights, GDP, institutional legitimacy, and political competition. However, none of these 
variables show severe multicollinearity. 
For the reconceptualized empowerment rights fixed-effects model, the mean variance inflation 
factor is 9.79, with moderate collinearity (VIF between 10 and 20) between institutional legitimacy, 
political competition, GDP and judicial independence, and lagged empowerment rights. No severe 







N 371 369 
Number of Groups 18 18 
Observations per Group, 
Average (min, max) 
20.6 (14, 21) 20.5 (14, 21) 
Prob  > X2 0.000 0.000 
R2 .983 .618 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variables are the degree of respect for physical integrity rights and empowerment rights, 
respectively. Empowerment rights model has centered judicial independence scores (where I subtracted the 
mean from each score before squaring). Coefficients represent the results of panel-corrected standard error 
models (with robust standard errors listed in parentheses). 
 
 
Table 3.2: Fixed Effects: PIR and Empowerment Rights in Latin America, 1981-2010 
 Physical Integrity Rights Empowerment Rights 














Judicial Independence2 -- -8.681* 
(3.473) 























Rho .512 .748 
N 371 369 
Number of Groups 18 18 
 92
Observations per Group, 
Average (min, max) 
20.6 (14, 21) 20.5 (14, 21) 
Prob  > F 0.000 0.000 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variables are the degree of respect for physical integrity rights and empowerment rights, 
respectively. Empowerment rights model has centered judicial independence scores (where I subtracted the 
mean from each score before squaring). Coefficients represent the results of fixed effects models with 
robust standard errors listed in parentheses.  
 
One first notices that in both models judicial independence is positively and 
significantly correlated with rights protections. However, judicial independence has a 
linear relationship with physical integrity rights only. Hence, increases in judicial 
independence correspond with increases in respect for physical integrity rights in the first 
year, holding all else constant. Yet, judicial independence has a nonlinear yet significant 
relationship with respect for empowerment rights—here modeled as a quadratic 
function.95 Notice that the negative sign on the quadratic term refers to the concave 
nature of the function (where the apex is at the top and the curve opens downward). The 
significance of the quadratic term indicates that increases in judicial independence 
correspond with increased respect for empowerment right only until a threshold. The 
coefficient of the quadratic term provides the steepness of the downward curve. These 
results provide a way estimate the threshold or turning point at which judicial 
independence no longer holds a linear relationship with respect for empowerment rights. 
By taking the derivative of the regression equation with respect to judicial independence 
and setting to zero, one finds that the threshold limit for judicial independence is roughly 
                                                           
95 Including a quadratic term in the regression assumes a global influence of the variable (Keele 2008). That 
is, that the variable’s predicted influence on the dependent variable is constant for all values of the 
independent variable (i.e. the quadratic term). However, this assumption holds for linear regression 
relationships as well (Keele 2008). 
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0.533 (for the panel-corrected error model) or 0.546 (for the fixed effect model).96 This is 
corroborated with the eyeball test of the descriptive statistics graph (Figure 3.1) and 
supports my hypothesis (H2) in that this level represents only mid-level judicial 
independence (which, again, ranges from zero to one). 
Turning to the other independent variables, institutional legitimacy does not reach 
statistical significance for either physical integrity rights or empowerment rights. This is 
likely because the legitimacy of government institutions poorly proxies court legitimacy. 
Similarly, political competition fails to reach significance for physical integrity and 
empowerment rights in all models except for the panel-corrected standard error model of 
empowerment rights where it holds the opposite sign than expected.97  
Political constraint has a significant and positive relationship with empowerment 
rights only in the fixed effect model. As the level of political constraint increases, there is 
a corresponding increase in respect for empowerment rights. However, this relationship 
does not appear in the panel-corrected standard error model. 
 While the results presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are revealing, graphs better 
illustrate the relationship between each of the variables. Figure 3.5 depicts the 
relationship between judicial independence (using raw scores) and respect for rights with 
95% confidence intervals.98 The blue line illustrates the positive, linear relationship 
between judicial independence and respect for physical integrity rights in Latin America 
from 1981-2010. The red line illustrates the positive but nonlinear relationship between 
                                                           
96 Substantively these numbers reflect the same thing where the threshold point is mid-level judicial 
independence. 
 
97 Note that political competition and regime type are correlated at a .83 level; however, political 
competition fails to reach significance if regime type is dropped for both types of rights. 
 
98 Estimates are taken from the fixed effects models for simplicity. 
 94
judicial independence and respect for empowerment rights. The graph reveals that the 
estimated threshold where judicial independence no longer has a significant effect on 
empowerment rights is between .5 and .6—which corroborates the threshold calculation 
of 0.533-0.546. Hence, courts only need judicial independence to promote empowerment 
rights up until they have mid-range judicial independence. Once courts achieve mid-level 




Figure 3.5: Influence of Judicial Independence on Rights 
 
Empowerment rights reconceptualized 
 The previous analyses conceptualized empowerment rights as Cingranelli and 
Richards (2010) originally conceived them. That is, they consist of foreign movement, 
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domestic movement, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, freedom 
of religion, workers’ rights, and electoral self-determination. I reconceptualize 
empowerment rights to include women’s social rights, women’s economic rights, and 
women’s political rights, while excluding electoral self-determination and workers’ rights 
since they may be influenced by political interests beyond the rights issue area. Hence 
this reconceptualization defines empowerment rights as an additive index consisting of 
foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and 
association, women’s social rights, women’s political rights, women’s economic rights, 
and freedom of religion. All of these component measures are derived from Cingranelli 
and Richard’s (2010) data. This new dependent variable, named Empowerment Rights 
Reconceptualized, ranges from 0-18.  Figure 3.6 (page 96) depicts the shifts in physical 
integrity rights, empowerment rights (original), and empowerment rights 
reconceptualized. For the most part, the general shifts in empowerment rights remain 
similar regardless of how one conceptualizes them.99 
I reanalyze the data using this new dependent variable, again using centered 
judicial independence scores. Table 3.3 (page 97) reflects the results of fixed effect 
model with the replication of the original fixed-effects empowerment rights model to ease 
comparison.100 The full table of results with control variables is included in Table 3B in 
Appendix B. 
 
                                                           
99 With the possible exception of Argentina. 
 
100 A panel-corrected standard error model could not be run for the reconceptualized empowerment right 
due to lack of overlapping time periods, resulting in the inability to estimate the disturbance covariate 




Figure 3.6: Rights Trends by Country 
 
One first notices that these models are virtually identical with the exception of 
political constraint, where it fails to achieve significance for the reconceptualized 
empowerment rights. This analysis corroborates the asserted nonlinear, threshold 
relationship and furthermore suggests that the threshold level of judicial independence as 
0.561. Figure 3.7 depicts the similarity between the original and reconceptualized 
empowerment rights models, where the blue line represents the marginal effects of the 
original CIRI empowerment rights and the green line represents the marginal effects of 
the reconceptualized empowerment rights values. (Note this figure uses raw judicial 
independence scores rather than centered scores.) While these models are virtually 
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identical, these analyses provide confidence that the threshold or nonlinear relationship 
between judicial independence and empowerment rights is not spurious.101 
 
Table 3.3: Empowerment Rights in Latin America, 1981-2010 
































Rho .748 .504 
N 369 335 
Number of Groups 18 18 
Observations per Group, 
Average (min, max) 
20.5 (14, 21) 18.6 (9, 21) 
Prob  > F 0.000 0.000 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variables are the degree of respect for empowerment rights. Both models have centered judicial 
independence scores (where I subtracted the mean from each score before squaring). Coefficients represent 
the results of fixed effects models with robust standard errors listed in parentheses.  
 
One first notices that these models are virtually identical with the exception of 
political constraint, where it fails to achieve significance for the reconceptualized 
empowerment rights. This analysis corroborates the asserted nonlinear, threshold 
relationship and furthermore suggests that the threshold level of judicial independence as 
                                                           
101 In addition, the reconceptualized empowerment rights are perhaps more intuitive and more interesting 
for individuals concerned with promoting women’s rights. 
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0.561. Figure 3.7 depicts the similarity between the original and reconceptualized 
empowerment rights models, where the blue line represents the marginal effects of the 
original CIRI empowerment rights and the green line represents the marginal effects of 
the reconceptualized empowerment rights values. (Note this figure uses raw judicial 
independence scores rather than centered scores.) While these models are virtually 
identical, these analyses provide confidence that the threshold or nonlinear relationship 
between judicial independence and empowerment rights is not spurious.102 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Influence of Judicial Independence on Empowerment Rights 
 
 
                                                           
102 In addition, the reconceptualized empowerment rights are perhaps more intuitive and more interesting 
for individuals concerned with promoting women’s rights. 
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Conclusion 
 This section asserts that courts play different roles in the protection and promotion 
of human rights depending upon the type of right. Specifically, courts serve as constraints 
on government behavior for physical integrity rights like torture, forced disappearance, 
political imprisonment, and extrajudicial killing. Yet courts are able to promote 
empowerment rights like civil, social, political, economic rights due to their institutional 
ability and responsibility to define and apply these rights through their jurisprudence. 
This difference in roles implies a different relationship between judicial independence 
and rights protection. Where courts serve as constraints, judicial independence is 
expected to have a significant, positive, and linear relationship with respect for physical 
integrity rights. Yet, where courts are able to define and actively promote rights through 
their interpretation and application of the law, judicial independence only has a 
significant and positive relationship with empowerment rights until some threshold. Both 
of these hypotheses earn support through the series of analyses provided in this section. 
These analyses, along with the descriptive data themselves, suggest that the threshold of 
judicial independence is roughly at the midpoint of the scale, between .533 and .561. 
Hence, a court needs only partial judicial independence in order to influence 
empowerment rights. After this threshold, judicial independence does not significantly 
affect the level of respect for empowerment rights. 
 These results suggest the need for better theories distinguishing between the role 
of courts and judicial independence on human rights. It also suggests the need to 
distinguish between different types of rights. Despite the promotion and increased 
protection of civil liberties and rights in Mexico, for instance, widespread physical 
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integrity rights have remained prominent in the news. Hence two distinctive trends have 
emerged within Mexico where the federal judiciary has improved rights protections and 
actively sought to promote rights in several areas (as discussed in the next section) but 
the increased militarization and escalation of drug cartel eradication has left citizens 
vulnerable to physical integrity rights violations. 
Thus, while judicial independence remains an important influence on physical 
integrity rights, it is not the simple solution to remedy violations of civil, social, 
economic, and political rights. Thus, popular judicial reforms may need to be reexamined 
or reformulated to more appropriately implement the desired goals. For instance, these 
results suggest that judicial reforms focusing primarily on increasing judicial 
independence may improve government respect for physical integrity rights but such 
reforms are unlikely to influence the respect and protection of other rights, unless the 
country has very little (below midpoint) judicial independence. 
 
3.3 Why would courts choose to incorporate international human rights law? 
Regardless of the type of right, domestic courts can promote human rights through 
increasingly holding violators accountable and expanding rights protections to a larger set 
of situations or contexts for a larger proportion of society. Yet, if courts have the ability 
to promote human rights protections, then why would courts choose to promote these 
rights? Three broad reasons can answer this: 1) judges serving on courts sincerely belief 
promoting rights is morally right or makes good policy and/or are compelled by their 
perceived duty to promote rights, 2) principal-agent hierarchical relationships motivate 
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courts to apply laws congruent with regional courts, and 3) judges seeking to garner 
increased power for the court as an institution strategically choose to promote rights. 
 
Judicial Preferences: Attitudes and Role Conceptions 
The first possible mechanism inducing judges, and the courts they serve, to promote 
human rights laws and protections is that either their attitudes and sincere policy 
preferences are congruent with rights promotion and/or they perceive their duty and role 
as a judge obligates them to promote rights. If judges’ decisions are a “function of what 
they prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to do, but constrained by what 
they perceive is feasible to do,” then the first two choices, representing the attitudinal and 
role theory models, may account for the choice to promote (Gibson 1983). Hence, their 
attitudes encompass what judges prefer to do while role orientations consist of what 
judges think they ought to do.103  
Attitudes congruent with rights promotion may lead judges to choose to promote 
human rights. Like other political actors, judges render decisions based upon their 
personal attitudes, values, and preferences (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 1993; Segal 1997; 
Segal and Cover 1989; Schubert 1965; Pritchett 1954). Hence, this mechanism asserts 
simply that judges promote rights protections because they prefer to. In this scenario, 
judges choose to promote rights because it moves national policy closer to the judge’s 
preferred policy location and/or because promoting rights makes ‘good’ law. 
                                                           
103 What judges think they ought to do also includes legal concerns. For example, a judge may want to 
apply the law a particular way congruent with his or her personal policy preference but the case facts may 
not allow such a decision. While I do not discuss these legal concerns here as I am primarily concerned 
with why judges would choose to promote human rights, I do not seek to imply the lack of consideration of 
legal factors. It is possible that judges choose to promote rights due to case facts, but I include these legal 
concerns within both the attitudinal and role theory models.  
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Role expectations could also interact with, mitigate, or constrain the translation of 
judicial attitudes into behavior. The role expectations consist of the norms of ‘proper’ 
behavior within a particular role or situation (Gibson 1983, 1978). The combination of 
sets of role expectations inherent within an identity or office creates a role orientation of 
the occupant with that identity or within that office. Role orientation is thus “a 
psychological construct which is the combination of the occupant’s perception of the role 
expectations of significant others and his or her own norms and expectations of proper 
behavior of a judge” (Gibson 1978). In essence, the perception of the appropriate 
behavior inherent within an office, position, or identity may influence the behavior and 
attitudes of the occupant. These perceptions include those created by the occupant but 
also by other judges, rights-related or legal epistemic communities,104 and the judicial 
‘audience’ in general (Baum 2006). Norms about judges and judging arising from each of 
these communities influence judicial decision-making through judges’ concerns about 
reputation, popularity, and respect at the individual and institutional levels (Baum 2006; 
Mishler and Sheehan 1996; Miceli and Cosgel 1994). In short, “judges, like other people, 
get satisfaction from perceiving that other people view them positively” (Baum 2006). 
For this reason, judges’ perceptions about themselves as well as perceptions about how 
other people view and respect them influence judicial decision making and the calculus to 
promote rights or not.  
Furthermore, the persistent interactions with these sets of norms across audience 
communities could also socialize the occupant to take on the identity defined by these 
norms perceived within the role of a judge (Glick 1992). Regular exposure to and 
                                                           
104 Epistemic communities are defined as “a network of professional with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992). 
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interactions with the rights-related and legal epistemic communities, including judges, 
lawyers, litigants, and other actors not only provide normative expectations that inform 
the role orientation of a judge but socializes the judge to alter his or her own identity and 
expectations. Increased and repetitive exposure of legal and role norms can lead to norm 
convergence, where actors that may not have agreed with or shared a normative belief 
eventually converge in their acknowledgment and support of the legal norm. 
Additionally, epistemic communities may provide judges rationale for adopting new 
rights policy solutions as well as make contingent arguments that define policies as “right 
under certain circumstances” (see Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Dobbin and 
Sutton 1998; Glick 1992; Haas 1989; see also DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Hence, 
socialization can change judicial attitudes as well as role orientations. For instance, 
because courts are widely considered the cornerstone of human rights protections, judges 
may promote rights because they believe they should (due to their membership in the 
court) or because they want to. The point at which judges learn and take on the perceived 
role, identity, and obligatory behavior of a ‘judge’ is where role theory converges with 
the attitudinal model. Even judges that may not have sought to promote rights before 
becoming a judge, or even early in their career, may learn and become socialized to these 
norms, thereby changing their attitudes. In this sense, the role orientation no longer 
constrains behavior but redefines the judges’ attitudes and preferences.  
It is important to recognize that role orientations do not necessarily constrain attitudes 
since they may reinforce existing attitudes or redefine attitudes all together. As such, both 
mechanisms may influence judges to choose to promote human rights laws that are 
consistent with international laws. Judges may promote rights because they prefer to, 
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because they think they ought to, or because they have learned to want to. Indeed, Walker 
(2012) finds that the “pressures that judges feel to advance human rights are generally 
self-imposed [where] [t]hese social elites view human rights as fundamental rights.”105 
Hence, attitudes and expectations may determine the degree to which judges choose to 
promote rights. 
 
Principal-Agent Motivations  
Secondly, principal-agent hierarchical relationships motivate courts to apply laws 
congruent with regional courts.106 These relationships denote the superior court as the 
principal and lowers as the, presumably, faithful agents of the superior court. In general, 
this hierarchical relationship appears strong in American federal courts, where circuit 
courts faithfully comply with Supreme Court precedent and changes in jurisprudence 
with little to no agency loss due to lower court ideological preferences (Westerland et al. 
                                                           
105 Furthermore, often judges’ activities promoting rights “are relatively unobserved by both domestic and 
international actors.” Walker’s (2012) description of his findings in Central American courts continues to 
argue that, while the judges themselves may advance human rights, citizens also attempt to advance these 
human rights through the legislative arena. Yet, he similarly argues, the courts still play an important role 
as the center of “administration and enforcement of the legislative provision” (Walker 2012). 
 
106 At this point I do not distinguish between decision congruence where cases are decided similarly due to 
case facts versus responsiveness where lower courts respond to changes in principal court policy or 
decision changes (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994). This distinction, while important, tends to become 
problematic since these concepts converge in terms of regional court- high court hierarchical relationships 
within the human rights issue area. Supranational court human rights decisions infrequently change in any 
meaningful way due to the nature of the cases and rights violations. Even when court membership changes 
or institutional and political contexts shift, supranational courts tend to remain consistent in their 
application of human rights law. Hence, there is little opportunity to evaluate responsiveness in this 
manner. Domestic high courts, on the other hand, more frequently alter their decisions and policies, 
especially after changes in judge membership and political contexts. Responsiveness is thus more important 
and more easily identified for evaluation within the domestic judicial context. Hence, the evaluations in this 
dissertation deal primarily with congruence, while only partially accounting for responsiveness in terms of 
changes in domestic legal systems and court activity after regional court decisions. (In other words, 
responsiveness is only included to the extent that domestic legal changes occur after the presence of a 
regional court decision. The ‘response’ in this scenario is triggered by the presence of a supranational court 
decisions rather than changes in supranational court jurisprudence.) 
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2010; Songer, Segal, Cameron 1994; Songer and Sheehan 1990; Songer 1987).107 
Similarly, Randazzo (2008) and Baum (1980) find that superior appellate courts constrain 
lower federal district courts in the United States.108  
There are four motivations where this hierarchical relationship will induce the 
incorporation or adoption of international law: a) fear of reversal due to corresponding 
reduction of personal recognition, respect, and/or reputation, b) fear of reversal due to the 
impeded inability to shape policy, c) advancing career and fear of reducing ability to 
advance, and d) compliance as a good in and of itself due to role conceptions, respect for 
authority, and desire to produce legally accurate and consistent decisions (Klein and 
Hume 2003).  
In terms of the first two motivations, fear of reversal can be caused by personal 
reputation motivations or policy-making motivations. For example, a national high court 
may comply with a regional court and international law in order to avoid international 
shaming and reprimand, thus incurring reputational costs. National high court judges 
could similarly comply in order to maintain their ability to influence and determine 
policy; if the court does not comply and its decision reversed, then the court has lost its 
ability to determine policy in that area.  
                                                           
107 Both find that the lower courts generally serve as faithful agents, although Westerland et al. (2010) find 
that lower court ideology does not influence its behavior while Songer, Segal, and Cameron (1994) finds 
that some room remains for agency loss due to lower court pursuing their own ideological preferences. 
 
108 Baum’s (1980) results are more similar to Songer, Segal, and Cameron (1994) rather than Westerland et 
al. (2010)—albeit perhaps less optimistic—in that superior courts “exert significant influence over the 
decisions of their subordinates” but that they do not completely determine lower court behavior or 
determine lower court behavior in “any absolute sense.” Hence, superior court influence, he argues, is one 
of several factors that determine lower court behavior and it may explain less than other factors not 
included in his analyses (such as judge preferences). 
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While fear of decision reversal is possible, however, national high court decisions are 
rarely considered by a regional court and therefore unlikely to be reversed. Hence, the 
likelihood of this event is so low that such a motivation is unlikely. This intuition is 
similarly addressed in American judicial scholarship where lower court fear of reversal is 
unlikely due to the fact that the Supreme Court hears only a tiny percentage of cases, 
rendering the likelihood that the Supreme Court will hear a case and reverse it extremely 
unlikely (Klein and Hume 2003).109 Indeed, Klein and Hume (2003) find that this 
motivation does not appear to explain lower court compliance110 to U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions. Thus, it seems that this motivation, while possible, is not particularly 
persuasive. It is even more unlikely to serve as a motivation since the regional court 
examined here, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, does not serve as an 
appellate court to national high courts as declared through its ‘fourth instance’ rule 
(Harris 2004, 12). 
The third motivation deals with judges’ career ambitions where compliance is 
motivated either by the desire to advance one’s career or by the fear of reducing one’s 
ability to advance. These motivations depend both on individual ambitions and the 
institutional structure of the judiciary. Put simply, national high court judges could 
strategically comply with regional court decisions and international law more generally 
                                                           
109 Note that this argument applies only terms of lower courts and the American Supreme Court. 
Hierarchical relationships between appellate and district courts may experience these motivations since 
there is a much greater likelihood that lower court decisions will be evaluated by the superior. Evidence 
exists suggesting that a stigma is attached to a judge’s reversal rate (Baum 1978; Caminker 1994), and 
Randazo (2008) finds that the anticipation or fear of negative responses by courts of appeal is the 
constraining force on U.S. federal district courts, inducing these lower courts to curtail their ideological 
influence (Randazzo 2008). However, this constraint applies to civil liberties and economic cases but not to 
criminal cases (Randazzo 2008). 
 
110 Compliance is defined here as the faithful application of existing higher court precedent and deciding 
cases as the higher court would be expected to (Klein and Hume 2003). 
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because it serves their personal career ambitions. For example, noncompliance could 
reduce a judge’s ability to advance his or her career due to the reputation of rights 
negligence or violation or due to ignoring existing legal standards. Alternatively, 
compliance where a judge rules against the state may reduce the judge’s ability to 
advance a career in politics within that home state. While these motivations are 
important, it is unclear the extent to which they occur at the institutional level. In other 
words, while an individual judge may behave according to these motivations, it is 
unlikely that this behavior would be observable or meaningful at the institutional level. 
Because courts consist of multiple judges with likely diverse career ambitions, it seems 
unlikely that these behaviors would influence court jurisprudence as a whole. 111 
The fourth motivation suggests compliance may occur simply because the national 
high courts view compliance as a good in and of itself that is desirable or beneficial. 
Judges may view their authority and position within a framework that dictates that they 
should comply in order to assure legal accuracy and consistency or simply to respect 
authority and the hierarchical legal structure.112 
 
 
                                                           
111 Looking specifically at the regional- national high courts hierarchical relationship, the IACHR is a part-
time body consisting of seven judges who serve six-year terms and are nominated by Convention parties 
and elected by the General OAS Assembly. While they all have legal backgrounds, few have ever served as 
a judge in their home state. The majority of judges were previously academics or had previous experience 
in diplomacy and politics (Harris 2004, 23). Hence, it seems unlikely that national high court judges are 
motivated to seek career advancement to the IACHR specifically. Obviously, this does not preclude career 
motivations in general since there are other judicial, political, and non-political careers that judges may 
seek. 
 
112 Yet the application of traditional principal-agent model to supranational and national court relationship 
may be problematic. Stone Sweet (2000) argues that this framework does not work well for European 
Union relationships since there is no clear hierarchy and the degree of oversight remains unclear. 




Empowerment of Court 
The third, final explanation for why courts may choose to incorporate international 
law and promote human rights consists of institutional motivations where judges seek to 
empower the court as an institution and seek to avoid reductions in judicial power.113 As 
such, judges are concerned with expanding public support and increasing legitimacy, 
which empowers the court, making it more capable and effective at constraining state 
behavior. Alternatively, they are also concerned with avoiding behavior that would 
delegitimize the court, reduce public support, and thereby weaken the court, making it 
vulnerable to institutional dependency, government attacks, and ignored decisions. In 
these cases, these concerns would predict that a court would prefer to appear as an 
impartial arbiter that is independent of political interests. This would lead to the 
incorporation of international human rights laws and compliance with regional court 
decisions since compliance signals the court’s impartiality, independence from state 
government influence, its legal accuracy and consistency, and its advocacy of the public. 
In general, pro-human rights decisions consistent with international law would increase 
public support of the court, thereby empowering the court as an institution.114 Expanding 
human rights protections can improve court standing in the eyes of the public, which may 
increase the degree of (diffuse) public legitimacy the court enjoys. Increased legitimacy 
                                                           
113 This mechanism could be categorized another principal-agent motivation. 
 
114 Due process rights in particular may not lead to increased public support and legitimacy. While 
international human rights laws seek to protect criminal rights and trial rights, these laws can be extremely 
unpopular. The reason is that in some cases, the protection of due process rights leads to the perception that 
criminals are benefitting from international law rather than the victims of crimes. For instance, a convicted 
foreign national convicted of drug crimes and murder who is later released to the home country rather than 
serving his or her sentence would lead to public outcry and backlash since in this case international law’s 
protection of due process rights appears to benefit the convicted criminal rather than the victims of his or 
her crimes.  
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can translate into greater judicial power or effectiveness since improved public support 
for a court makes executive challenges to court decisions more costly politically. 
While this dissertation does not distinguish between these possible motivations for 
expanding human rights, these reasons make it plausible that courts might want to expand 
human rights if they are able to. Two main outcomes should appear if courts are deciding 
to promote human rights. First, courts with discretionary dockets should increase the 
proportion of rights cases within those dockets. Increases in human rights cases imply 
increased court attention to rights issues and the desire of the court to rule on these issues. 
Secondly, promoting courts should increase pro-individual (i.e. pro-rights protection) 
decisions. Increased attention to rights issues is insufficient for rights protections and 
expansion; courts must decide cases in a way that promotes human rights protections in 
order to support these hypotheses. 
This leads to the second set of hypotheses: 
 
H3: Promoting courts should exhibit increased proportions of rights cases in 
discretionary dockets. 
 




I evaluate these hypotheses predicting changes in discretionary docket and 
decision outcomes using original and secondary data for Spanish-speaking, civil law 
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Latin American countries, although emphasizing the case of Mexico as it is in the midst 
of a transitioning judicial system as well as experiencing diverging rights trends. In this 
sense, the case study is descriptive as well as provides preliminary qualitative evidence to 
which I can compare my hypotheses. While this methodology limits my ability to identify 
causal mechanisms and constrains generalizability, this evidence is the first examine 
these trends of domestic high court incorporation of international human rights laws. As 
such this preliminary evidence is useful in generating attention to this important topic and 
in generating empirically testable theories that are tailored to Latin American experience 
and international law-national court dynamics. Furthermore, while these case studies do 
not provide a systematic test of the hypotheses I proposes, they do provide preliminary 
evidence as to whether domestic high courts do choose to promote human rights 
protections in manners that are consistent with international legal norms and some useful 
information about the domestic political contexts within which these processes occur. 
The inclusion of other Latin American countries is based upon available data. 
Unfortunately, relatively little research examines these courts’ human rights practices 
empirically or qualitatively. While more research examines their judicial independence 
and judicial review behaviors, this data is not appropriate for human rights cases within a 
civil law system. Further exacerbating the dearth of data, few courts make their decisions 
publicly available. Even within the handful of courts that do publish their opinions, they 
publish selectively for foreign readers. This introduces serious concerns of selection bias. 
Hence not only are case selections limited, the cases themselves provide incomplete data. 
Nonetheless, this data is helpful in evaluating change numbers and proportions of cases 
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but provides no information about human rights cases specifically or the associated 
decisions.  
I offer original data on the case of Mexico and emphasize its case throughout 
because it incorporates complex and contradictory domestic politics including a recently 
transitioning judicial system, intensifying organized crime and cartel violence, and 
significant achievements in certain areas of human rights. Moreover, Mexico exemplifies 
the same judicialization trends as experienced throughout Latin America where, since the 
1980’s, courts have become increasingly politically important (Seider, Schjolden, and 
Angell 2005). Latin American courts are increasingly asserting rights not effectively 
guaranteed by the executive or legislature, leading to citizens to increasingly resort to 
courts to resolve issues that were previously reserved for the political sphere (Seider, 
Schjolden, and Angell 2005). Mexico’s Supreme Court of Justice115 has similarly evolved 
and transformed through a series of constitutional reforms and changes in the power 
structures of the Mexican political system (Ríos-Figueroa 2007). 116 As with many other 
                                                           
115 Mexico’s Supreme Court of Justice (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación) (SCJN) sits atop the 
judicial hierarchy much like the United States Supreme Court. As the highest federal court, it consists of 
eleven members: the elected President of the Supreme Court (similar to the United States’ Chief Justice) 
and ten Ministers. Justices are proposed by the President of Mexico and confirmed by the Senate, much like 
in the United States.  Each Justice is appointed to serve 15 years, and the President of the Court serves 
under the title for four years. (Nonconsecutive reappointment is possible.) 
 
116 Judicial reforms occurred in 1917, 1994, 1996, and 2008. The 1917 constitutional reforms included 
changes to appointment procedures and the tenure system, which allowed for considerable autonomy from 
the executive (Domingo 2000). However, while the Supreme Court adopted a fairly independent position 
with regard to the executive and ruled against government interests at times, subsequent reforms in the 
1920s-30s aimed to curb judiciary action—leading to a more passive, deferential Court (Ríos-Figueroa 
2007; Domingo 2000).  
After taking office, President Zedillo institutes a series of judicial reforms to better insulate the 
Court from political pressures. The 1994 reforms created a Judicial Council (Consejo de Judicatura), 
relieving administrative burdens (like lower court appointments, the administration of the judicial budget, 
disciplinary mechanisms to control corruption), limited the role of the executive in Supreme Court 
appointments, granted 15 year tenure to provide insulation from the executive, removed executive approval 
as a requirement for the administration of the judicial budget, reduced the size of the Supreme Court from 
26 to 11 members, reduced benches from four to two, and forced the resignation of all current Court 
members in order to appoint new members. Importantly, the reforms also expanded the Court’s jurisdiction 
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Latin American countries, the Mexican Supreme Court had been perceived as historically 
subservient to the executive, corrupt, and ineffective until 1994. Since the 1994 judicial 
reforms, the Court has adopted a more active role, taking controversial positions, and 
garnering public attention in an unprecedented manner for judicial review and rights 
cases (Domingo 2005; 2000). This expansion of review powers has emboldened the 
Court to take a more active and public role, dealing with controversial issues more openly 
than in the past (Domingo 2005; 2000). Indeed, the Court finally openly challenged 
executive power in 2000, when the Court resolved a conflict between lower chamber 
members of Congress and President Zedillo to investigate illegal campaign funds (Staton 
2010). Importantly, the increased activism of the Court as a check to executive power has 
occurred in hand with relatively high compliance to the Court’s rulings, even when they 
are political inconvenient to the ruling party (Staton 2010; 2007).117 
In 2008, Mexico passed additional judicial reforms that introduced public, oral 
trials to criminal cases and instituted the presumption of innocence and police 
investigations. While this reform passed in 2008, however, the deadline for full 
implementation by the Mexican states is 2016. As such, as of October of 2013, only three 
of the 32 states have fully implemented these reforms with 13 states having partially 
transitioned. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of judicial review with policy-setting (erga omnes) effects and increased the accessibility for litigants to 
promote cases of constitutional review. These reforms created new jurisdiction of abstract review (actions 
of unconstitutionality) and expanded existing concrete review (constitutional controversies). (Reforms in 
1996 further expanded Court jurisdiction, enabling it to rule of electoral laws at the federal and state level.) 
Each of the reforms since 1994 has enabled the Court to play a more active and prominent role in Mexican 
politics. 
 
117 Of course, increased Court activism has not always been met with welcome. In 2004, Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) members117 called for the impeachment of two Court justices for having 
attempted to review a constitutional action in which President Fox challenged the constitutionality of a 




Changes in proportion of rights cases in discretionary dockets  
Mexico 
In order to evaluate changes in discretionary dockets (H3), I use action of 
unconstitutionality cases (acciónes de inconstitucionalidad) and facultad de atracción 
cases.118 These cases represent the only discretionary portions of Mexico’s Supreme 
Court of Justice’s docket, but they represent only a fraction of the Court’s docket.119 
Tables 3.4 – 3.6 show each category’s number of cases and percentage of the docket from 
2009-2014.  
 
Table 3.4 Discretionary Docket: Action of Unconstitutionality Cases  
Year Action of 
Unconstitutionality 
(Number of Cases) 
Action of 
Unconstitutionality 
(Percentage of Docket) 
Total Docket 
(Number of Cases) 
2009 96 1.04% 9191 
2010 37 0.41% 9054 
2011 34 0.35% 9749 
2012 67 0.57% 11849 
2013 43 0.33% 13032 
2014 113 0.80% 14195 
 
 
                                                           
118 The Supreme Court gained this jurisdiction in a constitutional amendment in 1988. 
 
119 Action of unconstitutionality cases became part of the Mexican Supreme Court’s docket in 1994 as part 
of a series of judicial reforms. These represent abstract review over the constitutionality of state and federal 
laws whereas constitutional controversies deal with only concrete claims through a posteriori review. 
Action of unconstitutionality case outcomes apply to general policy when eight or more justices agree on 
the resolution. Constitutional controversy resolutions may have general policy-setting or specific (litigant 
only) effects depending upon the case. The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to both case types 
(unlike amparo suits) and resolves both en banc. I do not include constitutional controversies in the 
analysis because these cases deal primarily with problems between different levels and branches of the 
government, such as between the state and national government or between the executive and legislative 




Table 3.5: Discretionary Docket: Facultad de Atracción Cases 
Year Facultad de Atracción 
(Number of Cases) 
Facultad de Atracción 
(Percentage of Docket) 
Total Docket 
(Number of Cases) 
2009 127 1.38% 9191 
2010 176 1.94% 9054 
2011 282 2.89% 9749 
2012 437 3.69% 11849 
2013 453 3.48% 13032 
2014 702 4.95% 14195 
 
Table 3.6: Total Discretionary Docket 
Year Cases Combined 
(Number of Cases) 
Cases Combined 
(Percentage of Docket) 
Total Docket 
(Number of Cases) 
2009 223 2.43% 9191 
2010 213 2.35% 9054 
2011 316 3.24% 9749 
2012 504 4.25% 11849 
2013 496 3.81% 13032 
2014 815 5.74% 14195 
 
Actions of unconstitutionality are discretionary abstract review cases dealing with 
the constitutionality of state and federal laws, and their outcomes apply to general policy 
when eight or more justices agree on the resolution. Facultad de atracción cases 
represent a discretionary amparo120 jurisdiction where if a case falls outside of the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction but the Court deems some element of the case to be 
fundamentally important to Mexican law, it may rule on the matter itself. Tables 3.4, 3.5, 
and 3.6 show that Mexico enjoys discretionary power in only a small proportion of cases. 
They also reveal, however, that the Court has been increasingly activist in terms of 
                                                           
120 Amparo cases are part of the Court’s mandatory docket and appellate jurisdiction, and court rulings in 
these cases apply only to the particular litigants in that case unless the Court makes the same ruling for five 
consecutive cases, whereby lower courts must apply the same conclusion to all similar future cases (Ríos-
Figueroa 2007). As such, court rulings in these cases generally do not alter national policy (as they would 
in common law countries). Also, amparo cases were heard en banc until 2003. 
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“attracting” cases that would otherwise fall outside of their jurisdiction while showing 
only relatively minor fluctuations in abstract judicial review. The increased presence of 
human rights cases on this discretionary docket implies increased Court attention to rights 
issues and the desire of the Court to rule on these issues in ways that affect national law.  
 Table 3.7 depicts the proportion of cases by litigant for action of 
unconstitutionality cases (acciónes de inconstitucionalidad) in Mexico from 2008-2014. 
As the percentages in red indicate, rights cases introduced by the National Commission 
for Human Rights have garnered increasing attention by the Court. These yearly 
percentages underestimate the percentage of rights cases since rights cases are often 
brought forward by other litigants (which would appear in the other categories).121 
Nonetheless, the percentage of rights cases, brought forward by the Commission of 
Human Rights, the Supreme Court ruled upon increased to nearly 28% in 2013.122 Since 
these cases represent a discretionary portion of the Court’s docket, the Court therefore 
decided to rule upon more rights claims brought forward by the National Commission for 
Human Rights in 2013 and to a lesser degree in 2011. Yet, the Court appears to have a 
relatively stable proportion of these cases relative to other action of unconstitutionality 
cases brought by other litigants, with an average of 15.7% each year.  
Table 3.8 similarly reveals increased judicial attention and activism in facultad de 
atracción cases (in red).123 These cases represent a discretionary amparo jurisdiction 
where if a case falls outside of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction but the Court deems 
                                                           
121 Note that individuals do not have standing for action of unconstitutionality cases. 
 
122 However, from 2009 to 2013, action of unconstitutionality cases have declined as a proportion of cases 
decided by the Court while caseload has increased over the same period (see Table 5). 
 











































55% 49% 44.7% 23.5% 23% 27.9% 69.0% 45.3% 
Legislative 
Minorities 
20% 17.7% 7.9% 8.8% 6% 11.6% 8.8% 11.0% 
Solicitor 
General 










20 96 37 34 64 43 113 391 
Data compiled from: https://www.scjn.gob.mx/transparencia/paginas/trans_jurisd.aspx. Note that 2008 data 
reflects only the final fourth trimester. 
 
some element of the case to be fundamentally important to Mexican law, it may rule on 
the matter itself. Hence the increased number of these cases indicates that the Court is 
increasingly choosing to rule on rights issues. It also implies an increasingly activist 
Court since these cases would normally fall outside of their jurisdiction. By resolving an 





                                                           
124 Note that this informal expansion of their jurisdiction remains constitutionally valid. 
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Table 3.8: Annual Trends in Case Type and Case Load 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Action of 
Unconstitutionality 
96 37 34 67 43 113 
Direct Amparo 2,448 2,952 3,060 3,951 4,572 6164 
Indirect Amparo 2,292 1,031 883 777 689 965 
Constitutional 
controversy 
122 94 130 124 115 121 
Facultad de 
atracción 
127 176 282 437 453 702 
Total Case Load 9,191 9,054 9,749 11,849 13,032 14,195 
Data compiled from: https://www.scjn.gob.mx/Transparencia/Indicadores_Gestion/SGAIG2T14.pdf. 
 
Table 3.8 also shows marked increases in direct amparo cases, which also consist 
of rights cases but part of the Court’s mandatory docket (in blue). Amparo primarily 
protects individual constitutional rights, and direct amparo consist of appeals of the final 
judgments in criminal or civil cases. 125 All Mexican citizens, civic organizations, 
indigenous communities, and even the government (when acting as a private moral 
person) may bring amparo suits (Staton 2010). Since these cases are mandatory, this 
substantial increase in cases does not necessarily reveal the Court’s desire to resolve 
these particular rights issues (unlike the changes in the discretionary docket composition), 
but it implies increased rights litigation. Yet, such a marked increase from 2009 to 2013 
of nearly double the number of direct amparo cases (a difference of 2,124 cases resolved 
per year) may be in part a response to the Court’s signaled interest to rule on rights 
issues. In essence, because the Court has signaled increased interest in and increased 
                                                           
125
 Indirect amparo (amparo en revisión) are claims heard in the first instance by the federal district courts 
in response to a) the publication of laws they by their mere promulgation prejudice the claimant’s liberties, 
b) acts and decisions not arising out of judicial, administrative, or labor tribunals, c) judicial, administrative 
or labor tribunal decisions executed outside the bounds of the trial or after its conclusion, d) acts within a 
trial whose executive would cause irreparable damage, and e) decisions within a trial that affect parties 
outside the trial (Staton 2010). Hence, in these cases, the Supreme Court exercises appellate jurisdiction.  
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receptiveness to rights issues through their discretionary docket (and increasing pro-rights 
decision, as will be discussed shortly), litigants are more likely to appeal their amparo 
suits so that the Court will address their issue and likely rule in their favor (Baird 2007). 
Judicial rulings by the Supreme Court since the 1994 reform, and especially after 2000, 
have indicated the willingness of the Court to act independently of the executive and even 
rule against the government (Domingo 2005). These rulings—along with the high levels 
of government compliance to them—have signaled to individuals, opposition parties, and 
political opponents that legal mobilization is a useful means to assert legal boundaries 
(Domingo 2005).126 
 
Costa Rica’s Constitutional Court  
Increased amparo resolutions, along with increasing caseloads, are also evidence 
in Costa Rica since the creation of the Constitutional Court (Sala IV) in 1989. In 1990, its 
first year of operation, the Constitutional Court received 2,300 cases which increased to 
13,400 cases per year by 2002 (Wilson 2005). Of these cases, habeas corpus cases 
increased from an average of 829 cases over the first five-year period of operation to 
1,355 cases on average by 2002 (Wilson 2005). Amparo cases similarly increased from 
an average of 3,553 cases over the first five years to 11,665 cases by 2002 (Wilson 2005). 
Table 3.9 reveals the number of cases the Court considered per year. Hence, not only has 
the Court received increasing petitions for cases, but the Court has increased the number 
of cases it considers substantially.  
 
                                                           
126 While the Mexican Supreme Court has become a credible, effective, and active political player, lower 
courts, for the most part, have not undergone the same transformation. Lower courts remain embedded in 
the passive, corrupt, and subservient role to the local politics.  
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Table 3.9: Number of Cases Considered by Sala IV per Year 
Year Cases Considered 
1990 1,600 




Additionally, this substantial increase in cases heard by the Court consists 
primarily of human rights or amparo cases (Wilson 2011). While these cases form part of 
the mandatory docket, they represent the Court’s willingness to challenge the elected 
branches as well as the Court’s openness to allow weak, marginalized, and poorly 
organized groups who had largely been ignored or excluded from policy-making to seek 
legal redress (Wilson 2011; 2005). Costa Rica’s 1949 Constitution included many of 
these rights, but the Court’s previous inactivity relegated them to merely rights on paper 
(Wilson 2005). As such, the increased litigation became a product of Court signaled 
interest in adjudicating rights cases and their enforcement of these constitutional rights.127  
 
Colombia’s Constitutional Court 
Similar trends occur in Colombia. Since the 1991 constitution, the Colombian 
Constitutional Court issued 235 decisions in 1992, while issuing 1123 decisions in 2002 
(Espinosa 2005). Table 3.10 illustrates the increases in Court decisions from 1992-2002. 
One notices that the Court issued the most decisions in 2000, reaching 1754 rulings. 
 
 
                                                           
127 Substantial increases in litigation reaching the Costa Rican Constitutional Court are also a product of the 
new rules that broadened the accessibility of the Court, where litigation is inexpensive and has minimal 
requirements for filing. In addition, cases may be brought by any individual without legal counsel and 
without filing any formal paperwork (Wilson 2005).  
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Table 3.10: Colombian Constitutional Court Docket 















These three countries reflect two important trends (not including the increasing 
proportion of pro-rights decisions discussed next). The first is that the Mexican Supreme 
Court is actively increasing the number of rights cases they hear in their discretionary 
docket. This activism has signaled the Court’s interest in and receptiveness to rights 
cases, which may persuade potential litigants to seek the court (see Baird 2007). Trends 
in amparo cases in courts’ mandatory dockets suggest that people are increasingly 
turning to the courts to resolve their rights issues. Colombia’s and Costa Rica’s 
Constitutional Courts share in Mexico’s trend of increased rights-oriented caseloads. 
Many of these changes have occurred with the opening of access to the judiciary, which 
is crucial for a court to be more active in defending rights (Wilson and Rodriguez 
Cordero 2006; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000). 
However, while courts are increasingly adjudicating rights issues and are 
increasingly asked to resolve such issues, these increases in rights cases may not be 
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unequivocally positive. One detriment is that due to the increased litigation, the 
mandatory docket of these courts has increased substantially—creating unreasonable 
workloads for most courts. Hence, in the response, courts must pay more attention to 
procedural requirements in order to throw out improper cases. The increased need to 
reduce caseloads means that some cases are not being heard, primarily due to procedural 
requirements. This could disenfranchise poor, uneducated, or rural right-seeking litigants 
who may not enjoy support from lawyers or NGOs. Massive caseloads may also lead to 
delays in trials and resolutions, which may lead to due process, criminal, and procedural 
rights infringements.  
 
Changes in decision outcomes in rights cases 
Mexico 
In addition to the Mexican Supreme Court’s increasing attention to rights cases, the 
Court has increasingly resolved cases in favor of individual rights. The Court has become 
especially active in promoting habeas corpus and criminal procedure rights, anti-
discrimination and reproductive rights, and civilian rights with respect to military actions. 
The Court’s active promotion of individual rights through their decisions is illustrated by 
the UN’s awarding of the Defense of Human Rights Award in December of 2013, stating, 
“The national Supreme Court has accomplished very considerable progress in promoting 
human rights through its interpretations and enforcement of Mexico’s constitution and its 
obligations under international law. Additionally, the national Supreme Court has set 
important human rights standards for Mexico and the Latin America region.”128 Indeed, 
the Court has placed increased emphasis on human rights and increased weight to 
                                                           
128 (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/hrprize.aspx) 
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international treaty obligations. In 2011, the Court declared that judgments by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights is the “law of the land,” and the Court ruled in 2013 
that rights that are guaranteed by international human rights treaties have equal weight to 
those guaranteed by the Mexican constitution. Furthermore, court decisions include 
substantial references to international laws, including treaties, conventions, IACHR, and 
other supranational court decisions. 
Perhaps the most significant of the policy changes instituted by the Mexican Supreme 
Court is the reduction of military jurisdiction and the extent to which military enjoy in-
house criminal or disciplinary procedures. In 2011, the Court ruled to reform Mexico’s 
flawed military justice system to hold soldiers accused of human rights violations 
accountable for their crimes. It declared that no civilian or human rights case should be 
tried in the military justice system. The ruling also stated that courts are obligated to 
comply with Inter-American Court of Human Rights judgments and that its jurisprudence 
should be taken into account by Mexican judges. In 2012, the Court formally declared 
unconstitutional part of military code requiring service members charged with a crime 
against civilians to be tried before a court martial. The Court further published a formal 
order confirming its ruling and directing ordinary federal criminal courts to henceforth 
assume jurisdiction. The same year, the Court conferred legal standing to third parties 
who were not themselves direct victims of military aggression, which enabled family 
members of civilians killed by military forces to intervene procedurally in such cases.  
Since 2008, criminal and procedural rights have taken a forefront in Supreme Court 
promotion—so much so that the Court has faced significant public controversy. While 
the 2008 reforms to move the country to faster public, oral trials with police authorized to 
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investigate crimes proved a significant shift in criminal procedure, these reforms have not 
yet been fully instituted nationwide. As of 2013, only three of the 32 states had fully 
transitioned, while thirteen states had partially transitioned. Hence, full implementation 
of these institutional protections should not be expected until 2016 (the deadline), 
especially with the difficulty of retraining prosecutors, lawyers, police, and judges. Yet 
the Supreme Court has moved to enforce criminal and procedural protections, especially 
through the presumption of innocence and firm conviction to due process rights. In 2013, 
the Court ruled that evidence obtained through torture and other violations of human 
rights is inadmissible. The Court also released a Canadian national who was in custody 
for 18 months on charges to try to smuggle one of Gaddafi’s sons into Mexico for failure 
of due process rights. Even more controversially, the Court ordered the immediate release 
of Florence Cassez, a French national, who had been in prison for 85 months after being 
convicted of kidnapping and murder as one of the heads of Los Zodiacos gang on 
grounds that her rights to due process were violated. 
In terms of women’s rights and discrimination, the Court has also made significant 
moves actively promoting rights. In 2012, the Court reinstated the original attempted 
murder charge in a domestic abuse case and remanded the prosecution to a judge for a 
new trial, saying that the victim’s legal rights were violated when the charge of reduced 
by a lower court judge. From 2011 to 2013, the Court expanded abortion rights through a 
series of cases by striking down state laws that declared that life begins at conception and 
decriminalized abortions. The Court also upheld state laws authorizing gay marriage in 
2012 in a series of cases and required the recognition of those marriages across all 
Mexican states. In 2013, the Court ruled that anti-gay comments and homophobic speech 
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are not protected speech—which marks the first case dealing with hate speech heard by 
the Court. Indeed, in 2014 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights applauded 
Mexico’s Supreme Court for adopting a Protocol that aims to help judges decide cases 
dealing with sexual orientation and gender identity in ways that conform to 
internationally recognized rights standards.129 In essence, this Protocol calls on judges to 
question the neutrality of the law applicable to a case if a situation of disadvantage is 
identified on account of gender identity or sexual orientation. 
 Hence, even though Mexico has not been considered pioneering or progressive 
with regards to rights—even as recently as 2011 (see Helmke and Ríos-Figueroa 2011)—
important transitions are underway. Specifically, the Mexican Supreme Court has played 
an active role in promoting rights and enforcing these rights through promoting, if not 
mandating, reforms of the judiciary, military code, criminal codes. For example, 
consistent with the 2011 Court decision, both houses of Congress passed a reform of 
military justice code in 2014. This reform ensures that abuses committed by the military 
against civilians are investigated and heard in civilian, rather than military, jurisdiction.130  
Furthermore, Mexico’s Supreme Court constitutionalized the IACHR’s 
conventionality control in 2011, where the Court recognizes the IACHR decisions as res 
judicata and thus binding. This 2011 constitutional amendment changed several articles 
of the Constitution, creating a “new legal system of human rights protections” (Colli-Ek 
2012) that places responsibility on all Mexican state authorities to take into account 
treaties to which Mexico is a party and requiring them to always favor rules that favor the 






person. The Supreme Court has furthered issued decisions that altered the way Mexican 
judges adjudicate cases where human rights are involved by fully recognizing IACHR 
decisions as res judicata and obligatory, by introducing conventionality control applied 
ex officio by all judges and allow judges to disregard domestic norms that breach human 
rights and contravene international human rights treaties, and implementing 
administrative actions to professionalize federal judges in the use of conventionality 
control. Hence, the Mexican Supreme Court dramatically changed the way judges (can) 
adjudicate.  
Beyond the high court, conventionality control appears preliminarily effective at 
the lower levels as well. In 2012, just one year after the constitutional amendment, lower 
court decisions in three Mexican states (Jalisco, Nuevo Leon, and Oaxaca) made 
conventionality control arguments in 5.4%-14.2% of human rights (direct amparo) cases 
(Aguiar-Aguilar 2014). Specifically, lower courts in Jalisco made arguments using 
conventionality control in 5.4% of cases, Nuevo Leon courts made the same 
conventionality control arguments in 13.6% of cases, and Oaxaca made conventionality 
control arguments in their decisions in 14.2% of cases (Aguiar-Aguilar 2014). These 
courts (and lawyers) still defend human rights protections using national laws more so 
than international law, but frequently cite the American Convention on Human Rights, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
Lawyers cited these international laws as well as conventionality control more 
frequently than the federal judges, however, which is relatively unsurprising since 
Mexican courts’ adoption of conventionality control is so recent. In other words, 
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litigation strategies change more quickly than lower court judicial decisions after changes 
in domestic policy. Considering that lawyers and their litigation is strategic (Wedeking 
2010) and often responsive to changes in human rights laws (Simmons 2009), it seems 
logical that lawyers add these new legal norms and frames into their litigation strategies. 
The virtually immediate appearance of conventionality control and the frequent 
references to international law at Mexican state court levels provide some optimistic 
evidence of the use of these legal rationales by both local lawyers and lower courts in 
addition to the significant changes by the Mexican Supreme Court. While the Supreme 
Court appears to want to play an active role in catalyzing domestic legal change, promote 
human rights, and internalize international laws, this preliminary evidence provides 
limited but optimistic support that the Supreme Court is effectively facilitating 
international human rights law incorporation. 
 
Costa Rica 
 In addition to increased numbers of rights cases, the decisions by Costa Rica’s 
Sala IV has led to the institution to be considered a protector of the people—and 
deservingly so in that it has supported the rights of diverse people. In 1990, for example, 
the Court ruled that civil service exams had to be administered in Braille, affirmed the 
collective rights of indigenous populations, protected the right to keep seeing-eye dogs in 
taxis for the blind, protected journalists’ right to work, and kept Rastafarian’s from being 
barred from buildings due to their religion (Wilson 2011). The Court protected women’s 
rights through ruling that a woman may seek sterilization without her husband’s consent 
in 1992, affirming equality in divorce law, and protecting equal rights for naturalization 
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through marriage. The Court also issued rulings dictating that prison guards cannot use 
gas against prisoners and that HIV patients have the right to be treated in state-run 
hospitals and clinics. The Court further expanded individuals’ health rights—a right not 
provided in the constitution but derived from the right to life, social security protection, 
and international treaties signed by the Costa Rican government (Wilson 2011). 
 Over the first ten years of its existence, the amparo cases (in general) have had a 
25% success rate (Wilson 2011). Looking at health rights however, the Court transitioned 
from rejecting state-funded HIV treatments in 1992, to requiring treatments by 1997 for 
three cases, and finally leading to 60% pro-individual decisions in health cases since 
1997 (Wilson 2011). Similar trends occur for other health areas, especially concerning 
breast cancer patients. 
 Despite the Court’s activism, there has been relatively little political backlash and 
criticisms leveled against the court have not transformed into actions or policies against 
the Court. Furthermore, despite criticisms, compliance with court decisions remains 
relatively high. Furthermore, the “hyperactivity” of the Court, particularly in terms of 
rights, has not shifted or subsided despite the turnover of serving judges (although 
different judges use different readings of the constitution and laws). The Court’s general 




Similar trends have occurred in Colombia, making it one of the traditional success 
stories in Latin America. In 2002, the Colombian Constitutional Court’s decisions 
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granted protections to fundamental rights in 58% of the cases (Espinosa 2005). Since its 
inception, the Constitutional Court has promoted health rights by expanding its 
application to adults, children, and AIDS patients. In 1992, the Court unanimously ruled 
that the right to life and personal integrity must be preserved when threatened by the lack 
of access to diagnostic cervices, medicine, treatments, and surgeries. In 1995, the Court 
unanimously declared that children’s right to health is fundamental in and of itself, and 
includes the right to receive treatment—even in cases of incurable disease. In 1999, the 
Court unanimously asserted that the right to health, under certain conditions, can entitle 
social security affiliates to receive treatment abroad when no treatments are available 
nationally. 
 The Colombian Constitutional Court has expanded indigenous rights as well. In 
1992 it ruled that national authorities may not disregard indigenous communities in the 
building of infrastructure, thereby requiring a consultative process with the affected 
indigenous groups. In 1997, the Court ruled that indigenous communities have the 
fundamental collective right to preserve their cultural identity and, in a similar ruling, that 
indigenous individuals have the right to be judged by traditional indigenous authorities. 
The Court expanded these rights a year later when it decided that indigenous authorities 
have the right to exclude nonindigenous religious groups or churches from preaching in 
their territory in order to preserve their cultural integrity. 
 The Court further expanded human rights protections through its 2000 decision 
requiring the executive to attend to displaced populations, its 1995 decision banning 
employer discrimination of trade unions, and its 1999 decision banning school 
discrimination against poor students, as well as other decisions upholding minimum 
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income, the right to determine one’s own gender, the right to develop one’s personality, 
the right to determine one’s sexual orientation, the right to be free from discrimination, 
and equality of religion. 
 The Court’s active expansion of rights,131 combined with the tradition of 
compliance on the part of elected branches and lower courts, has made the Court 
particularly influential in setting previously marginalized rights topics on the political 
agenda and empowering private individuals. Indeed, the social actors that have made the 
most frequent use of the Court to advance their own interests have been those with the 
least power within the policy-making processes that affect them (Espinosa 2005). 
 
Chile 
 Disappointedly, Chile’s regular judiciary and constitutional court have chosen not 
to actively pursue or promote human rights despite democratization until only recently. 
During Pinochet’s military regime, the Supreme Court made it impossible to defend 
human rights through its perceived role to obey and apply existing law rather than 
determine justice. During the transition period, even as the Chilean courts were accused 
of lacking “moral courage” and being “reckless and biased,” the courts maintained their 
conservative stance hindering human rights development by holding international treaties 
to be inapplicable retroactively (thereby upholding the national amnesty laws for 
government officials accused of torture), refusing to allow civilian courts to hold trials for 
military officers (thereby granting these officers the protection of ‘in-house’ justice), and 
                                                           
131 While the Court appears to advance rights claims in cases under concrete review, the Court tends to 
defer to the executive more in rights cases under abstract review compared to other cases in abstract review 
(Rodriguez-Raga 2011). This deference may be due to substantive case facts that differ systematically 
between rights cases under concrete versus abstract review. 
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preventing the prosecution of crimes under international law (Simmons 2009: 292; Cuoso 
2005; Hilbink 2007).  
Even after several judicial reforms and the arrest of General Pinochet, the 
Constitutional Court remained passive, formalistic, mechanical, and deferential (Cuoso 
2005). In most cases where the Constitutional Court does object to legislation under 
judicial review, it is merely based upon a technical deficiency rather than enhancing 
rights (Cuoso 2005). More disturbing is that for the majority of freedom of speech cases 
the Supreme Court resolved, the perpetuator of the rights violations was the Court itself 
rather than the executive or legislative branches. Even when the elected branches did not 
censor reporters, authors, and directors, the Supreme Court supported censorship, 
justifying their decisions as simply “applying laws that give preeminence to the 
protection of honor over speech, and that if the law is bad, the political branches ought to 
change it”—despite, of course, the fact that these rights were protected by the Chilean 
constitution (Cuoso 2005).  Similar trends occurred in discrimination cases, where the 
Supreme Court upheld discrimination against women, homosexuals, HIV patients, and 
the disabled, indigenous population, and children out of wedlock. Even reforms to 
modernize the archaic criminal procedure codes were instituted by the executive rather 
than initiated or mandated by the courts, which never questioned the constitutionality of 
the codes. Furthermore, national amnesty laws were deemed legally untenable by the 
Chilean Supreme Court only recently, in the 2006 case where the Supreme Court make 
explicit that the CAT determines that the national amnesty law cannot be applied to 
crimes against humanity (Simmons 2009: 294; Hilbink 2007). Indeed, the Supreme Court 
systematically avoided constitutional interpretations and protections by ruling in favor of 
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petitioners in only 2.83% of inaplicabilidad cases132 between 1990 and 1996 (Gómez 
1999). 
Only recently, have Chilean courts begun to move away from their passive, 
deferential, and conservative role. Since 2005, Chilean courts have done an about-face on 
rights adjudication where they now actively investigate previously shelved cases and 
convict military officials (Couso and Hilbink 2011; Huneeus 2010). Additionally, the 
Chilean Supreme Court has even embraced international human rights law, although 
somewhat inconsistently (Cuoso and Hilbink 2011; Marré and Carvajal 2007), and lower 
court judges have begun taking independent, “innovative” stands in the defense of human 
rights even challenging institutional superiors and elected officials (Cuoso and Hilbink 
2011; Valenzuela and Muñoz 2007). Thus the courts have begun to enter the political 
sphere similar ways as Mexico, Costa Rica, and Colombia, becoming an important 
political actor.133 
The institutional reforms in 2005 substantially impacted the Constitutional 
Court’s jurisdiction and caseload due to the transfer of recursos de inaplicalidad cases 
from the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to the Constitutional Court and increased 
accessibility to members outside of the political elite. The reforms also significantly 
changed the membership of the Constitutional Court when judges no longer sit on both 
Supreme and Constitutional Courts (as before), and constitutional judges are selected 
from an independent pool of academics and politicians. This reform in selection has led 
                                                           
132 These cases are concrete constitutional review cases with inter partes effects. 
 
133 This about-face has both ideological and institutional origins (Cuoso and Hilbink 2011). A paradigm 
shift in the Chilean legal community moved the courts away from the formalism and prioritizing the 
necessity and legitimacy of judicial protection of rights. A series of reform also contributed to the 
professional profiles and incentive changes of those seeking careers in the judiciary (particularly at the 
lower court level and constitutional court level). 
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to increasingly professional, full-time judges who remain outside of the original 
hierarchical judicial structure so that court members represent a more assertive, activist, 
pro-rights attitude compared to previous judges embedded in the traditional culture of the 
judiciary prone to passive, conservative, and deferential decision making. These 
institutional reforms, combined with the growing rights-based constitutional discourse in 
Chile, have led to a more activist and political influential Constitutional Court that has 
abandoned its previously formalistic trends to invoke international human rights law and 
comparative jurisprudence in unprecedented ways and rule against the government’s 
preferred policies. 
Soon after these reforms, the Constitutional Court issued decisions promoting 
human rights, including ruling that health organizations’ raising the premiums of aging 
clients was unconstitutional because the right to health care had priority over the freedom 
to contract, ruling unconstitutional portions of the Civil Code on grounds that it violated 
the right to identity for children born out of wedlock. Indeed, the Court even endorsed the 
notion that the rights recognized in the International Covenant on Social, Cultural, and 
Economic Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the American Convention 
of Human Rights are integral parts of Chile’s constitutional system. These unprecedented 
decisions and endorsement of international law as valid Chilean constitutional law has 
marked the beginning of a political active Court seeking to engage in and promote human 
rights for the first time since Chile’s return to democracy. It is important to note, 
however, that these changes are relegated to the Constitutional Court (and a proportion of 
lower courts of first instance) rather than the Supreme Court, which has provided no 
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evidence of transitioning away from the formalistic, conservative, passive, and 
deferential judicial tradition.  
 
Conclusions 
Courts have the ability to promote and expand human rights protections in a 
unique way. This section has examined the changing trends in national court decision 
outcomes in order to determine whether courts are increasingly protecting human rights. 
In the cases of Mexico, Colombia, and Costa Rica, the courts appear to play active roles, 
although to varying degrees, in determining human rights policy through their decisions. 
Despite strong conservative, anti-right trends, Chilean courts is beginning exhibit 
optimistic behavior much more in line with international human rights law and norms. 
Yet this section only provides a brief a survey of the recent trends within Latin 
American states and produces no causal mechanisms for these trends. These trends are 
likely due to a variety of factors, which need to be evaluated. At this point, however, 
much of this data does not exist. Ideologies and political attitudes of judges likely 
determine part of these observations. In particular, Chile’s about face only occurred after 
constitutional reforms and complete turnover of Court membership. In order to evaluate 
the relative strength of various causal mechanisms like judicial ideology, constitutional 
amendment, conventionality control, or domestic political pressures, future research must 
systematically examine case outcomes across these countries and offer ways in which to 
operationalize these mechanisms. Despite the preliminary qualitative nature of these case 
study, however, they do tell us that Mexico is not a unique case in that it is promoting 
rights, although it may be the most active and effective (or have the best publicity, see 
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Staton 2010). Hence, the recent changes in IACHR and region, as well as the general 




 This section asserted that domestic high courts are well suited for the 
incorporation of international law through their ability to promote human rights 
protections consistent with international law. The section hypothesized that promoting 
courts should be evident through changes in their discretionary docket and through trends 
in their case outcomes. Preliminary qualitative evidence in Latin America illustrates 
growing trend that these courts are becoming more receptive to rights litigation and 
increasingly issuing favorable outcomes. Some courts are also increasingly choosing to 
hear rights cases within their discretionary docket, but this trend follows closely in line 
the observation that people are increasing seeking resolution through the courts to resolve 
these issues. In addition, several Latin American countries provide preliminary 
qualitative evidence for federal courts’ effective promotion of human rights. However, 
these results are limited, especially in that they cannot be generalized, they do not 
identify the details of these processes, and they do not offer a causal mechanism for these 
promoting trends. Hence, these case studies are far from conclusive. 
 Additionally, while right promotion is typically considered a benefit (or moral 
obligation), the court activism exhibited in these trends remains controversial and 
potentially retain detrimental consequences. Increased caseloads in predominantly 
mandatory dockets means that courts must eliminate cases on superficial bases, such as 
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procedural requirements, without addressing the substance of the case. Hence, portions of 
rights cases—especially of the poor, uneducated, and isolated—may be thrown out. 
Additionally, the increased workload may lead to substantive changes in the quality of 
decisions and their enforcement. Increased due process rights can also negatively affect 
the legitimacy of the courts and judicial system when criminals are perceived to be better 
protected than victims. The release of perceived criminals also may lead to increased 
vigilante violence where individuals take matters into their own hands rather than seek 
resolution through the judiciary. 
 
Comparison to common law countries  
The question remains about how generalizable are these Latin American trends in 
promoting human rights. While the results are limited, do we see similar behavior in 
common law countries? I address this issue, albeit briefly, here. 
Figure 3.8 illustrates the percentage of pro-individual decisions in civil liberty and 
criminal cases in common law countries, taken from the High Courts Database compiled 
by Stacia Haynie, Reginald Sheehan, Donald Songer, and C. Neal Tate (2007). The data 
provides information on the decisions produced by eleven high courts over time, 
including the Australian High Court (1969-2003), Canadian Supreme Court (1969-2003), 
Indian Supreme Court (1970-2000), Namibian Supreme Court (1990-1998, but with only 
17 observations), Philippines Supreme Court (1970-2003), South African Supreme Court 
of Appeal (1970-2000) and Constitutional Court (1995-2000), Tanzanian Court of 
Appeal (1983-1998), United States Supreme Court (1953-2005), United Kingdom’s 
Judicial Committee of the House of Lords (1970-2002), Zambian Supreme Court (1973-
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1997), and Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court (1989-2000).  The red line reflects the percentage 
of pro-individual decisions from a sample of criminal cases per year. The blue line 
reflects the yearly percentage of pro-individual decision of sampled civil liberties cases. 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Pro-individual Decisions in Civil Liberties and Criminal Cases in Common 
Law Countries  
 
Despite the fluctuations, pro-individual decisions have generally increased, albeit 
modestly, for criminal cases in most countries, particularly in South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Canada, and Australia. Civil liberties case trends are less apparent due to the wide 
fluctuations, although the United States appears to have experienced a decrease in pro-
individual civil liberties cases while Canada appears to have modestly increased pro-
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individual outcomes.134 However, trends are difficult to identify with such prominent 
fluctuations. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 reflect the yearly change in pro-individual rights 
decisions for these countries in civil liberties and criminal cases, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 3.9: Yearly Change in Pro-individual Civil Liberties Decisions 
 
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 reveal that these courts are typically much more consistent with their 
levels of pro-individual decisions in criminal cases compared to civil liberties cases—
with the exception of the United States which exhibits much less yearly fluctuation for 
civil liberties cases than criminal cases. The absence of positively-sloped trends in 
                                                           




Figure 3.10: Yearly Change in Pro-individual Criminal Decisions 
 
either civil liberties or criminal cases suggests that there are no long-term trends in rights 
promotion. Of course, these graphs are purely descriptive and are limited by the fact that 
they include a significant time range and we have no Latin American graphs with which 
to compare. Even limiting the time frame does not produce obvious coherent trends. 
These graphs make clear, however, that either the United States is noticeably more 
consistent with civil liberties cases than its criminal cases and much more consistent than 
other country’s handling of civil liberties, or the measures devised to define and 
categorize these cases and outcomes are particularly well suited to the United States but 
less so to the other countries. The wide fluctuation around zero also implies legal 
uncertainty or inconsistency may exist in either the adjudication or litigation of civil 
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liberties cases. Criminal cases, for most countries, may be more straightforward. The 
wide-ranging fluctuations in civil liberties cases could also be due to the substance of the 
cases themselves. For example, even as civil liberties rights become more entrenched 
legally and socially, the cases the high courts resolve are often more complicated and less 
straightforward. Hence, it is not obvious what causes the fluctuations over time. 
 
3.4 Game theoretic model of domestic court promotion  
Promoting courts, however, often must face possible repercussions for their decision 
to promote human rights—especially in non-democracies or transitioning countries. 
Often these decisions limit government behavior, which may lead to an executive 
choosing to ignore the court decision (i.e. not enforcing it) and/or the government 
punishing the court through the removal of jurisdiction, impeachment or member 
removal, court packing, court dissolution, reduction of salary and funding, threats of 
harm, etc. Hence, courts have incentives to behave strategically when incorporating 
international laws when the government may not be supportive. Namely, courts are 
unlikely to promote international law institutionalization if they believe that they will 
face significant punishment costs. This intuition is illustrated formally in a game theoretic 
model. 
The following simple game theoretic model identifies the conditions under which 
domestic high courts may be expected to institutionalize international human rights laws 
despite the possibility of significant constraints by state governments. This model moves 
beyond standard separation of powers models and principal-agent models common within 
the judicial field to include legal, strategic, and political parameters. This model thus 
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formalizes the conditions under which domestic high courts could essentially unilaterally 
institutionalize international human rights laws, thereby promoting human rights even in 
the face of possible punishment.135  
The following sequence of events summarizes the strategic interactions between a 
domestic high court and the state government. In the first stage, a domestic high court 
(HC) must decide whether to institutionalize international law domestically, where ‘y’ 
represents institutionalization or the change in domestic human rights policy through the 
court’s decision. Specifically, the court has two options: a) y = 0 where the court chooses 
not to institutionalize the law and no domestic policy change follows, and b) y > 0, where 
the court chooses to institutionalize international law, thereby changing domestic policy.  
The next stage consists of the state government (S) determining whether to sanction 
or punish the court (B) or not (~B) for each state of the world.136 In other words, the 
government decides to punish the court for suspected or perceived policy change (y). Any 
sanctions the government attempts have the probable effectiveness of J, representing the 
degree of judicial independence, which is known to both the government and court. The 
                                                           
135 Note that this model is appropriate only for decisions that alter national policy. As such it is 
inappropriate for amparo cases (which requires five similar, consecutive decisions in order to establish 
policy). Hence, for Mexico, this model would only include actions of unconstitutionality and constitutional 
controversies. This model could be applied to common law countries, however, which have the legal norm 
of stare decisis or precedent. Also, this model generally predicts the conditions under which a court would 
be judicially active. As such it is not limited to rights cases. 
 
136 State governments often have several tools to sanction or punish ‘wayward’ or ‘activist’ courts. Such 
tools typically include the ability of state governments to remove court jurisdiction, impeach judges, 
eliminate courts entirely, creating new courts to bypass the existing courts, and determining the level of 
judge salary and personal safety. For example, in April of 2013, a Hungarian constitutional amendment 
nullified the entire jurisprudence of the high court from 1990-2012 and inserted into the new constitution a 
series of laws previously declared unconstitutional by the Court. Even in United States, legislative attempts 
to curb Supreme Court jurisdiction occurred when the Court threatened to overturn a congressional scheme 
(see, for instance, Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) where the Court upheld Congress’ 
attempt to prevent the Supreme Court from considering the constitutionality of post-Civil War military 
reconstruction in the South). 
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government’s decision to sanction or not, however, is constrained by the degree of 
domestic political competition and sensitivity to its citizen support (p), where the higher 
the value p, the more likely citizens and opposition parties will mobilize to enact political 
costs electorally or calling upon the international community to pressure and/or sanction 
the government.  
If the state government decides to not sanction the court (~B), then the new domestic 
human rights law and policy stands. However, if the government sanctions the court (B) 
then the domestic human rights policy reverts to the status quo. In other words, regardless 
of the extent of domestic policy change (y), the government’s decision to punish always 
leads to the status quo policy. The game then ends and payoffs received. 
The utility function of the government is the following, provided the government 
does not sanction or punish the court: 
−( − ) +  
where S represents the government’s policy preference point for domestic human rights 
policy, y represents the newly implemented human rights policy/law, and L represents 
gained legitimacy or a reputation boost. The utility function for the government should it 
sanction the court is the following: 
	 + (1 − 	) −  
where J represents judicial independence, y represents the newly implemented human 
rights policy/law, Q represents the status quo (original domestic human rights law), p 
represents the likely domestic political costs, and cS represents the institutional (and 
logistical) costs of punishment incurred by the state government. Institutional costs refer 
to the costs a government incurs for implementing the punishment; in other words, this 
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term measures how easy or difficult it is for a government to decide and implement a 
sanction on the court.137 Institutional costs are related to the degree of political 
fragmentation within the government, or how easy it is for a government to acquire the 
necessary support to enact a sanction.138 
The utility function of the domestic court (HC), under the condition that it decides to 
institutionalize international law and is not sanctioned, is the following: 
−( − ) +  −  
where θ represents the international law policy position, y again represents the newly 
implemented human rights law/policy, L represents a legitimacy/reputation boost, and ε 
represents a small implementation cost for the court (which could include increases in 
work load for institutionalization). 
 The utility function of the domestic court, under the condition that it decides to 
institutionalize and is sanctioned, is the following: 
−	 − ( − )
 
where cC represents the cost of being sanctioned incurred by the court, J represents 
judicial independence, θ represents the international law policy position, and Q represents 
the status quo domestic human rights policy.139  
                                                           
137 Another way of conceptualizing these cost are vertical political costs (domestic political costs driven by 
the electorate, opposition parties, or citizen body) and horizontal political costs (institutional costs where 
the government must coordinate a sanction and implement it). 
 
138 This cost goes to zero when there is no political fragmentation or the executive/legislative bodies need 
no additional support and can unilaterally sanction. 
139 Each institution’s utility function assumes a unidimensional human rights policy space as well as single-
peaked preferences. This assumption is not unreasonable since this model refers to a single policy issue 
area. (Although, the model could be generalized for court activism in general.) 
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 Hence, this game represents the strategic dynamics between a domestic high 
court, which is assumed to prefer the new international policy over the status quo policy, 
and the state government, which prefers the status quo to the new human rights policy.140 
The court is constrained by the government through the possibility of sanctions, yet the 
government is also constrained by institutional factors and political factors. The sequence 




 Using backward induction, the government (S) is indifferent between sanctioning 
and not sanctioning the domestic high court when 
 =  ± (− + 	 − 	 +  + )). Hence, in order for the domestic high court to 
move human rights policy and maintain it (that is, not be sanctioned), then it must 
institute legal human rights change no more than ( ± (− + 	 − 	 +  + )).  
These solutions provide predicted main variables that determine the likelihood of 
sanctioning, and thereby inform the court’s decision to institutionalize or not. These 
variables consist of the government’s domestic policy preference, the domestic policy 
status quo, judicial independence of the domestic high court, domestic high court 
legitimacy, likelihood of political costs, and the institutional costs incurred by the 
government should it choose to punish the high court.  
     
                                                           
140 This assumption is not required for the model (as it simply turns the difference between government’s 
preferred policy point (S) and new legal policy (y) to zero. However, substantively, I am interested in courts 
promoting rights, especially in non-democracies or democratizing countries. In these cases, there is likely 
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Figure 3.11: Game theoretic model for policy-setting cases with substantive outcomes. 
 
Policy preferences 
While the above variables take on empirical values for the evaluation of this model, state 
government policy preference and the domestic policy status quo (represented by S and Q 
in the solution set above, respectively) take on assumed, standardized values. Deriving 
values for these variables is an attractive alternative because no existing data includes 
cross-country ideological measures that can be easily compared across countries and  
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Figure 3.12: Game theoretic model for policy-setting cases. 
 
across time.141 Hence, I assume that the status quo policy point is 0. Institutional policy 
preference points are determined in relation to the status quo point and standardized so 
that they range from -1 to 1. Standardization makes the solutions for each condition 
simpler and more intuitive without altering the relationship between points. This 
approach, when substituted into the solution sets, provides the three possible conditions: 
a) where the government policy preference is equal to the status quo (S = Q), b) where the 
government policy preference is right (more conservative/ less favorable to human rights) 
of the status quo (S > Q), and c) where the government policy preference is left (more 
liberal/more favorable to human rights) of the status quo (S < Q). 
                                                          
141 Even within American politics scholarship this proves problematic. 
 
y > 0  
 





In the first condition, where the government policy preference is the same as the 
domestic status quo (S = Q), both values are assumed to be 0. When both S and Q are 
assumed to be 0,142 then the solution set reduces to  
 = +(−	 +  + ).143 
 
In the second condition, where government preference is right (more 
conservative/ less protective of human rights) of the status quo (S > Q), then S takes on 
the value of 1 (while Q remains at 0). Because the current policy (status quo) is to the left 
of government preferences, this condition implies that the domestic high court is more 
liberal (i.e. more protective of human rights) than the government. This can be 




In this case where (S > Q), the solution set reduces to:  
 = 1 + (−	 +  + ). 
In the last condition, where the government preference is left (more liberal/ 
protective of human rights) of the status quo (S < Q), then S takes on the value of -1. This 
condition implies that the domestic high court is more conservative (i.e. less protective of 
                                                          
142 This scenario does not imply a location for the court’s policy preference. That is, the court’s policy 
preference could be anywhere along the spectrum. However, the likely scenario and that scenario 
substantively of interest is that the court is more liberal/supportive of human rights than the government 
policy preference and status quo. The court has less incentive to move policy away from the status quo if 
they prefer that location.  
 
143 Following the assumption that the court wants to move policy to be consistent with international law, the 
solution is the positive square root. Hence, while mathematically the square root in this condition (as well 
as the following conditions) may be positive or negative, only positive roots are included in the solution 
sets. 
C Q S 
 
 147
human rights) than the government—thereby pulling the status quo (Q) right.144 This can 




In this case (S < Q), the solution set reduces to:  
 = −1 + (−	 +  + ). 
Note, however, that this condition occurs since the model formalizes court activism in 
general but violates the assumption that courts want to move domestic policy toward 
international law. For this reason, I mention this condition yet will not discuss it further. 
Based upon these solution reductions, one sees that the main variables remain 
judicial independence, court legitimacy, domestic political costs, and institutional costs. 
Hence, the model predicts that court promotion is a function of judicial independence, 
legitimacy, and costs incurred by the government (domestic political and institutional 
costs). More interestingly, this model predicts that these variables are interchangeable.145 
In order for a court to promote, y must be greater than zero (per the solution set). 
                                                          
144 This condition typically occurs during transitional periods where the members of the court remain from 
the previous (ousted) regime. For instance, the Chilean Supreme Court hindered human rights development 
and protection regarding torture—despite the ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)—by holding international treaties to be 
inapplicable retroactively (thereby upholding the national amnesty laws for government officials accused of 
torture), refusing to allow civilian courts to hold trials for military officers (thereby granting these officers 
the protection of ‘in-house’ justice), and preventing the prosecution of crimes under international law 
(Simmons 2009: 292). Human rights development and protection did not propel forward until after several 
judicial reforms and the arrest of General Pinochet (Simmons 2009: 293; Hilbink 2007: 185). National 
amnesty laws were deemed legal untenable by the Chilean Supreme Court only recently, in the 2006 case 
where the Supreme Court make explicit that the CAT determines that the national amnesty law cannot be 
applied to crimes against humanity (Simmons 2009: 294). 
145 By interchangeable I mean that one component is substitutable by another. Hence none of the 
components (judicial independence, legitimacy, political competition, or political fragmentation) is 
individually necessary in order for a court to promote rights policy.  
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For the first two conditions (where S = Q and S > Q) this occurs when the square root 
value is positive.146 (Note that the square root must be taken from a positive number in 
order to avoid imaginary numbers.) Additionally, the higher the positive value of the 
radicand,147 the larger the square root—leading to a larger shift in policy (y). So the shift 
in policy by the court is maximized when the radicand reaches its highest point. In other 
words, policy shift is the highest when legitimacy, domestic political costs, and 
institutional costs are at their highest values.  
One way to maximize the radicand is to maximize court legitimacy. As legitimacy 
(L) increases, all else equal, the radicand increases. Another way to maximize the 
radicand is to maximize domestic political costs (that is, political competition and/or 
sensitivity to citizen support) and/or institutional costs (that is, political fragmentation or 
fractionalization). As either component increases, holding all else equal, the radicand 
increases, leading to a greater shift in policy by the court.  
Interchangeability or substitutability occurs for domestic political costs and 
institutional costs due to their multiplicative term. In other words, these components are 
interchangeable since an increase in either increases the radicand. Hence, even if political 
competition and sensitivity to citizens is low but non-zero, the presence of institutional 
costs like political fragmentation can drive up the radicand and thus lead to court 
promotion. Similarly, if institutional costs are low but non-zero, domestic political costs 
can still drive up the radicand. In other words, both domestic political costs and 
                                                           
146 In the third condition, which is not discussed since it violates the assumption that the court prefers to 
move domestic policy closer to international law, the larger the square root value means that the domestic 
policy change (y) moves closer to zero (i.e. no change) until the square root value surpasses 1, when the 
court may choose to promote. Until the square root value takes on the value of 1, however, the court may 
shift policy to be more conservative and less supportive of human rights. Again this condition occurs since 
the model formalized court activism in general.  
 
147 The radicand refers to the number beneath the square root symbol (i.e. the number one takes the root of). 
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institutional costs are not necessary for the court to promote; only one is necessary (so 
long as the other is non-zero). Furthermore, it doesn’t matter which it is. In this sense, 
domestic political costs are interchangeable with institutional costs, and vice versa.148 
Along the same lines, court legitimacy is interchangeable with both political and 
institutional costs. As legitimacy increases, the radicand also increases. Even if domestic 
political costs and institutional costs are zero (either or both), legitimacy can drive the 
radicand upward. The converse holds true as well, where is legitimacy is at zero, the 
combination of costs can drive the radicand upward. Of course, having both legitimacy 
and costs be non-zero further increases the radicand. In other words,  is interchangeable 
with . Thus, the court will promote if it has either legitimacy or the government incurs 
costs (or both, but only one is needed to promote). 
 Finally, when judicial independence is at its least—zero—then it becomes 
irrelevant (because the term drops out) and when it’s at its highest (J = 1) then the term 
becomes –y. Hence, when judicial independence is at its minimum and maximum, 
respectively, the solutions become:  
 = +( + ) 
 = 1 + (− +  + ) 
This suggests that courts can promote even without judicial independence. So long as 
legitimacy is present and costs occur (that is, they are non-zero), then the court will 
promote even without judicial independence.149 
These solutions generate testable hypotheses about the degree to which these 
                                                           
148Hence,  is interchangeable with . 
149 This solution reaffirms the results produced in Section 3.2 where courts matter even if they do not have 
high levels of judicial independence. 
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domestic factors influence court activism. Contrary to popular conceptions, judicial 
independence is not necessary for the promotion of rights by domestic courts and court 
should have much wider latitude to promote and expand rights policies more so than 
typically assumed. According to this model, a court that completely lacks judicial 
independence will promote as long as it has a) public support or b) sanctioning incurs 
some cost. Thus, judicial independence is unnecessary for court activism. Moreover, 
judicial independence is not sufficient to lead to promotion.  
More intuitively, promotion will occur as long as there is some public support for 
the court and some costs will be incurred if the state were to sanction. Also intuitively, as 
the domestic political costs and institutional costs increase, the greater the court activism. 
Less intuitively, political competition and the transaction costs for sanctioning are of 
equal importance and substitutable.  
However, these costs do not matter if a court has public support. Even in 
scenarios where the government is completely unconstrained, the court will still promote 
so long as it has some public backing and legitimacy. Hence in dictatorship where 
transaction costs of moving policy is essentially zero, court will engage in activist 
behavior so long it has public support.  
Alternatively, if the court has no public support, then it will only promote if the 
government faces ex post costs or if there is some degree of political competition. 
These solutions contribute a more nuanced perception—or at least testable 
predictions—of what factors are necessary and/or sufficient for court promotion or 
activism more generally. The main counterintuitive prediction is the judicial 
independence is neither necessary nor sufficient for court promotion. Public support of 
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the court is a sufficient condition but not a necessary condition. Ex post costs incurred by 
the government for sanctioning are also sufficient but not necessary conditions. The 
steeper the sanctioning costs and the greater the public support for the court increase the 
size of the policy shift, where the most significant policy shifts by the court occur when 
both sanctioning costs and legitimacy are present and high. 
 
3.5 Chapter Conclusions 
 This chapter addressed the role of domestic high courts on the institutionalization 
or adoption of international human rights laws. It evaluated the influence of judicial 
independence across different types of rights, offered preliminary evidence of recent 
trends of Latin American high court promotion of human rights, and argued that judicial 
independence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the promotion of human 
rights. This argument is consistent with each of the sections in this chapter, particularly in 
terms of empowerment rights protections, the extent to which citizens seek courts for 
resolutions, and Latin American qualitative trends of rights promotion; the game theoretic 
model corroborated these observations as well as provides a more nuanced perception of 
how domestic factors interact or influence court behavior.  
These judicial independence results corroborate Helmke and Rosenbluth’s (2009) 
conclusion that judicial independence is not necessary for the rule of law. Furthermore, 
judicial independence, they find, is a poor indicator for how deeply committed a 
government is towards its minority and individual rights. The game theoretic model 
presented here, however, contradicts their intuition that judicial independence is more 
important when electoral competition is muted, however, yet corroborates their argument 
 
 152
that public support is important in maintaining the rule of law. Furthermore, these results 
provide the conditions under which Helmke and Rosenbluth (2009) conclude, “each may 
substitute where the other is lacking.” 
Yet, these analyses leave much to be desired for future work. It is important to 
discover whether federal court promotion affects individuals, especially when civil law 
mandates that most rights cases do not set policy unless a specific majority is reached 
and/or a series of similar, consecutive decisions occur.  In terms of Mexico’s judicial 
reform, will states adequately transition to the new system to make the rights enshrined 
effectively enforced? Additionally, problems of police corruption rampant in Latin 
America may leave several rights to fall behind. Also, how do ideologies and the 
professionalization of justices affect the decision to promote rights? How do international 
legal changes through conventionality control, for example, compare to domestic 
institutional changes in their ability to influence international law internalization? Are 
these recent trends in rights promote and court activism temporary or part of a longer 
process of the development of the rule of law? 
Furthermore these analyses treated international law in its broadest sense. By 
doing so the chapter only addressed normative, diffuse influences of international law 
rather than treaty provisions, international agreements, or supranational court 
jurisprudence. In other words, this chapter likely underestimates the influence of law 
because it only captured unlinked international legal and human rights norms rather than 
explicit commitments and obligations. Hence, I now turn to these explicit international 




REGIONAL COURTS AND THE ADOPTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 
This chapter addresses the role of regional court jurisprudence in the domestic adoption 
of international human rights laws. Despite the proliferation of judicial and quasi-judicial 
bodies in the international arena scholars remain split as to whether supranational courts, 
and international law more generally, exert influence. This chapter evaluates the 
following questions in an effort to contribute to this debate: do states comply with 
regional court decisions, particularly those with legal reform requirements? How long do 
states take to comply? Under what conditions do they comply with required domestic 
legal reform? Does ‘peer pressure’ induce compliance?  
Because I am interested in the internalization of international human rights laws, I 
focus on legal reform. While informative, general compliance rates can only provide 
indirect evidence that the IACHR, and regional courts more generally, influence the 
incorporation of international human rights laws domestically. Some of the reparations 
that determine compliance rates are not likely to be representative of incorporation. For 
example, the return of victim remains, the erecting of a plaque or monument, or the 
creation of a scholarship does not alter domestic legal systems or identities. Some 
reparations may lead to incorporation but do not necessitate incorporation of international 
legal norms. For example, human rights training programs help disseminate information 
 
 154
about rights protections and violations which could instigate socialization to these norms 
domestically. The expunging of victim criminal records may set an informal legal 
standard upon which future judges refer. Yet, the only direct way to gauge incorporation 
that generates lasting150 change that influences the identity of the states and the 
interactions among all its citizens are changes in domestic laws themselves. Hence the 
only reparation demanded by the IACHR that directly produces these effects are when it 
demands that domestic laws are amended, repealed, or established. Hence, in order to 
most directly evaluate the influence of the IACHR on domestic incorporation of 
international human rights laws is to examine the extent to which states are altering their 
domestic legal systems, thereby complying with IACHR orders. 
Despite the institutional and political mechanisms that suggest regional courts are 
or can be influential and important in incorporation summarized in Chapter 2, empirical 
evidence of compliance and international law incorporation have been at best mixed. 
Posner and Yoo (2005) argue that the IACHR has had “trouble securing compliance with 
its decisions,” apparent in the single case of full compliance and 5% overall compliance 
(including full and partial compliance). Hawkins and Jacoby (2010) provide a more 
comprehensive yet descriptive analysis of the IACHR finding that, in general, it secures 
50% partial compliance and 6% full compliance. More importantly, however this is the 
first study that evaluates regional court influence on incorporation where they identify 
compliance with the IACHR order to reform domestic laws. Compliance to these orders 
occurs 7% of the time—which is the lowest compliance rate relative to other reparation 
requirements. According to the Court itself, however, it secures, in general, an 18% full 
                                                           
150  The majority of IR scholarship examines these questions through changes in state behavior following 
the ratification of treaty provisions. While also worthwhile, these changes are not institutionalized or 
internalized and do not represent permanent or lasting change.  
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compliance rate and 62% partial compliance rate (reported in the 2014 Annual Report by 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).151 It does not, however, report 
individual reparation compliance. Using the same coding devices as Hawkins and Jacoby 
(2010), I generate an original dataset of compliance records from 2001-2015 reveal a 
32% full compliance rate (and an even higher overall compliance rate of 72%) to 
reparations requiring domestic legal reform.152 These levels of compliance, while 
perhaps not as high as they could ideally be, are significantly higher than those 
previously calculated, largely due to the longer timeframe that I examine. Note, however, 
that these compliance rates deal exclusively for legal reform reparations not for the entire 
case. Yet, of the reparations utilized by the IACHR, this reparation is the most difficult to 
achieve. These findings imply a significantly higher compliance level to the IACHR that 
previously assumed, especially with perhaps the most difficult reparation with which 
states must comply.  
 
Merging International Law and International Relations to Explain Compliance 
Since these compliance rates do not explain why or under what conditions 
compliance occurs, one must offer theoretical mechanisms that cause the incorporation of 
international human rights law and compliance. These mechanisms can be summarized 
through sets of factors: domestic political costs and incentives, domestic legal system and 
                                                           
151 (http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/activities/speeches/23.04.14.asp) 
 
152 Coding for full compliance is identical to Hawkins and Jacoby (2010), but the coding for partial 





the rule of law, regional ‘peer pressure,’ transnational advocacy network and 
mobilization, and entrenchment within the international human rights regime.  
 
Domestic Political Incentives 
The first mechanism broadly asserts that compliance occurs because of a cost-
benefit analysis by the state and court. While noncompliance is formally costless in that it 
does not induce ‘hard’ sanctions, compliance may be beneficial and/or noncompliance 
could be costly. In this scenario, the IACHR can induce or predict compliance based 
upon changes or conditions within the state. In terms of domestic political factors that 
make noncompliance costly, most theories postulate that these factors consist of the 
following: the ease with which political actors can alter policy (such as the number of 
veto player and degree of government fractionalization), domestic political competition 
and the presence of opposition parties, state capacity, foreign aid, foreign direct 
investment, and regime type. 
The ease with which political actors can alter domestic laws likely informs state 
decisions to comply. States where there are few constraints or veto points in changing the 
law per IACHR request are more likely to be able to comply than states where legal 
policy change is difficult and heavily constrained. In essence, the greater the number of 
veto players and the greater their ideological distance, the higher the transaction costs to 
comply. As change in laws require more political actors with veto power, the more 
difficult collective action agreements become. Similarly, as government fractionalization 
or the more divided political actors’ preference become, the higher the transaction costs 
and less likely legal reform is possible.  
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Domestic electoral or political pressure on the incumbent should similarly inform 
decisions to comply. When political competition is intense, the higher the likelihood that 
the decision to not comply will lead to ex post costs since the political opposition has 
incentives to mobilize the opposition. In other words, when political competition is 
intense, opposition parties are likely seeking to mobilize their supporters and gain new 
support. If an incumbent makes a ‘bad,’ unfavorable, questionable decision—like 
choosing to ignore international obligations to respect rights and issue reparations 
received by the IACHR—then the opposition will take that decision and run with it, 
mobilizing their supporters and erode incumbent support. Of course, this mechanism 
assumes that (at least) the opposition parties are aware of the IACHR reparation orders 
and that they care or find it strategically beneficial. 
State capacity highlights the dilemma some state may face where a state is willing 
to comply but lacks the resources to comply. The lack of resources could refer to the lack 
of economic resources, informational deficiency, or the need for skill acquisition. In 
terms of all three, more developed countries may exhibit greater compliance because they 
not only have the will to but the capacity to comply. Economic development enables 
financial resources that that state can allocate to compliance, but improved economic 
conditions should also facilitate the proliferation of human rights organizations and 
nongovernmental organizations as well as enable their work disseminating information 
through improved technology and increased access to it and supplying necessary skills 
for mobilization and litigation (Meernik et al. 2012).  
Foreign aid may influence the likelihood of compliance in that it represents 
external economic pressure to comply as well as increase international attention (Keck 
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and Sikkink 1998, 6). However, Lebovic and Voeten (2009) find that governments lack 
the incentive to punish human rights violations bilaterally and that human rights 
violations have no effect on multilateral aid allocations. Other scholars similarly question 
whether human rights practices influence foreign aid policies (see Apodaca and Stohl 
1999; Poe 1990); nonetheless, states may feel pressure to comply with IACHR decisions 
in order to ensure the continuation of economic assistance. 
Foreign direct investments offer a similar consideration in the decision to comply. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) provides economic pressure that would induce a higher 
probability of compliance. Foreign investors seek to protect their investments and 
property from encroaching state governments. Hence, states must signal safe investment 
through their respect for the rule of law—not just through the existence of property rights 
but also through their respect for independent adjudication with possibility of unfavorable 
decisions with which the state will comply. If states do not comply with court decisions, 
then investors should have little faith that the state would respect other court decisions 
that rule against the state in favor of the investors. This lack of credibility in terms of 
maintaining protected investments would lead to foreign investors to not invest, thereby 
reducing FDI. Furthermore, foreign investors are wary of investing in states publicly 
targeted by human rights organizations for rights violations, meaning that ‘naming and 
shaming’ strategies international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) impose real 
costs on states (Barry, Clay, and Flynn 2013). If a state is a party to an IACHR case, it is 
likely also the target of human rights ‘shaming’ campaigns, which would persuade a state 
to comply in order to salvage its investments (or the IACHR generates sufficient 
publicity to warrant similar effects). 
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Finally regime type may be important in that it determines the incentive structures 
in the first place. More democratic regimes are more likely to comply with the IACHR 
decisions. However, the influence of regime retains little value in terms of micro-theory 
causal mechanisms. It is likely that the influence of regime simply captures the above 
mechanisms.  
 
Domestic Legal Systems and the Rule of Law 
Domestic legal system and the rule of law may similarly contribute to 
international law internalization and compliance. Regarding domestic legal norms and the 
level of congruence with the IACHR, no variation exists across selected Latin American 
states. All of these states have civil law systems and grant blanket compulsory 
jurisdiction to the IACHR. However, they differ in terms of their rule of law 
development. National high courts with higher levels of judicial independence may 
represent states that have a higher regard or respect for the rule of law. In this case, high 
level of judicial independence proxies the state’ respect for the rule of law. States with 
high respect for the rule of law are more likely to comply with IACHR decisions. 
Effective judiciaries create ex post costs for states considering violating the agreement, 
thereby incentivizing the state to comply (Conrad 2014; Kelley 2007; see also Conrad 
and Ritter 2013). 
However, independent judiciaries that serve as effective constraints may lead to 
the state to decide to not comply with orders for legal reform precisely because the court 
will hold the state accountable to the commitment. In other words, states seeking to 
comply without being held accountable under the reformed laws would be less likely to 
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comply if they know that they will be required to follow the law by the judiciary. This is 
the same intuition as that for the relationship between judicial independence and treaty 
ratification and compliance, where states only comply with treaty obligations if domestic 
legal enforcement is strong but are less likely to ratify treaties, thereby adopting new 
constraints, if domestic legal enforcement is strong (Powell and Staton 2009). The 
existence of independence courts that are able and willing to keep the government in 
check creates ex post costs for the government to amend the laws in ways that constrains 
it in the future.153  
Yet another possible scenario occurs when national courts enjoying high levels of 
judicial independence decide to unilaterally alter the domestic law, such as through 
conventionality control. Because these courts are independent, they face fewer, less 
severe, and/or less likely negative responses by the government. For example, in Bámaca 
Velásquez v. Guatemala, the Guatemalan Supreme Court declared it “necessary to 
execute the nullity of the national resolution” that the IACHR declared “violates the 
universal legal principles of justice” and ordered new trial proceeding offering “an 
unrestricted respect of the rules of due process.” It further nullified the previous verdicts 
by the lower courts and declared the ‘self-enforceability of the Judgment issued by the 
Inter-America Court.” In this case, the courts unilaterally complied with the IACHR 
without the support or consultation from either the executive or legislative branches. 
Since independent courts are often emboldened after states commit to international 
                                                           
153 High level of judicial independence might also increase the likelihood of the IACHR to judge state 
remedies as compliant since part of their evaluation for full compliance is that they believe the violations in 
question will either not occur in the future or will be domestically enforced. The IACHR would have little 





human rights treaties and thus more likely to constrain and sanction violators, it seems 
plausible that the same effect would occur after an IACHR reparation order or 
conventionality control order (Powell and Staton 2009; Simmons 2009). 
The first two judicial independence mechanisms predict contradictory responses: 
one where judicial independence leads to compliance while the other leads to 
noncompliance. It is unclear which of these competing tensions would emerge victorious 
or if they would simply cancel each other out. The third mechanism moves the rational 
choice from the state government to the courts, which makes this mechanism 
fundamentally different in process from the other two mechanisms. However, its leads to 
predictions that higher levels of judicial independence would lead to increased likelihood 
of compliance as well as increased likelihood of conventionality control declarations and 
an activist court. 
 
‘Peer Pressure’ 
‘Peer pressure’ from neighbors or regional peers may also induce compliance to 
IACHR due to reputation costs. States incur reputational costs when other states and 
political actors perceive that the state has failed to honor a commitment. Since virtually 
all of Latin American share membership in the same institutions and have committed to 
the same obligations, reputational costs are likely to be high for noncompliance. 
Noncompliance signals that a state’s commitments are not credible, which can be costly 




‘Peer pressure’ could also be induced through socialization there the reputational 
cost are incurred not from the loss of credibility in commitments but from lack of 
conformity to role orientations, norms, values, and goals shared by members within the 
same community. The motivations are difficult to distinguish and may occur 
simultaneously. For example, Simmons (2000) finds that commitments to international 
law by regional neighbors exert a positive influence on state compliance to international 
law. In other words, states are more likely to comply when their neighbors are 
complying, but we do not know whether the reputational costs were rationalist-economic 
or normative.  
 
Transnational Advocacy Network and Mobilization 
Human rights organizations are crucial in the monitoring of rights violations, the 
publication and dissemination of this information, the mobilization of individuals and 
parties on these issues, and the presence of rights on political agendas through 
mobilization and lobbying for legal reform (Meernik et al. 2012; Brysk 1993). Human 
rights organizations with permanent locations with a state are the most likely to aware of 
the lack of legal changes as well as the presence of IACHR cases still pending 
compliance,154 and they are the most likely to publish this information and push 
compliance onto the national agenda and mobilize opposition. These organizations are 
also crucial to the theory of international shaming where these are the organization that 
demand international attention in order to initiate a ‘shaming’ strategy and pressure the 
                                                           
154 I assume that these organizations are aware of IACHR cases pending compliance because these cases 
typically have favorable decisions for the victims and HROs, and these decisions provide legitimation to 
HRO missions as well as increased relevancy of the organizations themselves (and the amount of attention 




state regime domestically through mobilizing citizens and opposition groups. The 
presence of these organizations increases the potential costs for noncompliance; therefore 
increased presence of human rights organization should increase the likelihood of 
compliance to IACHR decisions. 
 
Rights Regime Entrenchment 
The more entrenched a state is within the international rights regime, the more 
social, reputational, and normative pressures states face and the greater the associated 
costs should states fail to comply with IACHR decisions. The more international treaties, 
conventions, covenants, and protocols the state has ratified, including the supplementary 
and optional ones, the greater the states’ obligations to their rights commitments to the 
IACHR and other members within the regime community. Additionally, noncompliance 
for an entrenched state could be more costly in that it calls into question its credibility to 
a wider set of commitments. Thus, states that are more entrenched within the 
international human rights regime are more likely to comply with IACHR reparations to 
reform domestic law relative to less-entrenched states. 
 Before turning to my model and methodology, I offer a brief reminder of the 
IACHR as an institution. 
  
Background to IACHR 
 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights was established by the American 
Convention on Human Rights in 1979, but Court only received its first case in 1986. Its 
first judgment on preliminary objections in Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras became 
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published in 1987, and its first compliance report was published on September 10, 
1996.155 Compliance reports, while not part of the original charter of the Convention, is 
an implied enforcement mechanism the IACHR established by 1996. As of 2004, twenty-
five of the 34 American states have ratified the American Convention and 21 have 
granted the IACHR compulsory jurisdiction (Posner and Yoo 2005).156 
 The IACHR is a permanent court of seven judges that has advisory157 and 
contentious jurisdiction, where its decisions are legally binding and not subject to appeal. 
The Court only has the authority to hear cases claiming a violation of the American 
Convention and has authority to reparations, remedial actions, and compensation for 
violations.  
 The process for cases heard by the IACHR proceeds in essentially three phases, 
after which a judgment is published (although sometime the judgment contains all 
phases). The first phases are the admissibility and merits stage, where the Court evaluates 
the merits and admissibility of the case as well as their jurisdiction to hear the case and 
the preliminary objections phase where states submit their objections to the IACHR 
hearing the case. The final stage is when the Court issues a judgment ruling the outcome 
and a judgment on reparations that explicitly states what remedial actions a state must 
                                                           
155 Not all cases have compliance reports. In some cases, the Court acknowledged the state’s preliminary 
objections and dismissed the case. Other cases are still pending merit and reparations judgments. Many of 
the cases whose reparations and judgments have been issued recently also do not have compliance reports. 
 
156 All of the Latin American, Spanish-speaking, civil law countries analyzed in this chapter have ratified 
the American Convention and granted compulsory jurisdiction to the IACHR. The Dominican Republic 
was the latest to grant compulsory jurisdiction in 1999. The date of compulsory jurisdiction grants by 
country are as follows: Peru 1981, Ecuador 1984, Chile 1990, Venezuela 1981, Panama 1990, Guatemala 
1987, Argentina 1984, Colombia 1985, Paraguay 1993, Mexico 1998, El Salvador 1995, Uruguay 1985, 
Costa Rica 1980, Bolivia 1993, Nicaragua 1991, Honduras 1981, and Dominican Republic 1999. 
 
157 The IACHR can render advisory opinions interpreting the Convention or other human rights treaties at 
the request of the Commission, any OAS member state (regardless of whether it is a party to the 
Convention), or certain OAS organs.  
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take in order to comply with the Court’s judgment. In most cases, the Court will also 
issue compliance reports on a yearly basis for each case pending full compliance. 
  The IACHR has been active,158 where an estimated 169 contentious cases have 
received judgments by the Court. Additionally, the Commission received 2000 petitions 
in 2013—the most its ever received—and has 1753 cases at the admissibility and merits 
stage by the end of 2013. Table 4.1 shows the yearly activity of the Court and 
Commission.159   
While data are not available for each year due to changes in reporting by the 
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, one sees several trends in the data, 
represented in Figure 4.1 through Figure 4.3. First, Figure 4.1 shows that the number of 
cases presented to the IACHR by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights has 
increased over time. While only two cases were submitted to the Court in 1997, sixteen 
cases were submitted in 2010 and 11 in 2013. Hence the Court has been increasingly 
asked to adjudicate contentious cases over time. Figure 4.2 reveals that not only has the 
Court been presented with more cases but the Court has issued increasing numbers of 
decisions, thereby answered the call to adjudicate in greater numbers of cases. Albeit 
with some fluctuation (and despite the particularly low number for 2014 due to lack of 
data from compliance records), the IACHR has not only heard more cases but has issued 
decisions on them. 
 
                                                           
158 For clarification, the abbreviation IACHR always refers to the Court rather than the Commission (which 
shares the same acronym). 
 
159 Data are derived from the Commission’s annual reports, with the exception of the number of judgments 




Table 4.1: Usage and Activity of Inter-American Court of Human Rights 























1988 1 -- -- -- -- -- 
1989 2 -- -- -- -- -- 
1990 0 -- -- -- -- -- 
1991 0 -- -- -- -- -- 
1992 0 -- -- -- -- -- 
1993 0 -- -- -- -- -- 
1994 0 -- -- -- -- -- 
1995 3 -- -- -- -- -- 
1996 1 -- -- -- -- -- 
1997 3 23 2 435 147 34% 
1998 4 25 3 571 116 20% 
1999 4 30 7 520 161 31% 
2000 4 23 3 658 110 17% 
2001 7 4 5 885 96 11% 
2002 1 11 7 979 83 8% 
2003 5 6 15 1050 115 11% 
2004 11 4 12 1319 160 12% 
2005 14 7 10 1330 150 11% 
2006 15 8 14 1325 147 11% 
2007 8 4 14 1456 126 9% 
2008 9 7 9 1323 118 9% 
2009 12 13 11 1431 122 9% 
2010 8 4 16  1598 275 17%  
2011 13 -- -- -- -- -- 
2012 19 -- -- -- -- -- 
2013 13 -- 11 2000 340 17%  
2014 2 -- -- -- -- -- 
2015 --  -- -- -- -- 
 
  Part of the reason for increased litigation at the IACHR is likely due to the 
dramatic increases of petitions submitted to the Commission over time. As shown in 
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.3, the number of petitions submitted to the Commission has 
increased from 435 petitions in 1997, to 2000 petitions in 2013. Hence, people seeking 
justice are increasing utilizing the Commission and thus the Court. However, the 




Figure 4.1: Cases Presented to IACHR by Commission 
 
 




and therefore processed to open a case.160 (Although speculative, this stability is likely 
due to workload considerations of both the Commission, who has to investigate each 
admissible petition and case, and the Court.) 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Petition Activity in the Inter-American Commission 
 
                                                           
160 There are four admissibility requirements (set forth in Article 46(1) of the American Convention): 1) the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies (where the burden of proof for exhaustion is on the State); 2) compliance 
with the 6 month rule that states a petition must have been filed within 6 months from the date on which the 
party alleging the violation of the rights was notified of the final judgment of domestic legal remedies (for 
cases where domestic remedies were inadequate/ineffective then the court uses a ‘reasonable time’ test and 
this rule does not prevent the bringing of a claim that concerns an alleged violation that may have 
commenced more than 6 months before the case is brought but that involves a continuing breach); 3) no 
case may be pending before another international forum on the same subject; and 4) the provision of details 
of the petitioner or his/her representative which requires that the ‘petition contains the name, nationality, 
profession, domicile, and signature of the person or persons of the legal representative of the entity lodging 
the petition. There are also inadmissibility requirements: 1) any of the requirements of admissibility has not 
been met; 2) the petition or communication does not state facts that tend to establish a violation of the 
rights guaranteed by the Convention; 3) the statements of the petitioner or the state indicate that the petition 
or communication is manifestly groundless or obviously out of order; or 4) the petition is substantially the 




 Hence the IACHR is not irrelevant and has been increasingly sought out by 
people seeking justice for rights violations.161 For the most part, the Court has responded 
by increasing the number of cases it hears and issues decisions on. Furthermore, the 
Court remains relevant in that it retains, in general, an 18% full compliance rate and 62% 
partial compliance rate (reported in the 2014 Annual Report by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights).162 
 Yet, despite the increasing usage of the Commission and Court and these general 
compliance rates, little is known as to how the IACHR influences state behavior—
especially the degree to which its decisions influence domestic state laws regarding 
human rights. While previous scholarship examining the effects of international law and 
regional courts on rights violations (typically physical integrity rights violations) is 
important, the influence of international law through regional courts is the most stringent 
test of international law and regional court influence. Domestic legal reform initiated due 
to the IACHR’s requirement in their judgment on reparations is the most stringent test of 
compliance and international law/regional court influence in that it is the most costly to 
the state compared other types of reparations required by the Court and the most difficult 
one with which to comply. Reforming domestic human rights law offers a more 
permanent, widespread change that affects the entire nation rather than individual 
litigants. In addition, by making international law enforceable domestically, such reforms 
expand legal protections, grant legal standing and legitimization to potential future 
                                                           






litigants seeking justice in domestic courts, and make state violations more costly in that 
they can be held accountable domestically for reneging/violating domestic law.  
However, no existing data or scholarship, to my knowledge, examines to what 
degree and in what way does international law through the IACHR influences domestic 
law. Hence, in order to examine the degree to which international law becomes 
domestically adopted and institutionalized (again per the order of IACHR), I generated an 
original dataset of the IACHR cases and compliance from 2001-2015, which I describe 
below. In order to maintain a most similar system design for analysis, I limit all analyses 
to Spanish-speaking, civil law Latin American countries as described in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 The original dataset is compiled from the universe of public documents made 
available by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (online at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/compliance-with-judgment).163 This data spans from 
2001-2015.164 The unit of analysis is at the individual case level, with 114 unique 
cases.165 This data codes whether the Inter-American Court of Human Rights required the 
                                                           
163 These include documents in English and Spanish. 
 
164 To my knowledge, the IACHR has issued/heard 159 cases for Latin America (excluding Suriname, 
Haiti, Brazil, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago). Of these, compliance records exist (and are included in 
the data) for 114 cases. There are, to my knowledge, 14 cases that require domestic legal reform for which 
no compliance records could be obtained. Similarly, compliance records could not be obtained for 22 cases 
that did not require domestic legal reforms, 6 cases where I do not know what the reparations were, and 3 
cases where no reparations or compliance records exist because the state was not found at fault (2 cases) or 
where a friendly settlement was reached (1 case). Coding on reforms and issue area were cross-checked 
when possible with the Loyola University Law School’s IACHR Project (https://iachr.lls.edu). 
165 While the cases begin in 1987, compliance records are available only as early as 2001; in other words, 
the earliest compliance record publicly available was published in 2001. Each unique case often comprises 
several compliance reports (in addition to the judgments on merits and reparations). Compliance reports for 
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state to amend, adopt, or repeal existing domestic laws as part of the required reparations 
issued in its judgments. Reparation requirements often consist of the payment of 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, public statements on the radio or in newspapers 
acknowledging state responsibility for the human rights violations, the creation of 
education scholarships, the erection of monuments or plaques, human rights training 
courses for police and/or military, the investigation and prosecution of individual(s) 
responsible for the violations, identification and delivery of victim remains to family, the 
publication of the Court’s judgment, the creation of databases, expunging of criminal 
records, investing in a regional fund for rights victims (Fondo de Asistencia Legal de 
Víctimas),166 providing victims with medical and psychological treatment and assistance, 
and the annulment of any domestic sentences. However, for a proportion of cases, the 
regional court requires permanent changes in state domestic law.167 Of the 114 unique 
cases heard by the Inter-American Court (pertaining to Spanish-speaking, civil law 
countries only), 50 cases require changes in the state’s domestic law or 44% of cases 
require domestic legal reform. 
For these cases, the data codes noncompliance as 0, full compliance as 1, and 
partial compliance as 2. In order to register as full compliance, the Inter-American Court 
                                                                                                                                                                             
an individual case vary from one to eleven reports, where reports are typically published once a year. 
Hence, more recent cases often have fewer compliance reports than older cases. 
 
166 This fund, el Fondo de Asistencia Legal del Sistema Interamericano, was established in 2008 by the 
Organization of American States (OEA) General Assembly with the goal of assisting human rights victims 
access the Inter-American Court (and Commission) who would otherwise not be able to take their case to 
the Court. The fund relies on voluntary contributions and by OEA state members. 
167 Coding for domestic legal changes must affect the population and be (effectively) permanent, so 
expunging criminal records for individuals, human rights training for military, new trials, annulment of 





must explicitly conclude in its compliance report that the domestic law requirement is 
fully complied with. Hence, I use the Court’s judgment for successful compliance 
because the Court’s own determination of compliance is the most straightforward and 
consistent way to gauge compliance across cases. Of the 50 cases requiring legal 
changes, there are 16 full compliance cases (32% full compliance).168 
 In order to register as partial compliance, I define partial compliance as domestic 
legal changes that the Court explicitly applauds. In essence, these cases consist of 
successful changes in domestic laws per the Court requirement for compliance, but the 
Court wishes to wait to see how the law is implemented before issuing their ‘full 
compliance’ judgment. Most of these partial compliance cases are determined partially 
compliance by the Court itself; however, the Court provides no explicit procedures or 
requirements to declare partial compliance. Hence, Court standards for declaring ‘partial 
compliance’ are unknown, and it remains unclear whether these standards or 
requirements have remained the same over time and across cases. For example, the legal 
reforms catalyzed by Loayza Tamayo v. Peru were declared as partially compliant in 
2003, yet the Court declared full compliance in 2011 despite no additional changes in 
domestic reform.  For this reason, I code partial compliance as successful domestic legal 
reform per Court judgment but where it remains to be seen that the law will be 
implemented and enforced in a manner consistent with international law and the Court  
                                                           




judgment. Of the 50 cases requiring legal changes, there are 20 partial compliance cases 
(40% partial compliance).169  
 Using this coding scheme, the rate of compliance by reforming domestic laws to 
international standards in Spanish-speaking, civil law Latin American countries is 32% 
for full compliance (16/50 cases), 40% for partial compliance (20/50 cases), and 72% 
overall compliance, which includes both full and partial compliance (36/50 cases).170 
 These levels of compliance are particularly high—especially if one remembers the 
7% compliance recorded by Hawkins and Jacoby (2010). Indeed this compliance record 
is especially noteworthy because the types of legal reforms required for compliance are 
not superficial. All domestic legal changes were designed to match domestic law to 
international human rights laws standards. These reforms include creating legally defined 
crimes of forced disappearance, altering anti-terrorism laws to include due process and 
habeas corpus rights (along with other detention condition issues), and expanding civil, 
political, and economic rights to disenfranchised or indigenous groups. For example, in 
Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, the IACHR ordered Costa Rica to “bring its domestic legal 
system into conformity with the provisions of […] the American Convention.” Costa 
Rica fully complied in 2010 by 1) making a range of amendments to the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, such as “expanding the judgment appeals system by adding a 
criminal judgment appeals proceeding; reforming the review procedure; and, 
strengthening the principle of orality in criminal proceedings;” 2) creating a judgment 
                                                           
169 Partial compliance represents 17.5% of the data. Note that for two cases there were multiple legal 
reforms required where one was fully complied with while one had not been. These have been coded as 
partial compliance. 
 
170 Eleven cases in the compliance data are excluded where the countries are not Spanish-speaking or civil 




appeals recourse so that all judgments and dismissals issued in the trial phase are 
appealable; and 3) modifying the judicial review proceeding, which “shall act against the 
judgment issued by the tribunals of appeal i) when the existence of contradictory orders 
issued by said tribunals are alleged, or by said tribunals and by the Court of Criminal 
Review, or ii) when the judgment does not comply with or erroneously applies a 
substantive or procedural legal precept.”171 This case is representative of the stringent 
requirements the Court has for appropriate legal reform across cases and countries and 
reflects the substantial reform requirements necessary. 
 Similarly, the IACHR in Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia ordered the state to adopt, “in 
accordance with Article 2 of the Convention, [of] those measures for the protection of 
human rights that will ensure the free and full exercise of the right to life, to freedom and 
humane treatment and the right to fair trial and judicial protection, in order to avoid that 
detrimental facts such as the ones of the case at hand occur in the future.” Bolivia 
complied172 by establishing the crime of forced disappearances within its domestic legal 
system and amending police-related laws to be consistent with international treaties and 
conventions Bolivia was a party to (along with implementing training programs for the 
armed forces for human rights and humanitarian law).  
In a final example of Almonacid Arrellano v. Chile, Chile amended its Code of 
Military Justice in 2007, limiting military justice and amnesty and the jurisdiction of 
military courts in cases of rights violations by soldiers in addition to remanding cases 
with the litigants in question to ordinary courts under criminal proceedings. Thus, these 
                                                           
171 Again, note that domestic legal reform does not refer to the annulment of criminal charges, the 
investigation and prosecution of those responsible, and other legal matters that apply only to the specific 
case and individual litigants. Domestic legal reform must be nation-wide reform that is permanent, 
influencing or having the ability to influence all persons and future legal conflicts. 
172 Bolivia partially complied in 2002 and 2004 but reached full compliance in 2007. 
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domestic legal reforms are not merely superficial reforms to irrelevant laws but rather 
significant changes in domestic legal proceedings and the legally protected rights enjoyed 
by individuals. 
Table 4.2 shows the level of state participation as a litigant. In other words, the 
table shows how many times each state has had to appear before the IACHR. For 
example, Peru has had to appear before the IACHR in 25 individual cases while Costa 
Rica has only had one case against it. (Note, however, that these numbers excludes cases 
that do not have compliance records, i.e. cases that were filed but dismissed by the Court, 
cases pending judgments on merits and/or reparation, and newly filed cases.) As one can 
see, Peru has had the most active career with the IACHR, followed by Guatemala, 
Ecuador, and Colombia. On average, a state appears before the Court seven times 
(average is 6.71 times). 
Figure 4.4 demonstrates the number of cases that require domestic legal reforms 
by country. The IACHR issued the most reparations requiring domestic legal reform to 
Peru and Guatemala by far. Peru had eleven cases that required domestic legal reforms to 
match domestic law to international standards while Guatemala had eight cases making 
the same requirement. Every other state has five or fewer cases that require domestic 
legal change, but Honduras and El Salvador have never been required to alter their 
domestic laws. 
Figure 4.5 depicts overall compliance by country. The blue (navy) represents the 
number of cases the IACHR determined require domestic legal reform. The red 




Table 4.2: Frequency of State as Litigant to IACHR Case173 
Country Number of Cases as Litigant Percentage of Cases 
Peru 25 21.93% 
Ecuador 12 10.53% 
Mexico 6 5.26% 
El Salvador 3 2.63% 
Guatemala 17 14.91% 
Bolivia 4 3.51% 
Honduras 4 3.51% 
Nicaragua 2 1.75% 
Panama 4 3.51% 
Costa Rica 1 0.88% 
Chile 6 5.26% 
Argentina 6 5.26% 
Colombia 11 9.65% 
Dominican Republic 1 0.88% 
Paraguay 6 5.26% 
Uruguay 1 0.88% 




Figure 4.4: Number of Cases Requiring Legal Reform by Country 
 
                                                           
173 Belize has not appeared before the IACHR in any case in this data and is therefore excluded. 
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IACHR reparations orders. Of these cases requiring legal reform, Peru and Guatemala 
have the most cases where they have fulfilled or partially fulfilled domestic reform 
requirements. Of course, these states have had the most opportunities to comply; yet 
these states appear to (attempt to) comply with IACHR decisions in a majority of their 
cases. Additionally, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama have partially or fully complied with 
all of the cases requiring legal change. Uruguay has never complied with any cases 
(although there is only one case). Guatemala fully or partially complied with five out of 
eight cases. Paraguay partially or fully complied with two out of five cases. Peru partially 
or fully complied with six out of eleven cases, and Venezuela fully or partially complied 
with two out of four cases. Again, El Salvador, and Honduras have never been required to 
alter their domestic laws and therefore have no cases with which to comply in this regard. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Overall Compliance by Country 
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Figure 4.6 compares the cases requiring domestic legal changes to each state’s 
full compliance. The blue (navy) represents the number of cases the IACHR determined 
require domestic legal reform. The red represents the number of cases where each state 
has fully complied with the IACHR reparations orders. Only Ecuador and Costa Rica 
have fully complied with all the cases. Chile has fully complied with 75% of cases. 
Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, and Nicaragua have fully complied with 50% of cases. Peru 
has fully complied with 27.3% of cases, while Paraguay has fully complied with 20% of 
cases. Guatemala has fully complied with 12.5% of cases (one out of eight cases). 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela have not fully 
complied with any IACHR case requiring domestic legal reform. 
 
 




Time to compliance 
The data also include the time (in years) it takes for a state to comply. Time to 
compliance measures the number of years between the judgment of reparations to the 
compliance record declaring full or partial compliance. The first year where the legal 
reform is deemed fully or partially complied is coded.174 In other words, the compliance 
year consists of the first year declaring partial or full compliance. For cases that are 
partially compliant and then achieve full compliance later in time, the compliance year 
consists of the year of the full compliance declaration. The average length of time to full 
compliance is 4.56 years, with a minimum of 2 years and maximum of 12 years.175 The 
average length of time to partial compliance is 4.95 years, with a minimum of 2 years 
and maximum of 11 years.176  
Figure 4.7 represents how long, on average, it takes a state to fully or partially 
comply with an IACHR cases that requires domestic legal reform that pushes domestic 
law to match international law. For each state, the blue (navy) represents the average 
number of years until overall compliance while the red represents the median number of 
years until overall compliance. On average, it takes less time (between two and three 
years) for Chile, Ecuador, and Panama to comply compared to Bolivia, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela which all take 
between five to seven years to comply. Argentina, Mexico, and Paraguay take roughly 
three to four years to comply with IACHR decisions. 
                                                           
174 For a noncompliant case, the year of the most recent compliance report published by the Court is coded. 
 
175 The median is four years, and the mode is two or four years for full compliance. 
 





Figure 4.7: Time to Compliance by Country 
 
Figure 4.8 depicts the time each state takes to fully comply with the domestic 
legal reform requirements, where blue (navy) represents the average number of years 
until full compliance and red represents the median number of years until full 
compliance. This figure shows that Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Peru take the 
longest amount of time (six or more years) to fully comply with an IACHR decision. All 
other states take, on average, less than five years to fully comply. Argentina, Chile, and 
Ecuador take, on average, the least amount of time to fully comply with domestic legal 





Figure 4.8: Time to Full Compliance by Country 
 
Issue area 
The data further includes the rights issue area, including physical integrity rights 
and empowerment rights, as well as torture, arbitrary detention, forced disappearance, 
extrajudicial killing, right to life, due process rights, civil and political rights, 
economic/social/cultural rights, discrimination, women’s rights, LBGT rights, family 
rights, privacy rights, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of expression, 
indigenous rights (and ‘other’). Figure 4.9 depicts the breakdown of cases by issue area. 
Physical integrity rights cases (shown in navy) are the majority issue area with 80 cases 
while empowerment rights cases (shown in gray) make a close second with a little over 
60 cases. Looking more specifically at the types of PIR cases, torture is the largest 
category of PIR cases, followed by arbitrary detention and then forced disappearances. 
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Regarding empowerment rights cases, civil and political rights consist of the largest 
proportion of cases, followed by economic, social, and cultural rights. It is important to 
note, however, that each case typically have several issue areas. For example, just less 
than 40 cases include both PIR and empowerment rights issue areas (shown in green).177 
Additionally (but not shown in the figure) each case often includes multiple categories 
within empowerment rights or physical integrity rights. For example, a case may include 
civil and political rights as well as economic, social, and cultural rights. Similarly, a case 
may include torture, forced disappearance, and arbitrary detention. Virtually all of the 
cases included in the data include due process issues (not shown in figure). 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Cases by Issue Area 
  
                                                           
177 Note that the category of cases with both PIR and empowerment rights issues are not in addition to their 




Because each case often encompasses several issue areas, the purpose of this data 
is designed to examine whether compliance is based upon or influenced by issue area. 
Figure 4.10 depicts the number of cases by issue area the IACHR requires domestic legal 
reform. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights requires more domestic legal reform 
in physical integrity rights (PIR) cases than empowerment rights cases by roughly 
double. Additionally, the Court requires domestic legal reform in a majority of the PIR 
cases it hears. On the other hand, the Court requires domestic legal reforms about half of 
the time for empowerment rights cases. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Proportion of Cases by Rights Type 
 
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 reveal the breakdown of these cases by state. Figure 4.11 
shows the number of physical integrity rights (PIR) cases that require domestic legal 
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reform. Guatemala and Peru have had the most PIR cases requiring legal reform, while 
Chile, Ecuador, Panama, and Uruguay have only had one case. Mexico, Paraguay, and 




Figure 4.11: Number of PIR Cases Requiring Reform 
 
Figure 4.12 shows the number of empowerment rights cases that require domestic 
legal reform. Peru has had the most empowerment cases that require such reform, 
followed by Guatemala and Paraguay. All other countries have two or fewer 




Figure 4.12: Number of Empowerment Rights Cases Requiring Reform 
 
 Hence, we see that the IACHR deals with more PIR cases than empowerment 
rights cases and issues more domestic legal reform reparation requirements for PIR cases. 
Additionally, all countries have been required to alter domestic law for both PIR and 
empowerment rights cases except Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, and Bolivia, which have 
not had to alter their domestic laws pertaining to empowerment rights.   
 Turning to compliance by issue area, overall (full or partial) compliance is higher 
for empowerment rights cases than physical integrity rights cases. Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico complied with all of their PIR and empowerment rights cases 
requiring legal change. Bolivia, Panama, and Ecuador complied with all its PIR cases and 
had no empowerment rights cases with which to comply. Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and the 
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Dominican Republic complied with all of their empowerment rights cases but had no PIR 
cases with which to comply. Guatemala complied with 62.5% of its PIR cases and 66.7% 
of its empowerment rights cases. Paraguay complied with 50% of its PIR cases but did 
not comply with any of its empowerment rights cases. Peru complied with 57.1% of its 
PIR cases and 40% of its empowerment cases. Venezuela complied with 33.3% of its PIR 
cases and had no empowerment rights case with which to comply. Uruguay did not 
comply with its PIR rights case and had no empowerment rights cases with which to 
comply. 
 In terms of full compliance, Ecuador has fully complied with all its PIR cases but 
has no empowerment case requiring legal reform. Chile has fully complied with all its 
PIR cases and 50% of its empowerment cases. Argentina and Mexico have fully 
complied with 50% of their PIR cases and all of their empowerment cases. Bolivia has 
fully complied with 50% of its PIR cases but has no empowerment case requiring legal 
reform. Peru has fully complied with 28.6% of its PIR cases and 20% of empowerment 
cases. Paraguay has fully complied with 25% of its PIR case while not complying with 
any empowerment cases. Guatemala has fully complied with 12.5% of its PIR cases and 
33.3% of its empowerment cases. Finally, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela have not 
fully complied with any PIR cases but have no empowerment case requiring legal reform. 
Costa Rica has fully complied with all its empowerment right cases and has no PIR cases 
requiring reform. Nicaragua has fully complied with 50% of its empowerment rights 
cases has no PIR cases requiring legal reform. Colombia has not fully complied with any 
PIR or empowerment cases. The Dominican Republic has not fully complied with any 
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empowerment right cases but has no PIR cases requiring legal reform. These trends are 
depicted in. 
 
Full compliance summary by country 
 Hence, these descriptive statistics show that only Ecuador and Costa Rica have 
fully complied with all cases. However, these consist of relatively few cases, where 
Ecuador had only to comply with its PIR case and Costa Rica to its empowerment rights 
case. It took Ecuador between just over two years while Costa Rica took six years to 
comply with these decisions. 
 Chile has fully complied with 75% of cases, with 100% compliance to its PIR 
cases and 50% compliance with its empowerment rights cases. On average, Chile takes 
two years to comply with domestic legal reforms required by the IACHR. 
Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, and Nicaragua have fully complied with 50% of 
cases. Argentina and Mexico have fully complied with 50% of their PIR cases and with 
100% of their empowerment right cases. It takes Argentina, on average, two years to 
comply while Mexico takes just over four years to comply. Bolivia has fully complied 
with 50% of its PIR cases and has had no empowerment rights cases with which to 
comply. Nicaragua has fully complied with 50% of its empowerment rights cases with no 
PIR cases with which to comply. Bolivia and Nicaragua take roughly seven years to 
comply.  
Peru has fully complied with 27.3% of cases, where it fully complied with 28.6% 
of its PIR cases and with 20% of its empowerment rights cases. On average, Peru fully 
complies with IACHR orders after eight years. 
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Paraguay has fully complied with 20% of cases, where it has fully complied with 
25% of PIR cases but with none of its empowerment rights cases. Peru takes, on average, 
4 years to comply with the IACHR. 
Guatemala has fully complied with 12.5% of cases, where it has fully complied 
with 33.3% of its empowerment rights cases and 12.5% of its PIR cases. ;On average, it 
takes Guatemala 4 years to fully comply with IACHR decisions requiring domestic legal 
reform. 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela have not fully 
complied with any IACHR case requiring domestic legal reform. Colombia has not fully 
complied with any PIR or empowerment rights cases. The Dominican Republic has not 
fully complied with its empowerment right case and has no PIR cases with which to 
comply. Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela have not fully complied with any PIR cases, 
and none have any empowerment rights cases with which to comply. 
 
Implications 
Table 4.3 summarizes overall and full compliance by country. Note that the 
difference between full compliance and overall compliance consists of partially 
compliant cases. For example, Peru partially complied with two cases or 18.2% of their 
cases requiring domestic legal changes. 
This original data provides contradictory evidence of compliance compared to 
Posner and Yoo (2005) and Hawkins and Jacoby (2010) who underestimate full and 
overall compliance to the regional court. While Posner and Yoo (2005) estimate a 5% 
general compliance rate regardless of reparation type and Hawkins and Jacoby (2010) 
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Table 4.3: Summary of Compliance by Country 


















Peru 11 5 3 45.5% 27.3% 
Ecuador 2 2 2 100% 100% 
Mexico 4 4 2 100% 50% 
El Salvador 0 0 0 0% 0% 
Guatemala 8 5 1 62.5% 12.5% 
Bolivia 2 2 1 100% 50% 
Honduras 0 0 0 0% 0% 
Nicaragua 2 2 1 100% 50% 
Panama 1 1 0 100% 0% 
Costa Rica 1 1 1 100% 100% 
Chile 4 4 3 100% 75% 
Argentina 2 2 1 100% 50% 
Colombia 2 2 0 100% 0% 
Dominican 
Republic 
1 1 0 100% 0% 
Paraguay 5 2 1 40% 20% 
Uruguay 1 0 0 0% 0% 
Venezuela 4 2 0 50% 0% 
 
find a 7% full compliance rate to Court reparations requiring domestic legal reform from 
1987-2010, this data suggests significantly higher compliance rates—even as it uses 
nearly identical coding scheme to Hawkins and Jacoby (2010).178 Specifically, this data 
suggests that full compliance to requiring domestic legal change in occurs 32% of the 
time for Spanish-speaking, civil law Latin American countries and overall (partial or full) 
compliance occurs 72% of the time from 2000-2015. Furthermore, the IACHR is not on 
the decline, as suggested by Posner and Yoo (2005), in term of its being increasingly 
                                                           
178 Coding for full compliance is identical to Hawkins and Jacoby (2010) but some minor variation may 
exist in the coding for partial compliance. Note, however, that these previous works include all of Latin 
America rather than only the Spanish-speaking, civil law countries. If I include all countries (rather than 
only Spanish-speaking, civil law countries) the rate of compliance remains much higher with 28.1% full 
compliance (16/57 cases), and 68.4% overall compliance (39/57 cases).  
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asked to adjudicate, its willingness to issue decisions, and its ability to secure 
compliance. 
 
4.1 Predicting IACHR Legal Reform Reparation Issuance 
Before turning to predictions of compliance, the possibility exists that the IACHR 
is strategic in issuing decisions that require domestic legal reform. If the IACHR believes 
that a state will not comply with its orders, then the Court may lose legitimacy. Hence it 
is possible that the Court seeks reparations that are likely to be complied with and avoid 
the risk that its orders will be ignored so as to protect the legitimacy and relevancy of the 
institution. This leads to the hypothesis that, if the Court is strategic, it will require 
domestic legal reform only if the state has previously complied. More specifically, states 
that have reformed domestic legislation in a previous IACHR are more likely to receive 
reparations requiring domestic legal reform in a current case. 
 
H1: States with a history of (ever) complying with legal reform reparations are more 
likely to receive legal reform reparations in a given case. 
 
Along similar lines, the length of time since a state granted the IACHR 
compulsory jurisdiction may influence the Court’s decision to issue this type of 
reparation. The Court may feel more secure in issuing this reparation in cases where the 
state involved has a longer history of recognizing the Court and its jurisdiction in 
contentious cases. States that only recently recognized the Court’s jurisdiction may be 
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perceived as less likely to comply since they do not have a normative tradition of 
recognizing the Court and its legitimacy. This hypothesis is summarized below:  
 
H2: States with a longer history of recognizing the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction on 
contentious cases are more likely to receive legal reform reparations in a given case. 
 
Furthermore, there may be an interaction effect between the amount of time since 
a state has granted jurisdiction and history of compliance. A strategic Court would be 
most secure in likelihood of compliance for states that have a long tradition of 
recognizing the Court’s authority and have a strong history of compliance. Hence: 
 
H3: States with a longer history of recognizing the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction on 
contentious cases and have a history of compliance with previous legal reform 
reparations are more likely to receive legal reform reparations in a given case. 
 
Not only may the state’s history of compliance influence the IACHR’s decision to 
issue legal reform reparations in a particular case, but the distinction between physical 
integrity rights and empowerment rights may influence the likelihood of the IACHR to 
render a judgment requiring legal reform. Empowerment right violations may be more 
easily solved through amending or creating laws rather than PIR where the violations are 




Furthermore, all these Spanish-speaking, civil law Latin American states has 
ratified the Convention Against Torture (CAT)179 while none have ratified the Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. However, all states have also ratified the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.180 Hence, while physical integrity right law is 
likely to be more established compared to empowerment rights laws this may only be true 
for economic, social, and political rights. Several of the states ratified the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights prior to ratifying CAT, which might imply that civil and 
political right-related domestic law is more developed and congruent with international 
standards than PIR-related domestic law—which is still more developed and presumably 
congruent with international standards than economic, social, and cultural rights-related 
domestic law. IACHR may therefore seek to remedy empowerment right violations by 
ordering the state to develop such laws aligned with these Conventions, particularly 
regarding economic, social, and cultural rights.  These hypotheses are summarized below: 
 
H4: Cases involving economic, social, and cultural empowerment rights are more likely 
to receive IACHR orders to reform domestic laws compared to civil and political rights 
(empowerment) cases and physical integrity rights.  
 
                                                           
179 CAT has been ratified by Argentina (1986), Bolivia (1999), Chile (1988), Colombia (1987), Costa Rica 
(1993), Dominican Republic (2012), Ecuador (1988), El Salvador (1996), Guatemala (1990), Honduras 
(1996), Mexico (1986), Nicaragua (2005), Panama (1987), Paraguay (1990), Peru (1988), Uruguay (1986), 
and Venezuela (1991). 
 
180 The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has been ratified by Argentina (1986), Bolivia (1982), Chile 
(1972), Colombia (1969), Costa Rica (1968), Dominican Republic (1978), Ecuador (1969), El Salvador 
(1979), Guatemala (1992), Honduras (1997), Mexico (1981), Nicaragua (1980), Panama (1977), Paraguay 
(1992), Peru (1978), Uruguay (1970), and Venezuela (1978). 
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H5:  Cases involving to physical integrity rights are more likely to receive IACHR order 
to reform domestic laws compared civil and political empowerment rights cases. 
 
H6:  Cases involving both economic, social, and cultural empowerment rights and civil 
and political empowerment rights are more likely to receive IACHR orders to reform 
domestic laws compared to either category alone. 
 
Methodology 
In order to evaluate these hypotheses, I use a series of logit models predicting the 
likelihood of the IACHR issuing a reparation requiring domestic legal reform for a 
particular case.181  Before splitting the data into its rights subcategories, however, I run a 
series of simple logit models predicting the likelihood of IACHR issuing reform 
reparation based solely on the three main categories of right: PIR, empowerment, and 
both. I do this partially maintain the integrity of the data and analytical results since the 
subcategorized data can become unwieldy—as portrayed in in Table 4.4.  
The table reveals that the numbers of observations drops noticeably when 
isolating by type of rights, which is due to the fact that the majority of the cases share 
issues. There are 42 cases dealing with only PIR; 29 cases dealing with empowerment 
rights only (not distinguishing between civil and political rights, economic, social, and 
cultural rights, and neither); 37 cases dealing with both PIR and empowerment rights, 
broadly speaking; and 6 cases dealing with neither PIR nor empowerment rights. Within 
 
                                                           




Table 4.4: Categorization of Case by Type of Rights 
Type of Rights Number of Cases 
PIR only  42 
Empowerment only 29 
Both PIR and Empowerment  37 
Both PIR and Empowerment, Civil/Political only 17 
Both PIR and Empowerment, Eco/Soc/Cult only 4 
Bot PIR and Empowerment, both Civil/Political and Eco/Soc/Cult 5 
Both PIR and Empowerment, neither 16 
Empowerment only, Civil/Political only 3 
Empowerment only, Eco/Soc/Cult only 7 
Empowerment only, both Civil/Political and Eco/Soc/Cult 9 
Empowerment only, neither 19 
None of the above (Other) 6 
 
the empowerment (only) rights category, civil and political rights (Civil/Political) make 
up 3 cases, economic, social, and cultural rights make up 7 cases (Eco/Soc/Cult). There 
are 9 empowerment right cases that deal with both civil and political rights and 
economic, social, and cultural rights. Within the both PIR and empowerment right 
category, 17 cases deal only with civil and political rights; 4 cases deal only with 
economic, social, and cultural rights; 5 cases deal with both; and 16 cases deal with 
neither.  
Hence, because of the number of categories and the drop in case observations, I 
first run a series of logit models using only PIR, empowerment, and ‘both’ categories. I 
also include the variables Previous Overall Compliance in the first model, which is a 
binary variable that represents whether the state has fully or partially complied with a 
previous reform order (prior to the date of the IACHR judgment). Hence, cases with 
states that have fully or partially complied in the past are coded as ‘1’ and ‘0’ 
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otherwise.182 Similarly, I include the variable Previous Full Compliance in the second 
model, which is a binary variable that represents whether the state has fully complied 
with a previous reform order (prior to the date of the IACHR judgment). Hence, cases 
with states that have fully complied in the past are coded as ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise. I also 
include Length of Time Since Jurisdiction Grant, which is calculated by the number of 
years since the state granted compulsory jurisdiction to the case judgment. In other 
words, this variable is the difference in case judgment and jurisdiction granting years in 
order to capture the amount of time a state has recognized Court authority and legitimacy 
(H2).
183 Finally, I include an interaction term Jurisdiction Grant*Previous Overall 
Comply Interaction consisting of the interaction between Length of Time Since 
Jurisdiction Grant and a state’s history of compliance (Previous Overall Compliance and 
Previous Full Compliance, respectively). These variables are designed to evaluate H1 - 
H3 where the IACHR may be strategic in issuing legal reform reparations. The results are 
presented in Table 4.5.  
 
Results 
Unfortunately, the coefficients presented above in Table 4.5 are not directly 
interpretable, so I calculate the marginal effects and predicted probabilities. PIR cases 
with an average tradition recognizing the Court (i.e. mean number of years since the state  
 
                                                           
182 Cases where the year is shared are coded as 0. For example, if the first case of compliance if fulfilled in 
2003, and another case’s judgment occurs in 2003, the second case is coded as 0 since the Court may or 
may not know of the state’s compliance prior to their decision of ordered a reform reparation. 
 
183 The mean length of time since granting the IACHR jurisdiction is 19.132 years, with a minimum of 6 
year and maximum of 30 years. 
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Table 4.5: Logit Models Predicting Requirement of Legal Reform 
 Baseline Category: PIR Baseline Category: PIR 
Empowerment Rights 
(only) 
-.770†   
 (.467) 
-.799†  
  (.469) 
Both PIR and 
Empowerment Rights 
-1.059*  
  (.515) 





  (2.409) 
-- 
Previous Full Compliance -- 4.729*   
 (2.433) 
Length of Time Since 
Jurisdiction Grant 
-.059 












-- -.192†  
  (.108) 
Constant 1.301  
  (.973) 
1.401   
 (.970) 
N 114 114 
Prob > X2  0.021 0.0187 
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.109 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -69.707 -69.674 
Correctly Predicted 62.28% 64.04% 
† p < .10      * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the likelihood of the IACHR to require a state to reform its domestic law as 
reparations depending on whether the case deals primarily with physical integrity rights or empowerment 
rights. Standard errors are clustered by country-year (listed in parentheses). Similar results are reflected in 
probit specifications, but Hausman tests suggest that logit models are more appropriate. Additionally, the 
country itself does not significantly predict the likelihood of IACHR requirements to reform domestic laws, 
and whether the state complied last year does not alter the results nor significantly influences the likelihood 
of reparation issue. 
 
 
granted compulsory jurisdiction) and without a history of overall compliance184 have a 
likelihood of receiving a reform reparation of 19.39%. A PIR case with an average 
                                                           
184 Previous compliance pertains only to previous compliance to a specific legal reform reparation in the 
past. It does not include compliance to other types of reparations or general compliance. I hope to examine 
these influences in future work. 
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tradition of IACHR recognition and a history of overall compliance has a likelihood of 
97.06%. 
Turning to the interaction term, for every additional year since the state 
recognized the Court’s authority and also has a history of compliance, there is a 
corresponding decrease of 5.06% in the likelihood of receiving a reform reparation.  
Empowerment rights cases with an average tradition of recognition of Court 
jurisdiction and no history of overall compliance have a likelihood of 10.02% in 
receiving such reparation. Empowerment rights cases with an average tradition of 
recognition of Court jurisdiction and have history of overall compliance have a likelihood 
of 93.85% in receiving such reparation.  
Cases dealing with both PIR and empowerment right issues with a mean tradition 
of recognizing the IACHR’s jurisdiction and no history of overall compliance have a 
likelihood of 7.70% in receiving this type of reparation. The same cases with both types 
of rights, an average tradition of recognition, and a history of overall compliance have a 
likelihood of 91.95%.  
Turning to the second model, which is identical except that it measures previous 
full compliance (and its respective interaction) rather than overall compliance, we see 
similar results.  
PIR cases with an average tradition recognizing the Court and without a history of 
full compliance have a likelihood of receiving a reform reparation of 22.17%. A PIR case 
with an average tradition of IACHR recognition and a history of overall compliance has a 
likelihood of 96.99%. 
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With regard to the interaction term, for every additional year since the state 
recognized the Court’s authority and also has a history of full compliance, there is a 
corresponding decrease of 4.70% in the likelihood of receiving a reform reparation.  
Empowerment rights cases with an average tradition of recognition of Court 
jurisdiction and no history of full compliance have a likelihood of 11.36% in receiving 
such reparation. Empowerment rights cases with an average tradition of recognition of 
Court jurisdiction and have history of full compliance have a likelihood of 93.55% in 
receiving such reparation.  
Cases dealing with both PIR and empowerment right issues with a mean tradition 
of recognizing the IACHR’s jurisdiction185 and no history of full compliance have a 
likelihood of 8.79% in receiving this type of reparation. The same cases with both types 
of rights, an average tradition of recognition, and a history of full compliance have a 
likelihood of 91.60%. 
 
Discussion 
 These models presented in Table 4.5 reveal the large effect of previous 
compliance—whether partial or full—on the likelihood of receiving a reparation 
requiring domestic legal reform. The presence of overall compliance in any previous case 
increases the likelihood of a PIR case to receive this reparation from 19.39% to 97.06%. 
The presence of full compliance in any previous case similarly increases the likelihood of 
a PIR cases to receive a reform order from 22.17% to 96.99%. A similar pattern exists for 
empowerment rights where overall compliance shifts the likelihood from 10.02% to 
93.85%, and for cases with both rights types where overall compliance increases the 
                                                           
185 The mean length of time since granting jurisdiction is 19.132 years. 
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likelihood from 7.70% to 91.95%. In terms of the presence of a history of full 
compliance, empowerment right cases experience an increase from 11.36% to 93.55%, 
and cases with both PIR and empowerment rights experience a shift from 8.79% to 
91.60%. These are large changes to the probability of receiving an order from the IACHR 
to reform domestic laws. These significant (both substantively and statistically) effects 
confirm H1 and suggest that the IACHR is indeed strategic in that it issues this type of 
reparation more frequently when a state has complied to a similar order in the past. 
These models further suggest that states with longer histories of recognizing the 
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction to contentious cases do not have a higher likelihood of 
receiving a reparation for reform (H2). Hence, these results reject H2. However, this 
history of recognizing Court authority when combined with a history of compliance does 
significantly affect the likelihood of receiving a reform reparation. However, this 
influence is negative (thereby rejecting H3). States with longer histories of recognizing 
Court authority in contentious cases and a history of compliance are less likely to receive 
a reform reparation. I suspect that this negative influence is due to changes in domestic 
attitudes towards the Court over time. For example, a regime that acknowledges Court 
authority in 1988 may not be the same regime with the same attitudes and domestic 
pressures in 2013. Hence the regime in power at the time of granting compulsory 
jurisdiction may not the same regime at the time of the case or at the time of compliance. 
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 depict the relationship between the tradition or history of 
acknowledging the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction (Figure 4.13) and its interaction with 










Figure 4.14: Influence of Interaction between History of Acknowledging IACHR and 




The above figures show the relationships between a states’ history of 
acknowledging the IACHR through its granting of compulsory jurisdiction in contentious 
cases (and its interaction with previous compliance) on the likelihood of the IACHR 
issuing a reform reparation. Figure 4.13 corroborates the models presented in Table 4.5 
where while the length of time since the grant has a slightly negative slope, it does not 
influence the likelihood of receiving a reform reparation. On the other hand, once it 
interacts with a history of previous compliance—whether full or partial—it negatively 
influences the likelihood of receiving such a reparation. This graph adds, however, that 
this effect only occurs roughly after the 15-year mark. Hence, the negative effect only 
occurs when there is a substantial amount of time between granting of jurisdiction and the 
case (and previous compliance). This further implies that my speculation of regime 
change and attitude change over this significant amount of time may occur and thus drive 
these results. Future work is necessary, however, to evaluate this conjecture. 
Finally, these models further suggests that the empowerment rights are slightly 
less likely to receive such reparations (albeit at a .10 threshold level) while cases dealing 
with both PIR and empowerment rights are significantly less likely to receive the same 
type of reparation, regardless of the history of compliance. While these results do not 
directly test H3 and H4, they reject the intuition that empowerment right violations may 
be more easily solved through amending or creating laws rather than PIR where the 
violations are often due to not the lack of law but the executive ignoring existing law.  
As it turns out, many of the empowerment rights cases deal with laws that already 
exist. The violations thus occur because these existing laws are not adequately 
implemented or enforced to certain persons or situations. For example, states often have 
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adequate pension and salary laws but these laws were not appropriated applied to group 
of people (Abrill Alosilla et al. v. Peru186 and Acevedo Buendía et al. v. Peru187). Physical 
integrity rights cases, on the other hand, require legal reform often because the IACHR 
finds that states need to modify their criminal laws in order to eliminate amnesty laws 
(for example, Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, Barrios Altos v. Peru, and La Cantuta et al. v. 
Peru), eliminate mandatory sentencing of the death penalty (for example, Raxcacó Reyes 
et al. v. Guatemala), amend laws to open political participation (for example, Castañeda 
Gutman v. Mexico and Yatama v. Nicaragua), amend laws to expand property rights (for 
example,  Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, and Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. 
Paraguay), amend freedom of expression and defamation laws (for example, Caso “La 
Última Tentación de Cristo” v. Chile and Palamara Iribarne v. Chile), and establish laws 
the limit or criminalize arbitrary, prolonged detention and eliminate beatings/torture and 
forced disappearances (for example, Bulacio v. Argentina, Blanco-Romero et al. v. 
                                                           
186
 Abrill Alosilla et al. v. Peru centers on a violation of the right to judicial protection to the detriment of 
233 members of the Union of Lima Water and Sewer Service Functionaries, Professionals, and 
Technicians. Between 1991 and 1992, the State passed laws eliminating the existing salary scale system. 
Despite the constitution’s guarantee that these laws would not be applied retroactively, Peru applied the 
laws retroactively and failed to provide an effective domestic remedy for this constitutional violation.  
187
 Acevedo Buendía et al. v. Peru a law from 1979 allowed persons who retired from the Office of the 
Comptroller General to collect a pension equal to the salary of an employee performing the same or similar 
function to the one he or she performed at the time of his or her retirement. This law was replaced in 1992 
by a new law that eliminated the right of a pensioner to continue receiving the amount received under the 
old law. Two hundred seventy-three members of the Association of Discharged or Retired Employees of 
the Comptroller General of the Republic brought suit to collect pension benefits that were owed to them 




Venezuela, Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, 
and Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala). 188  
With this in mind, I now turn to evaluating H4 and H4 asserting that cases 
involving economic, social, and cultural empowerment rights are most likely to receive 
IACHR orders to reform domestic laws, followed by PIR cases, and finally civil and 
political rights (empowerment) cases. Hence, these hypotheses suggest that civil and 
political rights cases are the most developed (as indicated by treaty ratification) and 
therefore are the least likely to require reform reparation orders. Similarly, I predict that 
PIR laws are somewhat developed (as indicated by the relatively recent ratification of 
CAT by states) and therefore need more reform than civil political rights—which is the 
most developed of the three areas (per the early and unanimous Covenant ratification)—
but less reform than economic, social, and cultural rights cases. Furthermore, I suspect 
that cases dealing with both economic, social, and cultural rights and civil and political 
rights are the most likely to receive reform orders than either category alone. These 
prediction are again summarized below: 
 
H4: Cases involving economic, social, and cultural empowerment rights are more likely 
to receive IACHR orders to reform domestic laws compared to civil and political rights 
(empowerment) cases and physical integrity rights.  
 
                                                           
188 However, these results are less surprising if one considers that the need for legal reform may depend less 
on the type of rights and more the existing state of the law within each country. As noted previously, Peru 
and Guatemala have the most cases requiring legal reform in both PIR and empowerment rights cases. 
Hence, the need for legal reform is likely driven by country factors rather than case factors. 
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H5:  Cases involving to physical integrity rights are more likely to receive IACHR order 
to reform domestic laws compared civil and political empowerment rights cases. 
 
H6:  Cases involving both economic, social, and cultural empowerment rights and civil 
and political empowerment rights are more likely to receive IACHR orders to reform 
domestic laws compared to either category alone. 
 
 In order to evaluate these hypotheses, I use a series of dummies to distinguish 
between PIR (PIR), civil and political empowerment right (Civil/Political), and 
economic, social, and cultural empowerment right cases (Economic/Social/Cultural). In 
order to preserve the degrees of freedom, I do not include the variables from the previous 
model (presented in Table 4.5). I am interested primarily in whether the issue area 
predicts a reparation ordering domestic legal reform. However, when one runs a full 
model with issue area subcategories as well as history of compliance and tradition of 
recognizing Court authority, none of the issue area subcategory variables are significant, 
and the results are virtually identical to those presented in Table 4.5.189 For simplicity, I 
drop the 6 observations that are neither PIR nor empowerment rights; these cases dealt 





                                                           
189 The only exception is that cases dealing with economic, social, and cultural rights and where the state 
has a history of full compliance, the issue are has a significance of .073. 
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Table 4.6: Logit Predicting Requirement of Legal Reform 
 Baseline Category: PIR 
(neither) 
Empowerment Rights (neither) -1.135   
    (.696) 




Both PIR and Civil/Political  -.316   
 (.780) 
Both PIR and Eco/Soc/Cult  .560   
 (1.046) 
Bot PIR and both Civil/Political 
and Eco/Soc/Cult 
-.827  




Eco/Soc/Cult only 1.764†     
  (1.048) 
Both Civil/Political and 
Eco/Soc/Cult 
-.405  
  (1.040) 
Constant .288  
  (.343) 
N 105 
Prob > X2  0.181 
Pseudo R2 0.076 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -66.529 
Correctly Predicted 64.76% 
† p < .10      * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the likelihood of the IACHR to require a state to reform its domestic law as 
reparations. Standard errors are clustered by country-year (listed in parentheses). Similar results are 
reflected in probit specifications, but Hausman tests suggest that logit models are more appropriate. Note 
that the ‘Empowerment Rights’ (first row) refers to the neither category where neither subcategory of rights 
is included. Similarly, ‘Both PIR and Empowerment Rights’ category (second row) consists of neither 
subcategory. ‘Civil/Political only’ consists of only 3 observations and was dropped. 
Results 
 These results suggest that the type of rights, once divided into subcategories, does 
not exert much influence in the IACHR’s decision to render a reparation for domestic 
legal reform. The only types of rights that seem to exert any influence are economic, 
social, and political rights (without additional PIR involved) and even this influence is 
only at the .10 threshold. These results suggest that these types of rights are more likely 
to receive a reparation ordering legal reform, consistent with my hypothesis (H4). 
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However, the remaining rights do not seem to influence the IACHR decision for 
reparation (thereby rejecting H5 and H6).  
 
4.2 Predictors of State Compliance to IACHR 
  While the earlier descriptive statistics describes state compliance to the IACHR, 
they do not reveal why or when states decide to partially or fully comply with the court’s 
decisions. It is also unclear from the data whether the compliance is primarily determined 
by case level factors, such as the nature of the case or type of rights litigated, or state 
level factors, like the level of difficulty to change laws or its level of respect for the rule 
of law. This section explores these possibilities. 
 
Case Level Predictors of Compliance 
 Compliance to reparation orders may similarly depend upon the variation across 
cases. The majority of variation across cases again consists of the type of right—
specifically, whether the case deals primarily with physical integrity rights or 
empowerment rights—and the severity of the crime or likelihood of media attention at 
the domestic and/or international level.  
 While empowerment rights and cases dealing with both PIR and empowerment 
rights are less likely to receive reform order from the IACHR, these empowerment rights 
cases may similarly influence compliance when such orders are received. Compared to 
PIR, empowerment rights cases may demand more difficult changes in legislation, 
particularly due to the level of complexity in drafting or amending the law. 
Empowerment rights laws may be more difficult to draft since the guarantee of rights 
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often depends upon individual situations and contexts and cultural norms. For example, 
laws protecting the pension pay for employees is likely more complicated to draft and 
pass relative to PIR laws criminalizing torture, forced disappearances, and arbitrary 
detention (especially since international law most simply states not to engage in these 
activities). Similarly, empowerment laws regarding the property and contract rights of 
indigenous populations may have a more difficult time getting passed if there are cultural 
norms that dictate the inferiority of these group and institutionalized political 
disenfranchisement. Furthermore, all of the states included in this study have ratified 
CAT (albeit some only relatively recently) but only some of the empowerment right 
covenants and conventions, which may imply both the degree of development of these 
types of laws domestically and state attitudes supporting these rights (at least in 
principle). Therefore, one might expect that IACHR decisions that require domestic legal 
reform for empowerment rights cases are less likely to be complied with compared to PIR 
cases simply due to the fact that these laws are, in general, likely to be more difficult to 
draft, pass, and implement. This leads to my first hypothesis predicting state compliance 
to IACHR reform orders: 
 
H1: Regional court decisions requiring domestic legal reform for empowerment rights 
cases are less likely to lead to compliance relative to physical integrity rights cases. 
 
Additionally, the degree to which there is likely domestic or international 
attention to the individual cases may influence the likelihood of compliance. The more 
domestic and/or international audiences are likely aware of the case, the more pressure 
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the state will experience to comply. Furthermore, the more attention a case garners, the 
more likely people, organizations, and parties will mobilize to initiate or contribute to a 
shaming campaign. In short, the more attention a case garners, the higher the costs for 
noncompliance. Unfortunately, such data with comparable measures of domestic and 
international attention for these countries and time period do not currently exist to my 
knowledge. In terms of measuring international attention, Amnesty International annual 
reports are based upon rights violations and list all countries every year; these reports do 
not engage with cases at regional courts or compliance with those court decisions. The 
compliance records for IACHR decisions are obviously available online, however I 
suspect that few members of the international community beyond the IACHR itself (and 
a handful of academics) keep up to date with these records. In terms of domestic 
attention, newspaper and news reports on the IACHR case would be ideal. However, this 
data is not currently available, especially across states and time.  
Due to these data limitations, I proxy likely domestic and international (media) 
attention using a crude proxy for each case. To capture the likelihood of domestic 
attention, I create an ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 2, where higher categories reflect 
greater likelihood of (prolonged) domestic attention. This measure is extremely crude and 
relatively subjective, but is informed by the nature of the case, the type of violation(s), 
the identity of the victim(s), and the identity of the perpetrator(s). For example, a case 
that deals with prominent political candidates or a conflict between the judicial and 
executive branches would be coded as ‘2’ in order to distinguish it from cases that deal 
with the disappearance of a single non-prominent citizen (which would be coded as 
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‘0’).190 Similarly, massacres and mass murders are coded as ‘2;’ the abduction, torture, 
and/or murder of children and minors are coded as ‘2;’ and murders of prominent, well 
known individuals are coded as ‘2.’ A coding of 1 typically consists of violations 
perpetrated by paramilitary or police and the murder of an individual indigenous leader or 
activist. Codes of ‘0’ most frequently consist of forced disappearances, torture, or murder 
of individuals who are not prominent individuals in society and cases dealing with 
pension or salary issues. Hence, these codes, while crude, are designed to capture the 
likelihood that the domestic population is 1) aware of the violation, 2) aware that the case 
has been before the IACHR, and 3) aware of any remedial legal changes. (I assume that if 
the state complies with the IACHR, the state and media will make that information 
known—and since compliance is legal reform such changes in the law are likely to 
receive media attention.) This measure inherently assumes a strong correlation between 
the severity of the violations and the prominence of victims and/or perpetrators in likely 
media attention. In other words, cases with the most abhorrent or shocking violations and 
cases dealing with nationally recognizable and popular people are the most likely to 
receive domestic media attention.191 The data consists of 32 cases that are categorized as 
2 (28.6%), 37 cases categorized as 1 (33.0%), and 43 cases categorized as 0 (38.4% of 
data). 
                                                           
190 The category of 0 does not indicate the nonexistence of attention to the case but serves rather as a 
baseline. Hence, this coding scheme does not seek to trivialize cases or violation, but rather serves only to 
distinguish cases based upon the perceived likelihood of (prolonged) media attention.  
 
191 I also assume that these cases are the most likely to have prolonged attention. However, this measure 
may overestimate the effects because the violations before the IACHR case are sometimes decades old. 
However, while the cycle of media attention has likely dropped the case itself across this period of time, I 
believe it remains plausible that there exists a national memory of these most severe/shocking/prominent 
cases that will be tapped into once the case receives judgment. For example, in the United States, 
Guantanamo Bay issues dropped out of national medial discourse until recently when it was triggered by 




Similarly, to capture the likelihood of international (media) attention, I create a 
dichotomous variable (0 or 1), where ‘1’ reflects greater likelihood of international 
attention. This measure is again crude and is informed by the severity of the violation(s), 
the identity of the victim(s), and the identity of the perpetrator(s). For example, a case 
that deals with victims who are foreign nationals (like a U.S. citizen) would be 
categorized as ‘1.’ Massacres, mass murders, and (alleged) terrorist activities/groups are 
categorized as ‘1,’ and mass abductions of children at a national scale are categorized as 
‘1.’ All other cases are coded as ‘0.’ Hence, this crude proxy is designed to capture the 
likelihood that the international media/audience is aware of the violation and aware of the 
need for remedial legal changes. Again, this measure inherently assumes a strong 
correlation between the severity of the violations and the international or bilateral 
prominence of victims and/or perpetrators in likely media attention. The data consists of 
16 cases that are categorized as 1 (14.3%), and 96 cases categorized as 0 (85.7% of 
data).192 
To reiterate, these two variables are designed to capture the likelihood of 
domestic and international attention to an individual case. Such attention may pressure a 
state to comply by increasing the normative costs for noncompliance while cases that are 
ignored by domestic and international audiences retain very few costs for 
noncompliance.193 I also include an interaction term combining domestic and 
international attention variables to capture overall attention. 
                                                           
192 This measure may overestimate the effects of international media attention due to the fluctuation and 
shorter international media cycle. It is likely, in my opinion, that international news experiences a much 
shorter cycle compared to domestic news cycles in that it takes less time for a story to fall out of 
international news relative to domestic news where the audience is more directly involved and effected. 
 
193 While I do not predict that pressure differs across the types of rights per se, these attention variables are 




H2: The greater the likelihood of domestic or international attention, the greater the 
likelihood of compliance, regardless of type of rights.  
 
H3: The greater the likelihood of combined domestic and international attention, the 
greater the likelihood of compliance, regardless of type of rights.  
 
I also include a state’s history of compliance where states that have previously 
fully or partially complied with a legal reform reparation order are more likely to comply 
with a similar order in a given case. I measure this using a series of binary measures. 
First, I include Previous Overall Compliance and Previous Full Compliance for each 
case where a ‘1’ denotes that at the time of the reparation judgment the state had fully or 
partially complied to a legal reform order (and ‘0’ otherwise). Similarly, I include the 
variable Complied Last Year to denote that a full or partial compliance occurred the year 
before for any case(s) (and ‘0’ otherwise). I predict that any previous compliance 
increases the likelihood of compliance in a given case, summarized below: 
 
H4: States that have a history of (ever) fully or partially complied and states that have 
fully or partially complied in the last year are more likely to comply with a given case 
compared to states that do not have this history and states that have not recently 
complied, respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
attention—especially with an international audience—is more likely for physical integrity rights as they are 
more obviously unjust, shocking, and make for ‘better’ news and motivations to mobilize compared to 
empowerment rights which vary across cultures contexts. However, it is important to note that the type of 




  Along similar lines, the length of time since a state granted the IACHR 
compulsory jurisdiction may influence the likelihood of compliance (Length of Time 
Since Jurisdiction Grant). This measure is designed to proxy the establishment of a norm 
of compliance or credence to IACHR decisions. The longer a state has granted 
jurisdiction, the longer a norm of credence to and legitimacy of the IACHR may exist 
within the state. If this is the case, the longer the amount of time the state has recognized 
IACHR jurisdiction then the more established norms of compliance should be. However, 
I suspect a curvilinear relationship between this history and the likelihood of compliance 
because while states with longer histories of recognizing the Court and its compulsory 
jurisdiction in contentious cases are more likely to have established norms respecting 
IACHR authority, such long histories increase the chances that any norms of legitimacy 
established through the granting of jurisdiction could erode over time and/or the regime is 
no longer the same one that granted jurisdiction. (For example, the attitudes of the state 
toward the IACHR in 1985 may no longer reflect state attitudes and the likelihood of 
compliance in 2015.) Hence, I predict a concave curvilinear relationship where at some 
point the amount of time since the granting of jurisdiction no longer influences the 
likelihood or negatively influences it. I also include an interaction term between the 
length of time since the grant and Complied Last Year to identify states with longer 
histories and recent compliance, suggesting more established norms for respecting Court 
authority. This interaction term, Jurisdiction Grant*Complied Last Year Interaction, 
should have a positive linear relationship with compliance. These hypotheses are 




H5: States with a longer history of recognizing the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction on 
contentious cases are more likely to comply with legal reform reparations in a given 
case up to a point, where beyond this point the history no longer influences or 
negatively influences the likelihood of compliance. 
 
H6: States with a longer history of recognizing the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction on 
contentious cases and have complied in the previous year are more likely to comply in 
a given case. 
 
 Lastly, I control for the length of time, in years, between the judgment issuing the 
reparation for legal reform and the event of compliance. This variable is creatively named 
Length of Time Since Judgment. The average time since the reparation order is 5.482 
years, with a minimum of 1 year and maximum of 17 years. This includes cases that have 
not yet complied (where the difference is from 2015 to the judgment). I include this 
variable mostly to control for the fact that compliance may simply be a function of time. 
Since the dependent variable of compliance is dichotomous, where ‘1’ denotes 
compliance and ‘0’ denotes noncompliance, I run a series of logit models.194 The first 
model predicts overall compliance, which consists of full and partial compliance; the 
second model predicts full compliance only. Table 4.7 depicts the results of these models 
with physical integrity rights cases (with no media attention) as the baseline. 
 
                                                           
194 Similar substantive results emerge with probit and rare events logit models, but Hausman tests suggest 
that logit model specifications are most appropriate. 
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Table 4.7: Case-Level Logit Models Predicting Compliance to IACHR  















-1.004   
(.625) 
-.954   
(.627) 
-.837    
(.949) 
-.744   
(.946) 
Both PIR and 
Empowerment Rights 
-1.470*   
(.665) 
-1.455*   
(.673) 
-.340    
(.746) 




.407   
 (.355) 
.384    
(.353) 
.610    
(.395) 




3.436   
(4.632) 
3.692   
(4.190) 
6.288     
(4.663) 




-1.519   
(2.467) 
-1.669   
(2.253) 
-3.180   
(2.403) 




2.613   
(3.047) 





-- -- 5.358   
(3.715) 
4.058   
(3.230) 
Complied Last Year 
(Overall) 
.608    
(.703) 
.560    
(.704) 
-- -- 
Complied Last Year 
(Full) 
-- -- .225    
(1.048) 
.189   
(1.077) 
Length of Time Since 
Jurisdiction Grant 
-.391   
(.274) 
-.168**   
(.062) 
-.453    
(.374) 
-.131   
(.082) 
Length of Time Since 
Jurisdiction Grant2 
.007    
(.008) 




Last Year (Overall) 
-.126   
(.143) 




Last Year (Full) 
-- -- -.286    
(.188) 
-.226   
(.166) 
Length of Time Since 
Judgment 




-.134    
(.087) 
-.138   
(.086) 
Constant 5.028*  
(2.430) 
3.354**    
(1.309) 
3.293    
(3.073) 
.925   
(1.533) 
N 112 112 112 112 
Prob > X2  0.013 0.010 0.238 0.243 
Pseudo R2 0.216 0.213 0.188 0.181 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -54.506 -54.714 -37.305 -37.603 
Correctly Predicted 72.32% 70.54% 85.71% 85.71% 
† p < .10      * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the likelihood of compliance to IACHR judgment requiring domestic legal reform. 
Standard errors are clustered by country-year (listed in parentheses). Similar substantive results occur for 
probit models, however Hausman tests suggest that logit specifications are appropriate. The final column 
represents a rare events logit, since there are 16 full compliance observations out of 114 observations total 
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 The results presented in Table 4.7 reveal several things. First, the expected 
curvilinear relationship between the length of time a state has granted the IACHR 
compulsory jurisdiction on contentious cases (until the case judgment) and the likelihood 
of compliance is rejected by Model 1 predicting overall compliance (in the first, left-most 
column). Hence, these results reject H5 in the fact that the relationship is not curvilinear. 
 Model 2 (in the second column from the left) predicting overall compliance 
reports the same model but without the squared term. The only significant predictors for 
state compliance in a given case is if the case deals with both PIR and empowerment 
rights, the length of time since jurisdiction grant, and the time since judgment. Cases 
dealing with both PIR and empowerment rights are less likely to be complied with 
relative to PIR rights, lending partial support for H1 which predicts that empowerment 
rights cases are less likely to lead to domestic legal reform. However, cases dealing with 
only empowerment rights cases are not significantly different from PIR in terms of the 
likelihood of compliance—which does not fully support H1. Holding all values at their 
mean, the predicted probability of compliance to a case dealing with both PIR and 
empowerment rights is 13.87% whereas the predicting compliance for a PIR case is 
40.83%. 
 States with a longer history of recognizing the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction on 
contentious cases are less likely to comply with legal reform reparations in a given 
case—which essentially rejects my expectations in H5. While I expected a curvilinear 
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relationship where the length of time increased the likelihood of compliance and then 
negatively influenced it, these results show that the length of time has a linear negative 
relationship. More specifically, the marginal effects indicate that for every additional year 
since the original granting of compulsory jurisdiction, there is a corresponding 3.15% 
decrease in the likelihood of compliance. 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Influence of the Time Since Jurisdiction Grant on Compliance 
  
Figure 4.15, above, reveals that there is no significant influence until around the 
15 year mark, after which the length of time decreases the likelihood of compliance. 
These results suggest that state attitudes toward the court at the time of the grant likely 
erode over time—or become less relevant—and/or that the regime has shifted during this 
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timespan. Since this is speculation, however, future work is necessary to determine the 
causes for this decline. 
The significance of the time since judgment implies that compliance is also a 
function of time. The marginal effects indicate that, holding all other values at their 
means, for every additional year since the judgment of reparations was issued there is a 
corresponding decrease of 3.75% in the likelihood of compliance. This result is 
unsurprising in that IACHR cases and judgments become irrelevant over time since 
whatever pressure to comply, whether domestic or international, wanes over time.  
 Domestic and international media attention (proxies) do not significantly 
influence the likelihood of compliance, thereby rejecting H2 and H3. Nor does a history of 
full or partial compliance—even in the last year. Hence previous compliant behavior does 
significantly predict future compliance, thus rejecting H4. H6, predicting that states with a 
longer history of recognizing the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction on contentious cases 
and have complied in the previous year are more likely to comply, is similarly rejected. 
 Turning now to the models predicting full compliance, not only is the relationship 
between the history recognizing IACHR jurisdiction not curvilinear (as shown in Model 
3), but none of the variables reach statistical significance. Hence, none appear to 
significantly influence the likelihood of full compliance, thereby rejecting H1- H6. 
 
Country Level Predictors 
The previous models evaluate the degree to which case-level factors influence the 
likelihood of compliance. However, they do not take into account state-level variables 
that may predict compliance. Hence, in order to determine the degree to which state 
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characteristics influence the likelihood of compliance with an IACHR judgment, I 
transform the case-level data into country-year data.  
I include a measure of human rights INGOs with permanent locations within the 
state since the higher numbers of these organizations represent the increased likelihood of 
domestic pressure to comply and increased likelihood of the demand for international 
attention or shaming. Human rights organizations are crucial in the monitoring of rights 
violations, the publication and dissemination of this information, the mobilization of 
individuals and parties on these issues, and the presence of rights on political agendas 
through mobilization and lobbying for legal reform (Meernik et al. 2012; Brysk 1993). 
Human rights organizations with permanent locations with a state (rather than INGOs 
will temporary volunteers) are the most likely to aware of the lack of legal changes as 
well as the presence of IACHR cases still pending compliance,195 and they are the most 
likely to publish this information and push compliance onto the national agenda and 
mobilize opposition. These organizations are also crucial to the theory of international 
shaming where these are the organization that demand international attention in order to 
initiate a ‘shaming’ strategy and pressure the state regime domestically through 
mobilizing citizens and opposition groups. The presence of these organizations increases 
the potential costs for noncompliance. Hence I include the variable HRO, which measures 
that number of human rights INGOs, borrowed from Murdie and Davis (2012).196  
                                                           
195 I assume that these organizations are aware of IACHR cases pending compliance because these cases 
typically have favorable decisions for the victims and HROs, and these decisions provide legitimation to 
HRO missions as well as increased relevancy of the organizations themselves (and the amount of attention 
on and funding for the organizations which are crucial for INGO survival).  
 




Keep in mind, however, that I examine only compliance to IACHR order to 
changes domestic laws. Hence, compliance is defined by these domestic legal changes. 
Because I do not examine general compliance to all reparation types and do not examine 
human rights violations, the ‘shaming’ strategy initiated by international attention may 
not occur or severely moderated. While there is growing evidence that these international 
‘shaming’ techniques are effective in influencing state behavior (Murdie and Davis 2012; 
Hafner-Burton 2008; Franklin 2008; Brysk 1993), it is unclear whether these strategies 
would be implemented in the event of state noncompliance to regional court decisions 
requiring domestic legal reform. It seem unlikely that these strategies would be 
implemented in this event due to the remaining respect for state sovereignty, especially 
legally, and the relationship between developed (Western) countries and supranational 
courts. The United States, for example, has a long history of upholding the supremacy of 
domestic laws over international laws and not accepting supranational court jurisdictions. 
The United States is therefore unlikely to shame another state for not altering its own 
laws at the request from a supranational court despite the fact it may shame states for 
actively engaging in rights violations. Similarly, while Western Europe is friendly to 
supranational court decisions and international law, the likelihood of its engaging in 
‘shaming’ strategies is still less than it would for shaming a state to stop violating rights. 
In other words, the international shaming strategies are designed to lead to changes in 
state behavior but typically stops at state sovereignty lines when it comes to a state’s 
domestic laws.  
Hence, my inclusion of HROs is primarily designed to capture likely domestic 
pressure rather than ‘shaming’ strategies per se, although it does also represent the likely 
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domestic demand for international attention and ‘shaming’ strategy initiation.197 Meernik 
et al. (2012) show that the increasing presence of human rights organizations is “critical 
to the elevation of states to the international human rights agenda.” In this sense, I 
capture the opportunity for international attention in addition to domestic pressure. 
  
H1: The greater number of permanent HROs, the greater the likelihood of mobilization 
to exert pressure on the state to comply with legal reform orders, thus increasing the 
likelihood of compliance.  
  
I account for the degree of entrenchment within the international human rights 
regime through the inclusion of the variable Rights Entrenchment, which measures the 
number of international treaties, conventions, covenants, and protocols the state has 
ratified, including the supplementary and optional ones.198 This variable thus represents 
the total number of these treaties a state has ratified by that year. The more entrenched a 
state is within the international rights regime, the more social and normative pressure the 
state faces if it chooses not to comply with regional court judgments. Furthermore, more 
entrenched states have more obligations to their rights commitments than less entrenched 
states. Hence I predict that states that are more entrenched within the international human 
                                                           
197 In other words, the presence of human rights organizations would capture the likely demand for 
international pressure but the international response to the demand (that is, not the degree to which or when 
they would receive it). 
 





rights regime are more likely to comply with IACHR reparations to reform domestic law 
relative to less-entrenched states.199 
 
H2: The greater a state is entrenched in the international human rights regime, the 
greater the likelihood of compliance with legal reform orders relative to states that are 
less entrenched and participate less in the international human rights regime.  
 
I further include the level of judicial independence (Judicial Independence) the 
high court of a state enjoys, using data from Linzer and Staton (2012). States that seek to 
superficially comply or comply but without being held accountable under the reformed 
laws would be less likely to reform their domestic laws if they have independence courts 
since these courts will enforce them. Hence states that seek to comply but remain free 
from domestic accountability are unlikely to comply in the first place if they know that 
they will be required to follow the law by the judiciary. This is the same intuition as that 
for the relationship between judicial independence and treaty ratification and compliance, 
where states only comply with treaty obligations if domestic legal enforcement is strong 
but are less likely to ratify treaties, thereby adopting new constraints, if domestic legal 
enforcement is strong (Powell and Staton 2009). The existence of independence courts 
that are able and willing to keep the government in check creates ex post costs for the 
government to amend the laws in ways that constrains it in the future.200  
                                                           
199 I sought to include IGO participation as well to better account for participation in the international 
system and other socialization pressures (Greenhill 2010), but this data is not available for this time frame. 
 
200 High level of judicial independence might also increase the likelihood of the IACHR to judge state 
remedies as compliant since part of their evaluation for full compliance is that they believe the violations in 
question will either not occur in the future or will be domestically enforced. The IACHR would have little 
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On the other hand however, states with higher levels of judicial independence 
may represent states that have a higher regard or respect for the rule of law. In this case, 
high level of judicial independence proxies the state’ respect for the rule of law. States 
with high respect for the rule of law are more likely to abide by IACHR decisions. It is 
unclear which of these competing tensions would emerge victorious or if they would 
simply negate each other. As such I am agnostic about the direction of the influence of 
judicial independence on the likelihood of compliance.  
 
H3: The higher the level of judicial independence the lower the likelihood of 
compliance for states that seek to avoid being held accountable to the laws they would 
need to reform. Alternatively, the higher the level of judicial independence, the more a 
state may respect the rule of law and therefore be more likely to comply with an 
IACHR judgment.  
 
The ease with which domestic laws and policy can be altered is also included in 
predicting the likelihood of compliance. States where there are few constraints or veto 
points in changing the law or policy are more likely to be able to comply than states 
where legal policy change is difficult and heavily constrained. Henisz’s (2000; 2006) 
Political Constraint V index, which provides the data for the variable Political 
                                                                                                                                                                             
faith that the new laws would be effective if the state’s high courts do not have a reasonable degree of 
judicial independence. 
 High levels of judicial independence also increase the chances that the high court would 
unilaterally alter the law or make statements referring to the IACHR judgment. For example, in Bámaca 
Velásquez v. Guatemala, the Guatemalan Supreme Court declared it “necessary to execute the nullity of the 
national resolution” that the IACHR “declared […] violates the universal legal principles of justice” and 
ordered new trial proceeding offering “an unrestricted respect of the rules of due process.” It further 
nullified the previous verdicts by the lower courts and declared the ‘self-enforceability of the Judgment 
issued by the Inter-America Court.” In this case, the courts attempted to unilaterally comply with the 
IACHR rather than the executive or legislative chambers. 
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Constraint, which measures the extent to which a change in preferences of any one 
political actor may lead to a change in government policy. This measure is composed of 
the number of independent government branches with veto power over policy change, the 
extent of party alignment across government branches, and legislative fractionalization or 
preference heterogeneity. The higher this index of political constraints, the more difficult 
legal change would be. Therefore: 
 
H4: The higher the level of political constraints, the lower the likelihood of compliance 
due to the increased difficulty in successfully changing legal policy.  
 
I further include the likelihood of mobilization and thus domestic pressure on the 
state by incorporating a measure of domestic political competition. I use the level of 
political competition, measuring the electoral success of smaller parties (parties other 
than the largest party) in presidential elections from Vanhanen (2000; 2005).201 This 
measure ranges from zero to 100, where higher values represent more intense political 
competition. The more political competition, the higher the likelihood of domestic 
mobilization, and thus pressure to make the required legal reforms. Parties that are 
competing for the offices are more likely to mobilize voters if the state fails to comply 
with the legal reforms to expand or protect human rights. Hence the state experiences 
higher domestic political costs if it fails to comply because there are competing parties 
that will take advantage of the opportunity to mobilize voters and erode support for the 
existing administration. Hence, I predict that this variable has a significant and positive 
relationship with the likelihood of compliance. I also predict an interaction effect where 
                                                           
201 I also used the number of opposition parties for similar results. 
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the increased combination of HROs and political competition leads to increased 
likelihood of compliance. 
 
H5: The higher the level of domestic political competition, the greater the likelihood of 
compliance.  
 
H6: As the presence of HRO and political competition combined increases, the greater 
the likelihood of compliance.  
 
I also include a series of variables to capture spatial diffusion. I account for 
regional diffusion using a binary variable indicating if other states in the region have fully 
or partially complied in the previous year. I similarly include a count variable for 
neighbor diffusion, which consists of the numbers of cases with which a land-locked 
neighbor fully or partially complied in the previous year. These variables are designed to 
capture spatial diffusion where the likelihood of compliance increases if another state in 
the region or a neighbor has recently complied. Similarly, the more instances of recent 
compliance, the greater the likelihood of compliance. 
 
H7: A state’s likelihood of complying with an IACHR legal reform order increases in 
the presence of another state within the region complying in the previous year. 
Similarly, as the number of neighboring states who have complied in the previous yea 




 Finally, I control for regime type using Unified Democracy Scores (UDS), GDP 
per capita, foreign aid, and foreign direct investments. Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 
(2010) provide the Unified Democracy Scores that are a composite scale of democracy 
using Bayesian latent variable analysis of ten extant scales.202 This variable ranges from  
-2.5 to 3.5,203 where higher values represent higher levels of democracy.204 It is possible 
that more democratic regimes are more likely to comply with the IACHR and allow the 
political space for HROs to exist, organize, and proliferate as well as transmit 
information (Meernik et al. 2012).  
Similarly, more developed countries may have a greater likelihood of compliance 
since improved economic conditions should enable the existence and proliferation of 
HROs as well as enable their dissemination of information through improved technology 
and increased access to it (Meernik et al. 2012). 
Foreign aid may influence the likelihood of compliance in that it may represent 
external economic pressure to comply as well as increase international attention (Keck 
and Sikkink 1998, 6). However, Lebovic and Voeten (2009) find that governments lack 
the incentive to punish human rights violations bilaterally and that human rights 
violations have no effect on multilateral aid allocations. In deed, other scholars similarly 
question whether human rights practices influence foreign aid policies (see Apodaca and 
                                                           
202 The UDS incorporate information from 10 measures of democracy: Arat (1991), Bowman, Lehoucq, 
and Mahoney (2005) (BLM), Bollen (2001), Freedom House (2007), Hadenius (1992), Przeworski et al. 
(2000) (PACL), Polity scores by Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr (2006), Polyarchy scale by Coppedge and 
Reinicke (1991), Gasiorowski's (1996) Political Regime Change measure (PRC), and Vanhanen (2003). 
 
203 UDS mean estimates in this data range from .045 to 1.286, with a mean of .601. 
 
204 For the sake of simplicity, I incorporate the UDS posterior distribution mean estimates without any 
weights bases upon their corresponding measures of uncertainty. 
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Stohl 1999; Poe 1990); nonetheless, I include it to ensure in order to avoid the possibility 
of omitted variable bias. 
Foreign direct investments are included because they may provide economic 
pressure that would induce a higher probability of compliance. Foreign investors seek to 
protect their investments from encroaching state governments. Hence, states must signal 
safe investment through their respect for the rule of law—not just through the existence 
of property rights but also through their respect for independent adjudication with 
possible unfavorable decisions that the state will comply with. If states do not comply 
with court decisions, then investors should have little faith that the state would respect 
other court decisions that rule against the state in favor of the investors. This lack of 
credibility in terms of maintaining protected investments would lead to foreign investors 
to not invest, thereby reducing FDI. These variables are derived form the Word 
Development Indicators.205 
I examine these hypotheses using s series of models with a variety of dependent 
variables. I predict the presence or absence of compliance using logit models, the percent 
compliance using fixed effects models, and the event of compliance using Poisson 





                                                           
205 Alternative model iterations also included net fuel export, net oil export, GINI, trade (as percentage of 
GDP), civil unrest, political durability, years left in executive term, government fractionalization, 
opposition fractionalization, and ethnic fractionalization. I included conflict/war (derived from COW) 




Logit Models Predicting State Compliance 
Since the dependent variable of compliance is dichotomous, I run a series of logit 
models206 predicting overall compliance (including both partial and full compliance) and 
predicting full compliance. The standard errors are clustered around country-year (listed 
in parentheses).207 Since one should not expect domestic legal reform compliance unless 
a case is pending which with to comply, I include only the years where a state has 
outstanding or pending cases from 1987-2015. These years are calculated from the year 
of judgment until all pending cases have been complied with either fully or partially. This 
leaves the data to include 145 country-years, although the time periods for each country 
differ. 
 I include the logit models predicting overall and full compliance for comparison 
as well as the rare event logit specifications for the same models. I include the rare event 
logit models because there are 15 observations of full compliance within this data and 32 
observations of overall (full and partial) compliance. Hence events of full compliance 
occur for only 10% of the data while overall compliance occurs for 22% of the data. 
                                                           
206 The same results emerge from probit specifications. Fixed effect logistic regressions produce similar 
results to the rare events logistic regressions, although it drops HROs, when predicting overall compliance. 
Random effects logistic regression predicting overall compliance replicates the results of the logit models, 
producing significant, positive results for rights entrenchment (at the threshold level of .05). Fixed effects 
logistic regression modeling full compliance does not converge, and the random effects logistic regression 
for full compliance produces no significant results, similar to the rare event logit. I present logistic 
regressions with clustered errors rather than their panel versions for the sake of comparison and discussion 
due to the lack of robust results across models in terms of the significant effects of rights entrenchment, 
FDI, and political competition. These are the only variables that ever achieve significance across all model 
specifications and functional forms.  
 
207 Only three observations of conflict (internal intermediate armed conflict and internationalized internal 
war) exist in the data, so these variables are omitted from the analyses. This lack of conflict presence is 
therefore not likely to predict compliance so the omission of these variables should not bias the presented 
results. Also tested were (latent) respect for PIR (Fariss 2014), oil and fuel exports, total trade as percent of 
GDP, population, the number of pending cases (both requiring reform and not), executive constraint, 
number of opposition parties, NGO density, IGO participation, IGOContext (Greenhill 2010), and year 




When binary variable events are rare in the data, logistic regression can underestimate 
their occurrence in the data because the mean of the binary dependent variable is the 
relative frequency of events in the data (King and Zeng 2001). Hence, the probability of 
an event is underestimated while non-event probabilities are overestimated. This bias due 
to rare events amplifies the bias inherent in logit coefficients for finite, small samples 
(such as those with under 200 observations). Rare events models are designed to correct 
for this bias using a weighted-least squares correction factor that adds to the probability 
of an event (Tomz, King, and Zeng 2003; King and Zeng 2001). In this sense, rare event 
models may be most appropriate for this data. However, while logit coefficients can be 
biased in finite samples, Bergtold, Yeager, and Featherstone (2011) show that the 
marginal effects estimates are relatively robust to sample size. 
Hence, it is not straightforward whether the rare event or logit model 
specifications are most appropriate. Additionally, because the rare event models do not 
have scalar log-likelihoods, likelihood-ratio tests were unable to be performed to 
determine which model specification is most appropriate. For this reason, I present both 
model specifications whose results are presented in Table 4.8 below. Note also that the 
standard errors for the rare event models are not clustered by country-year. 
Model 1 reveals that few of the predicted factors likely to influence a state’s full 
or partial compliance to an IACHR order to reform its domestic laws actually exert any 
systematic influence. Only rights entrenchment, neighbor diffusion, foreign direct 
investment, and political competition appear to exert any significant, systematic influence 
on the likelihood of compliance. Because the coefficients are not directly interpretable, I 
use marginal effects.  
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Table 4.8: State-level Logit Models Predicting Compliance  










Model 4: Rare 




5.036   
(4.338) 
13.434   
(12.165) 
-.212    
(3.725) 




-1.614   
(2.022) 
-4.171   
(3.272) 
1.099    
(1.736) 




-.076*   
(.038) 
-.083    
(.070) 
-.016    
(.033) 




-1.163   
(1.469) 
-.726   
(1.529) 
.330    
(1.261) 




.006    
(.028) 
-.006    
(.025) 
-.009   
 (.024) 
-.006    
(.022) 
Regime Type -.458   
(3.037) 
-1.318   
(3.834) 
-.317    
(2.608) 




.656***   
(.203) 
.514*    
(.219) 
.247    
(.174) 





-1.885   
(1.275) 
-.452   
 (.788) 
-.438    
(1.095) 






.408   
 (1.212) 
.914    
(.917) 




.403†   
(.233) 
.489    
(.489) 
.160    
(.200) 
.146    
(.420) 


















Constant -8.586*   
(3.574) 
-7.798*   
(3.559) 
-4.133   
(3.069) 
-2.026   
(3.056) 
N 79 79 79 79 
Prob > X2 0.044 0.2458 -- -- 
Pseudo R2 0.294 0.2033 -- -- 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-19.777029 -16.914728 -- -- 
Correctly 
Predicted 
92.41% 92.41% -- -- 
† p < .10      * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the likelihood of compliance to IACHR judgment requiring domestic legal reform. 
Standard errors are clustered by country-year (listed in parentheses). Note that when predicting full 
compliance all spatial variables include only full compliance; alternatively, when predicting overall 
compliance all spatial variables include overall compliance. There are 15 observations of full compliance 
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within this data (with 145 observation) and 32 observations of overall (full and partial) compliance. Similar 
results to the logit models occur under probit specifications, although Hausman tests suggest that logit 
specifications are more appropriate of the two. Note that judicial independence has a linear relationship 
with compliance rather than quadratic and dropping foreign aid and/or GDP per capita yields in the same 
results. (The same results also occur if one replaces the count of neighbor compliance with a dummy for 
neighbor overall compliance or with a dummy for neighbor full compliance. Similar results occur if one 
includes total pending cases, the number of cases requiring reform pending, and previous compliance 
where none exert any influence. Interacting the diffusion terms, including the time since the granting of 
jurisdiction and its square or its interaction with previous compliance do not alter the results. Adding a one-
year lag of compliance does not alter the results. Similarly, adding government fractionalization, the years 
left in the executive’s term, population, total trade, oil exports, fuel exports, ethnic fractionalization, and 
political durability does not influence the results presented here. If one adds an interaction term between 
political competition and political constraint, the same results emerge although political competition is no 
longer significant for overall compliance. These variables are not included in the presented results so as to 
preserve the integrity of the analysis relative to the degrees of freedom. See Appendix D.)  
 
  
The degree to which a state is entrenched within the international human rights 
regime exerts a significant and positive effect on the likelihood of full or partial 
compliance. For every additional treaty ratified, a state’s likelihood to fully or partially 
comply with an IACHR order for legal reform increases by 1.99%. Hence, at the 
minimum degree of rights entrenchment where a state has ratified nine treaties, holding 
all other variables at their means,208 there is a .241% likelihood that the state will fully or 
partially comply with the IACHR legal reform order. When the degree of rights 
entrenchment is at its maximum of 17 treaties ratified, there is a 31.59% chance that the 
state will fully or partially comply with the IACHR judgment.209 These results provide 
support for H2, predicting a significant, positive relationship between the degree of 
involvement in the international human rights regime and likelihood of compliance. 
                                                           
208 The means are as follows: 1) UDS (regime type) = .606, 2) judicial independence = .547, 3) political 
constraint = .458, 4) political competition = 49.468, 5) HRO = 1.671, 6) HRO*Political Competition = 
78.116, 7) neighbor diffusion = .127, 8) foreign aid = .000, 9) FDI = 3.426, and 10) GDP per capita = 
6983.439. 
 
209 When rights entrenchment is at its mean of roughly 14 ratified treaties, the likelihood of compliance is 
6.06% (while holding all other values at their mean). Similarly the corresponding likelihoods as you add 
additional treaties are 11.05% at 15 treaties and 19.33% at 16 treaties. 
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Figure 4.16 shows the number of international treaties, convention, and covenants ratified 
by each country, and Figure 4.17 shows the relationship between rights entrenchment and 
the likelihood of compliance. 
 
 
Figure 4.16: Rights Entrenchment Across Countries 
 
Spatial diffusion, measured from neighboring states, also exerts an influence on 
the likelihood of overall compliance. For every additional land-locked neighboring state 
that has fully or partially complied in the previous year, there is a corresponding 6.85% 
increase in the likelihood of overall compliance. When a state has no neighboring states 
that have fully or partially complied in the last year, there is a likelihood of 2.37% that 




Figure 4.17: Influence of Rights Entrenchment on Overall Compliance 
 
maximum of) 4 neighbors that fully or partially complied in the last year, the likelihood 
of compliance becomes 99.51%. (With one neighboring state who complied in the 
previous year the likelihood is18.83%, with two neighbors complying in the previous 
year the likelihood becomes 68.88%, and with three neighbors complying in the previous 
year the likelihood becomes 95.48%.) These results provide some support for H7, 
although regional spatial diffusion does not appear to have a significant influence.  
Foreign direct investment influences the likelihood of overall compliance (at a 
threshold of .10), where every additional percentage point of GDP that FDI net inflow 
produces there is corresponding increase of 1.22% in the likelihood that the state will 
comply with the IACHR and reform its domestic laws. 
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Finally, political competition has a significant influence on the likelihood of full 
or partial compliance but it is in the opposite direction of my expectations, thereby 
rejecting H5 predicting that increased political competition would induce domestic 
political pressure to comply and thus increase the likelihood of compliance for states 
(assuming the administration is interested in political survival and stay in office). 
However, these results show that for every addition vote towards a party other than the 
largest one (in terms of vote share), there is a corresponding decrease in the likelihood of 
compliance of .23%.210 When political competition is at is minimum of 26.7% of the 
votes go towards smaller parties, the likelihood of compliance is 15.36%; when political 
competition is at its highest of 70% of votes going to smaller parties, the likelihood of 
full or partial compliance is .679%. I suspect that this result is due to resource allocation 
and agenda prioritization where parties in power who are losing power to opposition 
parties are allocating resources to other policies rather than reforming the domestic laws 
per the request of the IACHR. It is plausible that parties expect more electoral utility 
from other policies and actions relative to IACHR compliance. 
Turning to Model 2, the only significant influence on the likelihood of full 
compliance is the degree of entrenchment in the international human rights regime. For 
every additional human rights treaty ratified by a state, there is a corresponding increase 
in the likelihood of full compliance with an IACHR judgment by .635%. This provides 
additional support for H2. When the degree of involvement in the international human 
rights regime is at its minimum with nine ratified treaties, there is a likelihood of full 
compliance of .167%When rights entrenchment is at its maximum, with seventeen 
                                                           
210 I checked for curvilinear effects of political competition using a quadratic functional form (in predicting 
both overall and partial compliance) but no such effect exists nor does it alter the results presented here. 
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treaties ratified, the likelihood of full compliance increases to 9.22%. Hence, while the 
influence of rights entrenchment is similar across overall and full compliance, its effect 
size is noticeably smaller when predicting full compliance. However, none of the other 
variables show any significant influence on the likelihood of full compliance, thus 
rejecting H1 and H3- H7. 
The rare event logistic regressions provide no significant results for any of these 
predictors. However, because of the robust nature of the marginal effects provided by the 
Models 1 and 2 (Bergtold, Yeager, and Featherstone 2011) and the inability to account 
for non-independence of (panel) errors with the rare event logit, I believe that the logistic 
regression results (Model 1 and model 2) are more appropriate.211 Furthermore, random 
effects logistic regressions corroborate the effect of rights entrenchment in overall 
compliance while the results for full compliance corroborates the rare event logit. The 
combined results form these models suggest that the only factors likely influence full or 
partial compliance are rights entrenchment, foreign direct investment, and perhaps 
political competition. Political competition is the least robust of the three across model 
specifications, and therefore I place more confidence on the effects of rights 
entrenchment and FDI. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that all the domestic political factors 
that would influence the ease with which legal reform is possible and apply pressure for 
such legal reforms do not systematically influence these events of compliance, and these 
results are robust across all models, model specifications, and functional forms. This 
suggests that domestic politics may have little systematic influence on state decisions to 
fully or partially comply with IACHR judgments requiring domestic legal reform. 
                                                           
211 Indeed, these rare event results are not robust across model specifications, which also persuades me of 
the appropriateness of the logit models 
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Furthermore, compliance to these orders is relatively recent, as shown in Figure 4.18 and 
Figure 4.19. Figure 4.18 shows the percent compliance (calculated by the number of 
cases with full of partial compliance divided by the number of pending cases requiring 
legal reform) across countries and over time. The majority of compliant behavior, in the 
form of legal reform, occurs after 2000. Indeed, while partial compliance in particular 
occurs relatively earlier, most compliance occurs around 2009 and 2011, which is most 
apparent in Figure 4.19. Hence, not only are the judgments requiring compliance 
relatively rare and recent but compliance is similarly rare and especially recent—which, 
of course, produces issues for statistical analyses. 
 
 





Figure 4.19: Compliance Over Time 
 
 Because this state-level compliance data generate three types of data (binary, 
count, and duration) and to ensure that I avoid aggregation bias that may influence the 
substantive results of the logistic regressions presented above, I include an event count 
model of IACHR compliance (Alt, King, and Signorino 2000). I do this because the 
binary data utilized in the previous models censor the counts of compliance at one. 
Hence, the above models predict at least one event of compliance. In the data however, 
up to three cases have been fully or partially complied within a year, and up to two cases 
have been fully complied with in a given year. Because the data-generating process is 
time independent, in that the same likelihood for compliance in any time period is the 
same (conditional independence or Markov independence) and events are independence 
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from each other, I use a Poisson model with exponential distribution (Alt, King, 
Signorino 2000).212 I cluster the standard errors around country-year.213 
The results presented in Models 1 and 2 confirm the significant influence of rights 
entrenchment on the likelihood of IACHR compliance, whether full or partial. 
Furthermore, Model 1 corroborates the earlier logistic analyses with the weaker yet 
significant influences of FDI and neighbor diffusion. However, these models eliminate 
the influence of political competition (which was marginally significant and in the 
opposite direction of expectations). The marginal effects estimate that the baseline 
predicted number of events of full or partial compliance is .037. Holding all else constant, 
for every additional treaty ratified, the predicted number of events increases by .020. 
Hence, the predicted number of events increases to .057 with one additional treaty 
ratified. When rights entrenchment is at its minimum of nine treaties, the predicted 
number of compliance events is .005, holding all other variables at their means. When 
rights entrenchment is at its maximum, however, the predicted number of compliance 
events increases to .310 (again, holding all other variables at their means). 
 
 
                                                           
212 Negative binomial models produce the same results, but there is no evidence of overdispersion since the 
term for unobserved heterogeneity (alpha) is zero (4.55e-16) when modeling overall compliance and is zero 
(1.02e-15) when modeling full compliance. (Overdispersion would lead to inefficient estimators that could 
bias the standard errors downward to lead to spurious inferences that falsely reject the null hypothesis.) 
 Because there is no theoretical reason to believe separate data generating processes produce the 
zero and non-zero count events, I do not evaluate zero-inflated count models. 
 Finally, because the exponential distribution is shared between the Poisson and duration models, 
the parameters estimated in this model would be similarly estimated in a duration model (Alt, King, 
Signorino 2000). 
 
213 Fixed effect Poisson models drop several groups, including HROs, and only converges for overall 
compliance; random effects Poisson models do not converge for overall compliance while replicates the 




Table 4.9: State-level Poisson Models Predicting Compliance Counts 
 Model 1: Overall 
Compliance 
Model 2: Full 
Compliance 
Judicial Independence 3.731    
(2.950) 
12.043    
(10.138) 
Political Constraint -1.480    
(1.466) 
-3.784    
(2.712) 
Political Competition -.053    
(.033) 
-.074    
(.056) 
Human Rights INGOs 
(HRO) 
-1.040     
(1.173) 




.008    
(.023) 
-.005    
(.022) 
Regime Type -.501    
(2.369) 
-1.185     
(3.234) 
Rights Entrenchment .522***    
(.163) 




-1.612    
(1.138) 
-.423 
   (.637) 
Neighbor Diffusion 
(Count) 
1.560†     
(.830) 




.284†    
(.148) 
.418    
(.368) 










Constant -7.347*    
(2.786) 
-7.207*   
(2.991) 
N 79 79 
Prob > X2 0.000 0.149 
Pseudo R2 0.232 0.182 
Log pseudo-likelihood -21.932 -17.553 
Deviance Goodness of 
Fit 





Pearson Goodness of 
Fit 





† p < .10      * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the count of compliance events. Standard errors are clustered by country-year (listed 




 When predicting full compliance events, rights entrenchment is similarly 
significant, though the baseline predicted number of events of full compliance is .014. 
Every additional rights treaty ratified increases this baseline prediction by .006—which is 
a smaller effect than for overall compliance. When rights entrenchment is at its minimum 
of nine treaties, holding all other factors at their means, the predicted number of full 
compliance events is .002. When rights entrenchment consists of 17 ratified treaties, then 
the predicted number of full compliance events is .088. 
 Diffusion through neighboring states has a significant effects at the .10 level, 
where for every additional neighboring state that has complied in the last year, the 
predicted number of compliance events increases by .058. Holding all other values at 
their means, the predicted number of compliance events is .031 when no neighboring 
state has complied in the last year and is 3.31 when three neighboring states have 
complied in the last year. While diffusion through neighboring states seems to exert some 
influence on the likelihood of overall compliance, however, it does not appear to fur 
strictly full compliance (see Model 2). 
 Finally, the predicted number of compliant events increases by .012 as foreign 
direct investment increases each percentage point as a percentage of GDP. Though 
foreign direct investment seems to exert some influence on the likelihood of overall 
compliance, however, it does not appear to exert influence on full compliance (see Model 
2). 
 These models also corroborate the logistic regressions presented previously in that 
they reject the hypothesized prediction that greater number of permanent human rights 
INGOs would increase the likelihood of an event (H1), that higher degrees of political 
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constraint would decrease the likelihood of an event (H4), that increased political 
competition domestically would increase the likelihood of compliance (H5), that 
increased political competition along with greater numbers of HROs would increase the 
likelihood of an event (H6), and part of H7, predicting regional diffusion. There is no 
evidence for an effect of judicial independence levels on the likelihood of the presence or 
absence of compliance or the likelihood of an event of compliance. This may reject H3, 
but since this hypothesis is agnostic in terms of direction it is also possible that the 
expected effects occur but simply cancel each other out. The models presented here 
simply are not able to make this distinction, and future work will need to examine this 
possibility.  
 
4.3 Chapter Conclusions 
 This chapter offers new data and implications on Latin American compliance 
behavior and IACHR reparation behavior. I find that states comply much more frequently 
than previously assumed even with the most difficult reparation orders. These data offer a 
new perspective on compliance trends that moves beyond anecdotal evidence. This data 
therefore offer the opportunity to examine compliance and regional court behavior based 
upon case and legal considerations as well as political considerations.  
  This chapter also addressed the possibility of IACHR being a strategic actor in 
issuing reparations of legal reform. I find that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
is more likely to issue a reparation requiring domestic legal change for states that have 
previously fully or partially complied to a similar order. The IACHR is also more likely 
to issue a reform reparation for cases involving empowerment rights and cases involving 
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both empowerment rights and physical integrity rights. While these results do not directly 
prove that the IACHR is strategic when issuing these reparations, the increased likelihood 
of receiving them if one has previously complied suggests that this is a possibility.  
If this is the case, the strategic behavior portrayed by the IACHR would be similar 
to that of the ECJ. Due to the lack of enforcement mechanism, regional courts suffer from 
perpetual threats of override or irrelevance when their decisions are perpetually ignored. 
This difficulty can initiate a vicious cycle where regional courts can never gain the 
legitimacy they need to enforce their decisions. One way to avoid this vicious cycle as 
well as establish and maintain regional court legitimacy is for the court to make demands 
that are likely to be complied with. Courts would therefore target compliant states and/or 
issue trivial demands. In this way, courts could protect themselves from bowing to 
member-state interest because they are issuing demands while also protecting themselves 
from rampant noncompliance that erodes their legitimacy, power, and relevance. These 
possibilities are rarely systematically or empirical examined and is often traded for 
separation of powers models. However, this tradeoff precludes a comprehensive 
understanding of the motivations, strategies, and behaviors of supranational judicial 
institutions. 
 This chapter’s empirical analysis of state compliance to IACHR orders is 
similarly suggestive yet far from the last word. In terms of case-level predictors for 
compliance, cases that deal with both PIR and empowerment rights are less likely to be 
complied with relative to PIR rights. This suggests the possibility that states prefer to 
comply when compliance requires behavior that is not particularly difficult. In other 
words, the more comprehensive the task compliance requires, the less likely a states will 
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make the effort. Of course, these are precisely the cases that would require longer periods 
of time to comply. The inherent comprehensiveness and difficulty reduces states’ ability 
to achieve collective action quickly and effectively and may require additional resources 
that are temporarily beyond state capacity.  
States who have granted the IAHR compulsory jurisdiction more than fifteen 
years before the case receives a judgment are less likely to comply with the reparation 
orders. Similarly, yet unsurprisingly, case compliance in terms of reforming the laws 
becomes less likely as time goes on. These relationships suggest that commitments to the 
IACHR erode over time rather than become internalized. However, because these events 
are so rare and recent, most interpretations are speculative at best at this point in time. 
At the state level, the degree of rights entrenchment appears to influence state 
decisions to comply, and, to a lesser extent, neighbor diffusion and foreign direct 
investment. These three factors increase the chances of state compliance, but rights 
entrenchment, or the degree to which a state is involved in the international human rights 
regime, is the most robust influence of the three. This result lends support to the intuition 
that membership within communities and the obligations that are inherent in the 
membership systematically influence behavior. The question this result implies is: what is 
the micro-theory for this influence? While scholars have a variety of theories that predict 
behavior consist with these results, these mechanisms typically occur simultaneously and 
are impossible to measure scientifically. Hence, in order to isolate causal mechanisms 
that lead to this type of behavior, political scientists must find a way to disentangle these 
processes both conceptually and methodologically.  
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While this information about what induces state compliance in important, the 
factors that do not affect compliance are equally noteworthy. The degree of domestic and 
international media attention does not influence the likelihood of compliance. Previous 
compliance also does not does significantly predict future compliance. Furthermore, 
domestic political features do not appear to systematically influence state compliance to 
the IACHR either. Regime type, the level of judicial independence, the level of political 
constraints in changing policy, the level of political competition, the development of 
human rights INGOs, regional diffusion, foreign aid, and economic development do not 
influence the likelihood of state compliance to the IACHR. It would seem that the 
traditional factors that scholars rely on, and have found substantial support in other 
contexts, have no merit in compliance to the IACHR. Yet, these analyses leave much to 
be desired. First, the rarity of all of the events of interest remains particularly 
problematic. IACHR decisions are in and of themselves rare. Their decisions to issue a 
reparation order that requires domestic legal reform is even more rare. Events of state 
compliance—especially full compliance—are even more rare still. Furthermore, the 
recent nature of these rare events makes statistical and inferential analysis difficult. 
 Beyond this dissertation, more work needs to be done to identify whether and in 
what ways judicial independence may influence a state’s decision to comply with IACHR 
order (and whether it influences the likelihood of receiving such a reform order in the 
first place). Several theories surround its influence predict contradictory results, yet 
virtually no empirical research has sufficiently disentangled them when examining 
international law.  
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Additionally, future work should address the role of crime and drug-linked crime 
to these relationships between domestic and international law, especially when it is likely 
that reformed domestic law that is aligned with international law is not necessarily 
politically popular even for the population. In Mexico, for example, domestic legal 
reforms enforcing due process rights were seen to benefit convicted criminals rather than 
the protect victims’ rights. Hence the assumption of single, unified response to the 
prospect of institutionalizing international law domestically is unrealistic and would 
likely vary according to states’ experience with widespread crime, drug cartels, severe 
socio-economic divides, and government corruption. These other issues may also 
influence where IACHR judgments are on the national political agenda. For instance, 
states dealing with widespread organized crime with heavy casualties may prioritize 
political stability and citizen safety prior to any action to attempt to comply with the 
IACHR. 
 Furthermore, domestic legal changes may not be perceived as an effective or 
meaningful change by a population, which would make such compliance through these 
reforms less beneficial politically and less important. Since human rights is most 
important in terms of state behavior, states where the population perceives a wide divide 
between the law and behavior are unlikely to care about, trust, or lobby for legal change. 
When the government is especially corrupt, for example, any legal changes would likely 
be met with either suspicion or total lack of interest since these changes not lead to 
changes in state behavior. Hence, legal reforms are only important if the state abides by 
them and are likely to occur if the state can be expected to abide by them. 
 
 245
 Hence, while this chapter seeks to contribute to our understanding of the 
relationship between international law and domestic law and the dynamics between states 






CONCLUSIONS: COURTS, COMPLEMENTARITY, AND COMPETITION 
This dissertation asks, how does international human rights law, become domestic law? 
This question carries legal and practical implications that remain understudied yet crucial 
for effective human rights policy and successful international human rights regimes. I 
attempt to open Pandora’s box of processes of internalization, through which states are 
fundamentally changed. I argue that the legal processes and pressures are equally as 
important as changes in state behavior. Laws influence behavior by creating incentive 
structures and expectations for people and behavior, by setting national political 
discourse, by establishing the relationships between governments and people, by creating 
categories of political identities and conferring responsibilities, freedoms, and powers to 
these categories (and determining the selection of people within each category), and by 
regularizing behavior, expectations, and identities. Laws formally institutionalize each of 
these identities and relationships, define behaviors and norms, and do so in through a 
transparent, consistent, predictable legalistic process that confers legitimacy. 
Furthermore, laws influence behavior over time in that it affects behavior and identities 
contemporaneously as well as future behavior, identity affiliation, political discourse, and 
normative expectations. Hence, evaluating the degree to which international law 
catalyzes changes in domestic human rights laws provides insight into international law’s 
ability to effectuate comprehensive, long-term or permanent changes in domestic politics. 
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As such, examining the role of international law in redefining domestic political contexts 
lends itself as a more stringent and more comprehensive way to evaluate the importance 
and influence of international law, especially compared to evaluations relegating its 
influence to instigating immediate changes in state behavior exclusively. 
 This dissertation thus offers two perspectives of how international human rights 
laws influence domestic laws. The first addresses the relationship between international 
law with states’ domestic high courts to identify the role of these high courts in 
translating and implementing international law as domestic, legally enforceable law. This 
perspective examines the influence of strong, independent courts on domestic rights 
practices and provides preliminary evidence on the extent to which high courts have been 
in proactive in promoting human rights protections consistent with existing international 
law. The second manner in which this dissertation addresses the influence of international 
law on domestic legal systems is through the compliance records of states with the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. I evaluate the influence of international law 
specifically through regional court jurisprudence by its ability to effectuate domestic 
legal changes within states. These two approaches enable a preliminary glance at how 
international law influences domestic law, emphasizing the roles of national and 
supranational courts in this process. 
This dissertation finds support that international law, conceptualized as the broad 
set of legal processes, rules, expectations, and norms as well as direct orders from a 
regional court, does influence domestic law and therefore state identity.214 I find that 
Latin America appears to in the midst of these influences where its regional court and 
                                                           
214 The influence of codification on state identity is a long-term process. To be explicit, I do not argue that a 




national courts have made significant institutional changes, legal changes, and normative 
changes in the way they perceive the fluid relationships between international and 
domestic laws and in the way these actors interact with each other.  
More specifically, I find that domestic judges are incorporating international law 
into their domestic legal systems. While I do not argue that this is at the expense of 
judicial preferences or strategic motivations,215 the fact that international is, in fact, 
reaching domestic legal systems is important. Combined with the substantial increases in 
Latin American rights litigation and regional judicialization, this may suggest that 
international law and courts are experiencing increases in legitimacy. It could also reflect 
the increasing perceptions of legitimacy and usefulness of law, most generally, in 
providing desirable and meaningful solutions. All of these trends provide for optimistic 
predictions as the region continues to develop its rule of law and better protect human 
rights. 
Also significantly, I find that a high level of domestic court judicial independence 
is unnecessary in protecting many human rights and, congruently, judicial independence 
is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the promotion or expansion of rights 
laws that are consistent with international law. Judicial independence only serves as a 
credible threat of accountability in constraining government behavior in relation to 
physical integrity rights. In terms of combating torture, extrajudicial killing, forced 
disappearance, and arbitrary detention, higher levels of judicial independence allow 
courts to more credibly and effectively constrain the government. Beyond these rights, 
                                                           
215 My suspicion, although not empirical examined in this dissertation, is that Latin American judicial 
preferences are often in line with international human rights laws (more so than with other issue areas). 
This alignment does not necessarily mean that judges agree on the application of these laws or even that 




however, judicial independence appear to offer diminishing returns with rights 
protections and rendered virtually irrelevant in court decisions to expand rights 
protections.  
While I do not take these results to undermine the importance and desirability of 
judicial independence, they do call into question scholars’ and policy-makers’ 
assumptions of the role judicial independence plays in establishing the rule of law. Two 
fundamental components of the rule of law is the ability of the government to be 
constrained by law and the protection of human rights. Judicial independence has largely 
been credited with producing both of these conditions—even the single most important 
factor leading to the rule of law (although see Helmke ad Rosenbluth 2009). 
Policymakers then emphasize judicial reforms focusing primarily on the establishment of 
judicial independence in their efforts to promote the rule of law internationally. However, 
these policies only work insofar as judicial independence is truly the primary cause for 
these conditions. The results presented here call these policies into question. While these 
policies should be effective (at least theoretically) in preserving physical integrity rights, 
they are unlikely to produce results in either the enhancement of rights protections 
beyond PIR, court activism in expanding rights and constraining the government, or the 
incorporation of international law. 
This dissertation also offers new data and suggestive evidence that the IACHR is 
strategic in it issuance of reparation orders and that state compliance to reparation orders 
requiring legal reform is based upon case-specific and state-level factors. States that have 
a history of compliance to previous legal reform orders are significantly more likely to 
receive future orders, although the likelihood of these events are relatively low. However, 
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the IACHR also issues significantly more reform orders involving empowerment rights 
or the combination of PIR and empowerment rights. The importance of this case-level 
attribute likely—albeit speculatively—represents relative differences in the development 
of these rights or case complexity. In terms of rights development, this result could 
indicate the relative underdevelopment of economic, social, and cultural rights.  
Alternatively, the combination of multiple rights often increases case complexity, which 
Latin American states may have insufficiently accounted for or correctly balanced in 
existing domestic law. 
In terms of state compliance to IACHR reform reparations, case-level and state-
level factors appear to play a role. Cases that deal with both PIR and empowerment rights 
are less likely to induce compliance. This may suggest that states prefer to comply or are 
better able to comply when compliance requires behavior that is not particularly difficult 
or complicated. In other words, the more comprehensive the task compliance requires, 
the less likely a states will make the effort. Alternatively, the state may simply not the 
capacity or resources to make certain complex changes to laws. Either way, of course, 
these are precisely the cases that would require longer periods of time to comply even if 
the state genuinely intends to comply.  
At the state level, the degree of rights entrenchment appears to influence state 
decisions to comply, and to a lesser extent neighbor diffusion and foreign direct 
investment. These three factors increase the chances of state compliance, but rights 
entrenchment, or the degree to which a state is involved in the international human rights 
regime, is the most robust influence of the three. This result lends support to theories of 
socialization, social pressure, and epistemic communities arguing that membership and 
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participation within institutions and communities, as well as the obligations that are 
inherent in those memberships, systematically influence behavior.  
Equally noteworthy are the factors that do not systematically affect compliance. 
The degree of domestic and international media attention does not influence the 
likelihood of compliance, suggesting that ‘naming and shaming’ strategies may less 
effective for IACHR compliance. Previous compliance also does not does significantly 
predict future compliance, suggesting perhaps that norms of compliance to the IACHR 
erode over time (across administrations) or are not significant motivations for 
compliance. Furthermore, several domestic political features do not appear to 
systematically influence state compliance to the IACHR either. Regime type, the level of 
judicial independence, the level of political constraints in changing policy, the level of 
political competition, the development of human rights INGOs, regional diffusion, 
foreign aid, and economic development do not influence the likelihood of state 
compliance to the IACHR. It would seem that the traditional factors that scholars rely on, 
and have found substantial support in other contexts, have no merit in compliance to the 
IACHR legal reform reparation orders. 
The lack of influence of regime type on compliance runs counter other studies 
examining international law compliance that find that democracies are more likely to 
comply with international law (assuming they granted jurisdiction in the first place). The 
level of judicial independence, once again, does not appear to influence the choice to 
comply. However, the several theoretical mechanisms that predict opposite results could 
lead to this lack of significance. Future research will need to model specifically for these 
three relationships in order to accurately determine the role of judicial independence in 
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regional court compliance. The ease with which legal reform can be enacted does not 
appear to influence compliance, nor do mechanisms of political opposition or rights 
advocacy mobilization. State capacity, at least economically, does not exert a systematic 
influence on choices to initiate legal reform, nor do foreign aid or regional peer 
consideration. 
 It is important to note that these conclusions are limited due to data constraints, 
rarity of events, and the nature of the relationship between international law, domestic 
courts, and the IACHR. While these empirical results identify the extent to which 
domestic Latin American courts promote rights laws that are consistent with international 
law, suggest that the IACHR is strategic to some degree, and identify factors that predict 
compliance to IACHR jurisprudence, these analyses do not evaluate—or even identify—
the relationship between the IACHR and domestic courts.  
Determining the precise nature of the relationship between Latin American 
supranational and domestic court remains unclear. One reason is that the legal reform 
orders to not demand specific policies. The IACHR simply identifies which laws, with 
varying degree of specificity, violate Convention commitments and orders the state 
amend its laws following its domestic authority and legal processes.216 Hence, while the 
IACHR may demand that certain legal obstacles for the protection and enforcement of 
rights be removed, demand the criminalization of forced disappearances, or demand the 
annulment of mandatory death penalty sentences, the state have significant room to 
maneuver. Hence, the IACHR does not dictate the final domestic policy, although it 
                                                           
216 For example, the IACHR declared in Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (2005) that “The 
State must take such domestic legislative, administrative and other steps as may be necessary, within a 





evaluates such legal changes based upon the removal of legal obstacles that prevent 
compliance with the Convention. 
A second reason is that the IACHR does not directly interact with domestic 
courts. IACHR is primarily devised to engage with state governments rather than 
domestic legal systems, which is evidenced by the fact that IACHR reparation orders are 
directed to state governments and virtually never address the state’s court. Only a handful 
of compliance records reveal domestic judicial responses to IACHR orders. Hence, at 
least in terms of the IACHR compliance reports, the incorporation of international law is 
not directly through the courts but rather through legislative, executive, or administrative 
processes. While this does not suggest that the IACHR has no direct connect to or 
influence over domestic judiciaries, the nature of the reparation orders and compliance 
reports makes the identification of these relationships difficult. 
In contrast to compliance report enforcement mechanisms for incorporation, 
conventionality control may provide the more direct link between the IACHR and 
domestic courts. Perhaps its recent establishment indicates willful efforts on the part of 
the IACHR to seek more direct contact with, and perhaps influence over, domestic courts. 
However the motivations for its creation as well as the perceptions of its intent remain 
unclear. Conventionality control renewed interest toward the basic question of whether 







Complementarity or Competition?  
One may interpret that the IACHR is attempting to empower itself and national 
judiciaries by cooperating through conventionality control, but this obligation could be 
empowering to domestic courts or perceived as a threat to their existing judicial 
discretion. In other words, conventionality control may lend power and legitimacy from 
the IACHR to domestic courts whereby this granting of authority empower domestic 
courts to ignore existing laws that run counter to the Convention. This is likely to be the 
case only if the IACHR and domestic courts share similar interpretations of Convention 
rights and obligations. In this case, the IACHR lends its authority so as to provide an 
enforcement mechanism for domestic judicial decisions that uphold these interpretations 
in the face of a potentially noncompliance state government. If the state government is 
noncompliant to its own judiciary, it can expect increased ex post costs for 
noncompliance in terms of legitimacy and potentially in terms domestic political costs. 
Since the judiciaries are posing a united front, state noncompliance to its own courts is 
simultaneously noncompliance with international law and IACHR jurisdiction. Hence, 
governments are not choosing merely to ignore their domestic courts but the cooperative 
strategy raises the stakes in such a way where domestic decisions of noncompliance of 
domestic courts is simultaneously violations of international jurisprudence and 
commitments. Put more simply, one instance of domestic noncompliance automatically 
becomes three instances of noncompliance.  By raising the stakes in this manner, it is 
possible that domestic noncompliance could more easily trigger international ‘naming 
and shaming’ and domestic mobilization. The shift from one to three instances of 
noncompliance raises the perceived severity of government noncompliance and implies 
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greater state disregard for Convention commitments and human rights, possibly leading 
to greater public awareness and mobilization. 
On the other hand, domestic courts could perceive conventionality control as a 
threat to their judicial discretion. In other words, conventionality control granted by the 
IACHR attempts to supplant domestic judicial preferences and discretion with its own. 
As such, it relegates domestic judicial jurisprudence as inferior to IACHR interpretation 
of law and violates state sovereignty. Hence, international law moves away from an 
ongoing dialogue between courts to a dictation of legal interpretation and application 
where international law always reigns supreme. This places not only international and 
domestic law in competition, but it initiates a competitive power struggle within the 
judicial community where domestic judges struggle to maintain their discretion, or the 
freedom and ability to interpret laws and apply them based upon their own preferences, 
roles, and expectations. 
If one accepts Benvenieti’s (2008) prediction that domestic courts, when facing 
this external threat, would then strategically cite and incorporate international law so as to 
protect their judicial power in the face of expansionary international legal institutions that 
increasing leave national courts with dwindling opportunities to regulate and restrain 
domestic political institutions, then one would expect the increased reference and 
incorporation to international law.217  
However, this prediction leads to the behavioral equivalence of the models of 
complementarity and competition. Both models predict increased incorporation and 
citation of international law, although for extremely divergent reasons. The model of 
                                                           
217 Recognize that Benveneiti’s (2008) argument did not deal with explicitly international law threats; 
rather I am applying his framework of threat response to international law threats. 
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complementarity suggests that increased reference to international law empowers 
domestic courts relative to state governments by presenting a unified legal front that 
raises the stake of domestic noncompliance and making noncompliance more costly. 
Hence, even if courts do not agree with the IACHR or international law, referring to it 
can be strategically beneficial when the courts anticipate noncompliance. The model of 
legal competition actually asserts the same argument. The difference is where the threat is 
coming from. In the model of complementarity, the domestic courts’ perceived threat is 
that of noncompliance by the state government while in the model of competition, the 
domestic courts’ perceived threat is an external, foreign threat—which could be the 
international law itself. When this is the case, like in conventionality control situations, 
then the paradoxical solution to the threat of international law is using international law. 
The intuition, I suppose, is that a political actor must play the game in order to protect her 
ability to be in the game at all.  
The problem with this solution to the model of competition is that in order to 
achieve short-term security, courts are contributing to threat itself in the long run. The 
most they ‘play the game’ to stay relevant and retain their power of discretion, these 
courts further entrench international law and legal norms within domestic societies as 
well as promote its diffusion internationally. Especially since increased reference to 
international law is often gauged as a metric of its success, the courts are contribution to 
their own (perceived) demise. 
It is interesting to note that both of these models suggest international is merely a 
tool to be used by rationalist, strategic domestic courts. Neither makes any real mention 
about the quality of law, normative pressures, or the constitutive nature of law; this 
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absence, or perhaps agnosticism, brings scholars back to original divides between 
neoliberal and constructivist paradigms. However, since both models predict increased 
engagement with international law and norms, courts are submitting themselves into the 
same types of socialization and peer pressures exerted from the transnational legal 
community. Hence the neoliberal and constructivist are not really at odd with each other, 
but the neoliberalist story ends much sooner than the constructivist version that continues 
beyond the (perhaps strategic) entry into these pressures that can have systematic but 
unintended effects on political actors.  
This discussion highlights the problem of how do we distinguish between the use 
of international law as evidence of its moral or normative success that affects the hearts 
and minds of diverse people and its use as merely another political tool that has no effect 
or purpose beyond short-term calculated benefit? Even more perplexing—or intriguing 
depending upon your point of view—is how much does this distinction matter? If one 
argues that participation in a complex network of social interactions with diverse 
communities of actors, regardless of the reason of entry or participation, influences one’s 
identity, preferences, role orientation, social values, and paradigm through which one 
experiences and interprets the world, then the distinction of these model does not matter.  
 The real influence of international law comes from two related characteristics: a) 
its ability to create these networks as well as induce exposure to and repeated interactions 
with other actor networks (which is not unique to international law), and b) through the 
interpretation of its success. So long as international law’s use is interpreted as its 
success, it use retains the power to persuade and influence others. Once its use is tossed 
aside as simply another political tool in a tool kit, its ability to influence the hearts and 
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minds of people falls apart and relegates its influence to strictly rationalist cost-benefit 
analyses. Because we interpret international law to be something more than a political 
tool, it can be. Furthermore, the more we believe it to be successful and effective, the 













                                                           
218 This leads to moral quandary for political scientists: if eroding public belief in international law causes 
its erosion, should we actively contribute to its erosion? While I do not argue that international law should 
not be questioned or objectively and systematically examined, it highlights the all too frequently ignored 
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APPENDIX A –PREVIOUS U.N. DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AWARD 
RECIPIENTS 
The United Nations Prize in the Field of Human Rights   
FIRST AWARD - December 1968 - 20th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 
 
Manuel Bianchi (Chile), Ambassador, Chairman of Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights 
 
 René Cassin (France), Original member of Human Rights Commission 
Chief Albert Luthuli (posthumously) (South Africa), President of the ANC 
 Mehranguiz Manoutchehrian (Iran), Attorney/Legal Adviser and Senator 
 Petr Emelyanovich Nedbailo (Ukraine), Member, Human Rights Commission 
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt (posthumously) (U.S.A.), First Lady, President of the Human 
Rights Commission 
 
SECOND AWARD - December 1973 - 25th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 
 
 Dr. Taha Hussein (posthumously) (Egypt), Professor of Literature 
C. Wilfred Jenks (posthumously) (UK), Director-General of International Labour 
Office 
 
 Maria Lavalle Urbina (Mexico), Lawyer, Professor 
Bishop Abel Muzorewa (Zimbabwe), President of the ANC, Bishop of United 
Methodist Church 
 
 Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam (Mauritius), Prime Minister of Mauritius 
 U Thant (Myanmar), Secretary-General of the United Nations 





 Begum Ra’Ana Liaquat Ali Khan (Pakistan) 
 Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan (Iran) 
 Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King (Posthumously) (USA) 
 Mrs. Helen Suzman (South Africa) 
 The International Committee of the Red Cross 
 Amnesty International 
 Vicaria de la Solidaridad (Chile) 
 Union nationale des femmes de Tunisie 
FOURTH AWARD - December 1988- 40th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 
 
 Baba Murlidhar Devidas Amte (India), Lawyer 
 John Humphrey (Canada) Director, United Nations Division of Human Rights 
 Prof. Adam Lopatka (Poland), President, Supreme Court of Poland 
 Bishop Leonidas Proaño (Ecuador) 
 Nelson Mandela (South Africa) 
 Winnie Mandela (South Africa) 
FIFTH AWARD - December 1993- 45th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 
 
 Mr. Hassib Ben Ammar (Tunisia), President of the Arab Institute for Human Rights 
Dr. Erica-Irene Daes (Greece), Chair/Rapporteur, Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations 
 
 James Grant (U.S.A.), Executive Director of UNICEF 
The International Commission of Jurists 
 The Medical Personnel of the Central Hospital of Sarajevo 
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Dr. Sonia Picado Sotela (Costa Rica), Jurist, Vice President of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights 
 
 Ganesh Man Singh (Nepal), Supreme Leader of the Nepali Congress 
 The Sudanese Women’s Union 
Father Julio Tumiri Javier (Bolivia), Founder and President, Permanent Assembly of 
Human Rights in Bolivia 
 
SIXTH AWARD – December 1998 – 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 
 
 Sunila Abeyesekera (Sri Lanka), Director of Inform 
Angelina Acheng Atyam (Uganda), who has worked to secure the release of children 
in rebel captivity in Uganda 
 
 Jimmy Carter (U.S.A.), former President of the United Sates 
 Jose Gregori (Brazil), Head of the Brazilian National Secretariat for Human Rights 
 Anna Sabatova (Czech Republic), one of the founding members of "Charter 77" 
 A Prize was given in honour of all human rights defenders. 
SEVENTH AWARD – December 2003 – 55th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights 
 
Enriqueta Estela Barnes de Carlotto (Argentina), President of the Asociación 
Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo [Association of Plaza de Mayo Grandmothers] 
 
Deng Pufang (China), Founder and Director of the China Disabled Persons’ 
Federation 
 
 The Family Protection Project Management Team (Jordan) 
Shulamith Koenig (U.S.A), Executive Director of the People’s Movement for Human 
Rights Education 
 
The Mano River Women’s Peace Network in West Africa (network of women’s 
organizations from Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea) 
 
 Sergio Vieira de Mello (Brazil), special posthumous award 





Louise Arbour (Canada), former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Benazir Bhutto (posthumously) (Pakistan), former Prime Minister and leader of the 
opposition who was assassinated. 
 
 Ramsey Clark (U.S.A.), former Attorney General 
 Dr. Carolyn Gomes (Jamaica), of Jamaicans for Justice 
Dr. Denis Mukwege (Democratic Republic of the Congo), co-founder of the General 
Referral Hospital of Panzi 
 
Sr. Dorothy Stang (posthumously) (Brazil), murdered nun, Human Rights Watch 
NINTH AWARD – December 2013 – 65th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 
 
Mr. Biram Dah Abeid (campaigner against slavery) from Mauritania  
Mr. Abeid, himself the son of freed-slaves, is engaged in an advocacy campaign to 
eradicate slavery. In 2008, he founded an NGO, the Initiative for the Resurgence of the 
Abolitionist Movement. His organization seeks to draw attention to the issue and to help 
take specific cases before courts of law. Mr. Abeid recently won a human rights 
defenders award for his work. 
Ms. Hiljmnijeta Apuk (human rights activist and campaigner for rights of 
people with disproportional restricted growth – short stature) from Kosovo*   
 
 Hiljmnijeta Apuk has been an activist for the rights of the persons with disabilities 
for over 30 years, both domestically as well as internationally. She is the founding 
director of the Little People of Kosovo non-governmental organization and acts as 
national coordinator of an awareness campaign for employment possibilities of persons 
with disabilities. In addition to working for many years on rights of persons with 
muscular dystrophy and of those with disproportionally restricted growth up to the height 
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of 125cm, Ms. Apuk is also an artist, working to promote authentic culture of persons 
with disabilities through her artwork. Ms. Apuk was a member of the Ad Hoc Committee 
of the UN General Assembly on drafting of the Convention of the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. 
Ms. Liisa Kauppinen (President emeritus of the World Federation of the Deaf) 
Finland 
 
 Dr. Liisa Kauppinen has been a ‘voice’ for the human rights of deaf people since 
1970. She was effective in securing the inclusion of references to signed languages, Deaf 
Culture, Deaf Community and the identity of deaf people within the UN’s Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2006. Dr Kauppinen's human rights work, 
however, has not focused exclusively on the rights of deaf people, but also on rights of 
women and women with disabilities. Dr Kauppinen's passion for international work lead 
to a number of development co-operation projects with Deaf Communities in Africa, 
Central Asia, South East Asia, Latin America, the Balkans and North West Russia. 
Ms. Khadija Ryadi (Former President of the Morocco Association for Human 
Rights) Morocco  
 
Khadija Ryadi has been a human rights activist since 1983 when she joined the 
Moroccan Association for Human Rights. Ms. Ryadi has been at the fore-front of several 
human rights causes, including fight against impunity, full equality between men and 
women, self-determination and freedom of expression regardless of sexual orientation. 
She is a coordinator of a network of 22 human rights NGOs in Morocco. 
Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico (Mexico’s Constitutional Court)  
The Mexican Supreme Court of Justice provides legal protections for constitutional 
rights of Mexican citizens and residents. The national Supreme Court has accomplished 
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very considerable progress in promoting human rights through its interpretations and 
enforcement of Mexico’s constitution and its obligations under international law. 
Additionally, the national Supreme Court has set important human rights standards for 
Mexico and the Latin-American region. 
Malala Yousafzai (student activist), Pakistan  
Malala Yousafzai has become a symbol for young women’s rights the world over. 
Initially a vocal and well-known advocate for education and women’s rights, she was 
already a well-known figure speaking out on the girls’ crucial right to education, 
women’s empowerment and the links between the two. After surviving an October 2012 
assassination attempt in retaliation for her actions and advocacy for education and 
women’s rights, Ms. Yousafzai has demonstrated her courage and commitment by 
continuing to speak out on behalf of the rights of girls and women. 
(*) Reference to Kosovo should be understood in full compliance with United Nations 











APPENDIX B – CHAPTER 3 FULL MODELS WITH CONTROLS 
Table B.1: Panel-Corrected Standard Error Model of PIR and Empowerment Rights in 
Latin America, 1981-2010
 
 Physical Integrity Rights Empowerment Rights 











































































N 371 369 
Number of Groups 18 18 
Observations per 
Group, 
Average (min, max) 
20.6 (14, 21) 20.5 (14, 21) 
Prob  > X2 0.000 0.000 
R2 .983 .618 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variables are the degree of respect for physical integrity rights and empowerment rights, 
respectively. Empowerment rights model has centered judicial independence scores (where I subtracted the 
mean from each score before squaring). Coefficients represent the results of panel-corrected standard error 





















Table B.2: Fixed Effects Model of PIR and Empowerment Rights in Latin America,  
1981-2010 
 
 Physical Integrity Rights Empowerment Rights 














Judicial Independence2 -- -8.681* 
(3.473) 
















Two year lag, Rights -.357*** 
(.049) 
-- 


































Rho .512 .748 
N 371 369 
Number of Groups 18 18 
Observations per Group, 20.6 (14, 21) 20.5 (14, 21) 
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Average (min, max) 
Prob  > F 0.000 0.000 
R2 within .954 .581 
R2 between .979 .157 
R2 overall .970 .252 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variables are the degree of respect for physical integrity rights and empowerment rights, 
respectively. Empowerment rights model has centered judicial independence scores (where I subtracted the 
mean from each score before squaring). Coefficients represent the results of fixed effects models with 























Table B.3: Fixed Effects Model of Empowerment Rights in Latin America, 1981-2010 
































































Rho .748 .504 
N 369 335 
Number of Groups 18 18 
Observations per Group, 
Average (min, max) 
20.5 (14, 21) 18.6 (9, 21) 
Prob  > F 0.000 0.000 
R2 within .581 .482 
R2 between .157 .338 
R2 overall .252 .369 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Dependent variables are the degree of respect for empowerment rights. Both models have centered judicial 
independence scores (where I subtracted the mean from each score before squaring). Coefficients represent 
























APPENDIX C – MEXICAN SUPREME COURT 










































Direct Amparo 17.2% 14.0% 18.0% 16.2% 20.48
% 
17.9% 25.3% 17.93% 
Indirect Amparo  9.7% 19.6% 13.8% 10.6% 8.94% 6.19% 8.58% 11.03% 
Constitutional Issue 2.5% 2.7% 1.9% 2.5% 1.98% 1.70% 1.91% 2.09% 
Action of 
Unconstitutionality 
2.0% 2.1% 0.8% 0.7% 1.09% 0.64% 1.02% 1.00% 
Direct Amparo 1.2% 0.7% 0.4% 1.2% 1.06% 0.71% 0.64% 0.82% 
Modification of 
Jurisprudence 
0.3% 0.2% 0.6% 0.4% 0.10% 0.18% 0 0.27% 
Total Number of 
Cases (Decided) 
1003 4564 5024 5177 5851 6720 1573 29361 
Data compiled from: https://www.scjn.gob.mx/transparencia/paginas/trans_jurisd.aspx. Note that 2008 data 
reflects only the final fourth trimester, and the 2014 data only reflects the first trimester data. 2012 data 
includes cases for substitution of jurisdiction (9 cases or 0.15%)—which is not included above. 
 





































Municipal 80% 67.5% 64.1% 65.9% 83.6% 84.3% 73.3% 73.2% 
State 20% 26.8% 28.3% 29.5% 13.8% 14.8% 16.7% 22.4% 




25 123  92  132  116 115 30 616 
Data compiled from: https://www.scjn.gob.mx/transparencia/paginas/trans_jurisd.aspx. Note that 2008 data 















































Guerrero 16% 0 2.4% 0.8% 3.5% 1.8% 0 1.5% 
Districto 
Federal 
12% 6.0% 3.5% 0.8% 0 1.8% 0 3.4% 
Jalisco 12% 8.6% 7.1% 23.8% 22.1% 6.1% 3.7% 13.4% 
Oaxaca 12% 22.4% 12.9% 13.5% 16.8% 7.9% 11.1% 14.8% 
Tabasco 8% 3.4% 3.5% 7.1% 0 0 7.4% 3.2% 
Guanajuato 4% 0.9% 1.2% 0.8% 4.4% 0.9% 0 2.0% 
Tlaxcala 4% 1.7% 7.1% 1.6% 0 1.8% 3.7% 1.9% 
Morelos 8% 11.2% 14.1% 9.5% 15.0% 51.8% 33.3% 19.5% 
Estado de 
Mexico 
4% 4.3% 4.7% 2.4% 3.5% 0 0 2.7% 
Colima 4% 0.9% 0 0 0.9% 0 0 0.2% 
Veracruz 4% 1.7% 4.7% 1.6% 1.8% 2.6% 7.4% 2.9% 
Yucatan 0 1.7% 0 0.8% 0 0 3.7% 0.5% 
Nuevo Leon 12% 10.3% 11.8% 13.5% 7.1% 8.8% 22.2% 11.9% 
Sonora 0 1.7% 1.2% 1.6% 1.8% 3.5% 0 2.7% 
Campeche 0 4.3% 0 0.8% 0 0 0 1.0% 
Chihuahua 0 1.7% 1.2% 0 0.9% 0 0 1.4% 
Puebla 0 0.9% 2.4% 0.8% 0.9% 2.6% 3.7% 1.4% 
San Luis 
Potosi 
0 6.0% 1.2% 0.8% 4.4% 0.9% 0 1.7% 
Zacatecas 0 2.6% 3.5% 0.8% 3.5% 2.6% 0 2.0% 
Queretaro 0 5.2% 0 0.8% 9.7% 1.8% 0 3.1% 
Nayarit 0 3.4% 1.2% 3.2% 0 0 0 1.0% 
Hidalgo 0 0.9% 1.2% 0 0.9% 0 0 0.5% 
Quintana Roo 0 0 5.9% 2.4% 0.9% 0 0 1.0% 
Baja 
California 
0 0 4.7% 1.6% 0 3.5% 0 1.5% 
Aguascalientes 0 0 2.4% 0 0 0.9% 0 0.7% 
Chiapas 0 0 1.2% 0 0 0 0 0.2% 
Sinaloa 0 0 1.2% 0.8% 0 0.9% 3.7% 0.7% 
Michoacan 0 0 0 5.6% 0.9% 0 0 1.5% 
Baja 
California Sur 
0 0 0 4.0% 0 0 0 1.2% 
Coahuila 0 0 0 0.8% 0.9% 0 0 0.5% 
Total Number 
of Cases 
25 116 85 127 113 114 27 589 
Data compiled from: https://www.scjn.gob.mx/transparencia/paginas/trans_jurisd.aspx. Note that 2008 data 














































55% 49% 44.7% 23.5% 23% 27.9% 6.3% 34.0% 
Legislative 
Minorities 
20% 17.7% 7.9% 8.8% 6% 11.6% 31.3% 12.9% 
Solicitor 
General 










20 96 37 34 64 43 16 294 
Data compiled from: https://www.scjn.gob.mx/transparencia/paginas/trans_jurisd.aspx. Note that 2008 data 
reflects only the final fourth trimester, and the 2014 data only reflects the first trimester data. 
 







































Local Laws 100% 92.7% 100% 97.1% 93.75% 97.7% 75.0% 94.2% 
Federal 
Laws 




0 1.0% 0 0 0 0 0 0.3% 
Local Power 
Agreements 
0 0 0 0 1.56% 0 0 0.3% 
International 
Treaties 




20 96 37 34 64 43 16 294 
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Data compiled from: https://www.scjn.gob.mx/transparencia/paginas/trans_jurisd.aspx. Note that 2008 data 
reflects only the final fourth trimester, and the 2014 data only reflects the first trimester data. 
 









































4.1% 2.0% 0.7% 0.7% 11% 2.4% 0 4.2% 
Local Laws 15.5% 45.6% 3.5% 4.0% 10% 5.3% 8.5% 19.2% 
Federal Laws 77.3% 51.3% 94.6% 95.4% 76% 83.7% 89.0% 75.2% 
International 
Treaties 




97 894 691 151 523 416 82 2741 
Data compiled from: https://www.scjn.gob.mx/transparencia/paginas/trans_jurisd.aspx. Note that 2008 data 
reflects only the fourth trimester, 2011 data reflects only the first trimester, and 2014 data only reflects the 
first trimester. Cumulative data for 2008, 2011, and 2014 are unavailable. Table does not include 
itemization for SEFA. 
 
 





































Administrative 80.4% 90.9% 60.5% 82.1% 68.26% 71.2% 69.5% 76.7% 
Civil 3.1% 2.3% 2.3% 2.6% 3.82% 6.3% 1.2% 3.0% 
Penal 15.5% 4.3% 29.8% 6.0% 23.52% 14.2% 15.9% 15.2% 
Labor 1.0% 1.5% 7.1% 6.6% 4.21% 7.7% 13.4% 4.2% 
International 
Right 
0 0.9% 0.1% 0 0 0 0 0.3% 
Electoral 0 0.1% 0.1% 2.6% 0.19% 0 0 0.6% 
Total Number 
of Cases 
97 894 691 151 523 416 82 2741 
Data compiled from: https://www.scjn.gob.mx/transparencia/paginas/trans_jurisd.aspx. Note that 2008 data 
reflects only the fourth trimester, 2011 data reflects only the first trimester, and 2014 data only reflects the 








APPENDIX D –CHAPTER 4 ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
Table D.1: Logit Predicting Requirement of Legal Reform 
 Baseline Category: PIR Baseline Category: 
Empowerment Rights 
Physical Integrity Rights 
(only) 
















  (.352) 
N 114 113 
Prob > X2  0.049 0.096 
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.033 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -74.596 -75.030 
Correctly Predicted 63.16% 61.06% 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the likelihood of the IACHR to require a state to reform its domestic law as 
reparations depending on whether the case deals primarily with physical integrity rights or empowerment 
rights. Standard errors are clustered by country-year (listed in parentheses). Similar results are reflected in 
probit specifications, but Hausman tests suggest that logit models are more appropriate. Additionally, the 





















-1.120†   
 (.631) 
-.918    
(.918) 
-.732   
 (.841) 
Both PIR and 
Empowerment 
Rights 
-1.470*    
(.617) 
-.451    
(.687) 





-.190*   
 (.080) 
-.146†   
 (.087) 





-.176***   
(.048) 
-.163**   
 (.065) 




.405    
(.356) 
.562    
(.372) 




3.949   
 (4.834) 
6.346*   
 (3.202) 





-1.846      
(2.572) 
-3.27†   
 (1.718) 
-2.555    
(1.619) 
Constant 3.649**    
(1.170) 
1.532   
 (1.326) 
1.184    
(1.203) 
N 112 112 112 
Prob > X2  0.003 0.100 -- 
Pseudo R2 0.204 0.1664 -- 
Log pseudo-
likelihood  
-55.398 -38.291 -- 
Correctly Predicted 76.79% 85.71%  
† p < .10      * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the likelihood of compliance to IACHR judgment requiring domestic legal reform. 
Standard errors are clustered by country-year (listed in parentheses). Similar substantive results occur for 
probit models, however Hausman tests suggest that logit specifications are appropriate. Domestic and 
international media attention (interaction) has a p value of .057 when predicting full compliance in a logit 
specification (second column). The final column represents a rare events logit which I ran since there are 
16 full compliance observations out or 114 observations total (whereas overall compliance consists of 36 







Table D.3: Alternative Case-level Logit Predicting Compliance for PIR Cases 
 Overall Compliance Full Compliance Only 
































N 36 36 
Prob > X2  0.000 0.519 
Pseudo R2 0.291 0.143 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -15.719 -18.240 
Correctly Predicted 77.78% 77.78% 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the likelihood of compliance to IACHR judgment requiring domestic legal reform. 
Standard errors are clustered by country-year (listed in parentheses). There are 10 observations of full 
compliance within this data (with 36 observation) and 25 observations of overall (full and partial) 
compliance. Similar results occur under a rare events logit model predicting full compliance. Similar results 














Table D.4: Alternative Case-level Logit Predicting Compliance for Empowerment Cases 
 Overall Compliance Full Compliance Only 




























N 17 21 
Prob > X2  0.013 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.301 0.344 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -8.053 -9.162 
Correctly Predicted 70.59% 80.95% 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the likelihood of compliance to IACHR judgment requiring domestic legal reform. 
Standard errors are clustered by country-year (listed in parentheses). There are 8 observations of full 
compliance within this data (with 21 observation) and 14 observations of overall (full and partial) 
compliance. Similar results also occur under probit specifications, although Hausman tests suggest that 
logit specifications are more appropriate. Correlation between overall compliance (full and partial 
compliance) and international media attention is .343 but includes only 4 non-zero observations. Likelihood 
























1.454   
(4.573) 
11.077   
(13.802) 






1.147   
(3.057) 























Regime Type -2.526   
(4.007) 
-5.813   
(6.175) 






.879***    
(.277) 
1.061*   
(.456) 



























-2.450   
(3.121) 




























Foreign Aid (Net 
ODA) 













Constant -7.540*   
(3.340) 




-8.011**   
(2.620) 
N 83 52 83 52 
Prob > X2 0.000 0.151 0.009 0.050 
Pseudo R2 0.321 0.262 0.252 0.222 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 





91.57% 88.46% 90.36% 88.46% 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the likelihood of compliance to IACHR judgment requiring domestic legal reform. 
Standard errors are clustered by country-year (listed in parentheses). There are 15 observations of full 
compliance within this data (with 145 observation) and 32 observations of overall (full and partial) 
compliance. Similar results also occur under probit and rare event logit specifications, although Hausman 
tests suggest that logit specifications are more appropriate. Note that dropping foreign direct investment 
and GDP per capita results in the same results. (The same results also occur if one replaces the count of 
neighbor compliance (in the previous year) with a dummy for neighbor overall compliance or with a 

































134.472*   
(61.539) 
56.018   
(32.225) 
13.159    
(8.010) 




-84.188   
(46.522) 





-6.988   
(5.434) 
-2.995   
(3.574) 
-2.939   
(4.563) 




-.084   
(.096) 
-.103*   
(.051) 
-.087*    
(.041) 





4.611   
(2.564) 
  1.640    
(1.401) 
1.619    
(1.645) 
1.738    
(1.255) 
Regime Type -5.742   
(4.695) 
-2.613   
(2.943) 
.117    
(3.393) 




1.603***   
(.476) 
1.083***   
(.288) 
1.160***   
(.315) 





-3.538   
(1.905) 
-2.401   
(1.580) 
-2.779   
(2.217) 




3.302   
(2.151) 
2.412   
(1.285) 
2.961    
(1.960) 
2.825**   
(1.064) 
INGO (HRO) -1.904   
(1.596) 
-.837    
(.527) 






-3.777   
(2.361) 
-1.889   
(1.064) 
-3.153    
(1.831) 




2.485   
(2.323) 






-.469   
(.275) 
-- -- -- 
Total Pending 
Cases  
.780    
(.751) 





1.093**   
(.378) 
.521*    
(.239) 
.545    
(.350) 
.452*    
(.226) 
Foreign Aid (Net 
ODA) 















Constant -66.123**   
(25.952) 
-28.307**   
(11.423) 
-18.480***   
(5.022) 




N 79 79 79 83 
Prob > X2 0.126 0.212 0.010 0.018 
Pseudo R2 0.466 0.350 0.353 0.306 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-14.958 -18.218 -18.133 -19.779 
Correctly 
Predicted 
89.87% 92.41% 91.14% 91.57% 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the likelihood of compliance to IACHR judgment requiring domestic legal 
reform. Standard errors are clustered by country-year (listed in parentheses). There are 15 observations of 
full compliance within this data (with 145 observation) and 32 observations of overall (full and partial) 
compliance. Similar results also occur under probit specifications, although Hausman tests suggest that 
logit specifications are more appropriate. (The same results also occur if one replaces the count of neighbor 
compliance (in the previous year) with a dummy for neighbor overall compliance or with a dummy for 
neighbor full compliance.) In the first column predicting overall compliance, the squared term for judicial 
independence approaches significance at a .070 level, the degree of alignment between the executive and 
lower legislative chamber approaches at a .072 level, the regional diffusion dummy approaches significance 
at a .063 level, and the squared term of pending cases requiring reform approaches significance at a .088 
level. In the second column, judicial independence approaches significance at a .082 level, neighbor 
diffusion nears significance at .060, and previous compliance nears with .076. Previous compliance 
approaches significance at a .085 level in the third column predicting overall compliance. In the final, 
fourth column, political competition has a p level of .097, and GDP per capita has a level of.084. Similar 



























-122.254**   
(45.935) 
-20.031   
(24.007) 
-2.011707   
6.849833 




42.712**   
(13.763) 
5.642   
(3.859) 
.2614035   
3.183474 




.448    
(.247) 
.113    
(.112) 
-.0087744   
.0592416 





-6.363   
(3.733) 
-.625   
(1.965) 
.402954   
1.181707 
.5074739   
1.039691 
Regime Type -8.389   
(8.421) 
-1.954   
(3.996) 
.249    
(3.319) 




-3.822*   
(1.770) 
-.705    
(.841) 
.1121603    
.274046 





8.823*   
(4.452) 
1.798   
(1.459) 
.2626466   
.9725326 




-5.363   
(6.260) 
-.254   
(2.364) 
.9417136   
1.175878 
  1.138197   
1.188134 
INGO (HRO) 10.963*    
(4.598) 
2.074   
(2.907) 
.0065743   
.6130564 







2.558   
(1.689) 
-1.163295   
.8835629 




-1.976    
(7.523) 






1.337   
(.804) 
-- -- -- 
Total Pending 
Cases  
-3.835   
(2.336) 





-3.377   
(1.758) 
-.652    
(.885) 
.0851662   
.4162528 
.1809718   
.3896511 
Foreign Aid (Net 
ODA) 







GDP per capita .005*   
(.003) 






Constant 69.152***   
(18.431) 
8.739   
(8.477) 
-2.492   
(3.429) 
-3.165255   
3.662385 
N 79 79 79 79 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
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Dependent variable is the likelihood of compliance to IACHR judgment requiring domestic legal reform. 
Standard errors are listed in parentheses. There are 15 observations of full compliance within this data (with 
145 observation) and 32 observations of overall (full and partial) compliance. (The same results also occur 
if one replaces the count of neighbor compliance (in the previous year) with a dummy for neighbor overall 
compliance or with a dummy for neighbor full compliance.) In the first model (left-most column) 
executive/legislative alignment nears significance with a p level of .088, political competition barely misses 

































133.368*   
(55.820) 






-35.444*   
(16.724) 
-8.754    
(4.641) 




-.461   
(.300) 
-.230    
(.135) 





5.336   
(4.537) 
2.706   
(2.363) 
1.362    
(1.391) 
Regime Type 8.176   
(10.233) 
5.340   
(4.806) 




3.320   
(2.151) 
1.773   
(1.012) 





-5.874   
(5.410) 
-2.593   
(1.754) 




8.808   
(7.607) 
4.345   
(2.843) 
1.722    
(1.384) 
INGO (HRO) -11.379*   
(5.587) 
-5.727    
(3.496) 





-12.187*   
(6.333) 
-7.472***   
(2.031) 




-.038   
(9.142) 











4.918   
(2.839) 





2.790   
(2.137) 
1.273   
(1.064) 
.706    
(.490) 
Foreign Aid (Net 
ODA) 






GDP per capita -.006    
(.003) 




Constant -65.823**   
(22.398) 
-26.370**   
(10.195) 
-13.307***    
(4.036) 
N 79 79 79 
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Prob > X2 0.281 0.007 0.161 
Pseudo R2 0.595 0.447 0.313 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-8.593 -11.751 -14.597 
Correctly 
Predicted 
97.47% 94.94% 93.67% 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the likelihood of full compliance to IACHR judgment requiring domestic legal 
reform. Standard errors are clustered by country-year (listed in parentheses). There are 15 observations of 
full compliance within this data (with 145 observation) and 32 observations of overall (full and partial) 
compliance. (The same results also occur if one replaces the count of neighbor compliance (in the previous 
year) with a dummy for neighbor overall compliance or with a dummy for neighbor full compliance.) In the 
first column, GDP per capita nears significance at a .076 p level, total pending cases has a p value of .083. 
In the second column, political constraint borders significance at .059 p level, rights entrenchment 
approaches significance at a .080 level, and political competition approaches with a level of .088. In the 
third column, political competition reaches a p level of .071, GDP per capita reaches .081 p level, and 






























1.527   
(3.492) 
9.456   
(10.693) 
2.747   
(3.199) 




.673   
(2.575) 
-1.566   
(4.786) 
.391   
(1.263) 




-.057   
(.041) 
-.100    
(.072) 
-.052   
(.034) 




-.023   
(.032) 
-.037   
(.033) 
-- -- 
Regime Type  -2.402   
(2.965) 
-4.290   
(4.397) 
-3.112   
(2.611) 




.707***   
(.211) 
.871*   
(.366) 
.693***   
(.178) 





-1.947   
(1.306) 






1.727   
(1.157) 












-2.275    
(2.545) 
-281.264***   
(65.925) 
-2.805   
(2.432) 




.365   
 (.197) 
.271    
(.354) 
.283*   
(.138) 





  -.011   
(.122) 
-.149    
(.248) 
-- -- 
Years since Join 
OAS 
-.023   
(.093) 
.049    
(.146) 
-- -- 
Foreign Aid (Net 
ODA) 





GDP per capita -.000   
(.000) 
-.000   
(.000) 
-.000   
(.000) 
-.000    
(.000) 
Constant -7.286**   
(2.545) 
-8.367*   
(3.832) 
-9.236***   
(2.336) 
-6.919***    
(1.903) 
N 83 83 83 83 
Prob > X2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.258 0.318 0.237 0.288 




* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the count of case compliance to IACHR judgments requiring domestic legal reform. 
The number of events occurring per year ranges from 0-3 for overall compliance and 0-1 for full 
compliance. For overall compliance, there are 113 observations of 0, 29 obsrvations of 1, 2 observations of 
2, and 1 observation of 3. Standard errors are listed in parentheses, clustered by country-year. Foreign 
direct investment nears significance at a .064 level in the first model column predicting overall compliance. 
The same results occur if one replaces the count of neighbors’ compliance with presence of full compliance 
or with dummy of neighbors’ compliance.  The same substantive results predicting full compliance occur 
using a negative binomial model, although the first and third columns—those predicting overall 

































109.553***   
(31.784) 
34.464   
(19.717) 
116.970***    
(31.960) 




-71.372**   
(23.474) 





-4.665   
(4.681) 
-6.551*   
(3.176) 
-7.339   
(5.150) 




-.052   
(.050) 
-.176*   
(.092) 
-.039   
(.055) 






3.276   
(1.956) 




1.330   
(1.342) 
Regime Type  -4.809   
(2.998) 
4.765    
(3.596) 
-7.520*   
(3.152) 




1.130***   
(.276) 
1.407*    
(.699) 
1.087***   
(.285) 





-2.415   
(1.520) 
-1.993   
(1.137) 
-1.535    
(1.167) 





1.632   
(1.168) 
3.530   
(2.102) 
.771    
(.893) 
1.782    
(.952) 
INGO (HRO) -1.249   
(1.171) 
-4.171   
(2.449) 
-.728    
(.425) 





-3.005   
(1.732) 
-5.289***   
(1.161) 
-2.675*   
(1.293) 





1.975   
(1.187) 
-3.780   
(2.762) 
2.883    
(1.613) 





-.330*   
(.171) 





.479    
(.526) 





.702***   
(.169) 






Foreign Aid (Net 
ODA) 







GDP per capita -.000   
(.000) 




-.000    
(.000) 
Constant -52.596***   
(13.127) 




-13.832***   
(3.383) 
N 79 79 79 79 
Prob > X2 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.3685 0.375 0.355 0.274 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-18.030 -13.414 -18.406 -20.729 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the count of case compliance to IACHR judgments requiring domestic legal reform. 
The number of events occurring per year ranges from 0-3 for overall compliance and 0-1 for full 
compliance. For overall compliance, there are 113 observations of 0, 29 observations of 1, 2 observations 
of 2, and 1 observation of 3. Standard errors are listed in parentheses, clustered by country-year. In the first 
model column, predicting overall compliance, executive/legislative alignment has a p value of.094, 
previous compliance (whether full or partial) has a p value of .083, and the number of cases pending 
requiring reform has a p value of .096. In the second column, predicting full compliance, judicial 
independence has a p value of .080, INGO human rights organizations have a p value of .089, regional 
diffusion has a p value of .080, and neighbor diffusion has a p value of .093. In the third column, pending 
cases requiring reform reaches a p value of .074, executive/legislative alignment reaches a p value of .084, 
and INGO human rights organizations have a p value of .087. In the final, fourth column, neighbor 
diffusion narrowly misses significance with a p value of .061, INGO human rights organizations have a p 
value of .068. (The same results occur if one replaces the count of neighbors’ compliance with presence of 
full compliance or with dummy of neighbors’ compliance.)  The same substantive results occur using a 


























-.587   
(.630) 
-.599    
(.616) 






-.134   
(.268) 
-.125    
(.263) 
-.178     
(.251) 




-.005   
(.004) 
-.003    
(.004) 
-.005    
(.004) 




-.020   
(.030) 
-.019   
 (.029) 
-- -- 
Regime Type  -.188   
(.226) 
-.123    
(.221) 
-.163    
(.199) 




.004    
(.028) 
.005    
(.027) 
.032*    
(.014) 




-.002   
(.063) 





.055   
 (.072) 





.005     
(.017) 





-.234   
(.152) 
-.243    
(.149) 
-.233    
(.139) 






.036*    
(.018) 







omitted omitted -- -- 
Years since Join 
OAS 
.046    
(.038) 
.040    
 (.037) 
-- -- 
Foreign Aid (Net 
ODA) 





GDP per capita -.000   
(.000) 
-.000    
(.000) 
-.000    
(.000) 
-.000  
  (.000) 
Constant .325    
.417) 
.461    
(.408) 
.245     
(.349) 
.397    
(.341) 
N 83 83 83 83 
Number of 
Groups 
14 14 14 14 
Observations per 












Prob > F 0.1885 0.2916 0.0764 0.1426 
F(14,55) 1.39 1.21 -- -- 
F(8,61)           -- -- 1.90 1.60 
R2 Within  0.262 0.2362 0.1994 0.1737 
R2 Between 0.165 0.1013 0.2248 0.0899 
R2 Overall 0.0057 0.0017 0.0056 0.0006 
Rho .903 .89982997 .4799269 .59501815 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the percentage level of compliance to IACHR judgments requiring domestic legal 
reform. Standard errors are listed in parentheses. Similar results also occur under random effect 
specifications, although Hausman tests suggest that fixed effect specifications are more appropriate. Note 
that dropping time since joining OAS and GDP per capita results in the same results; similarly, including 
the total number of cases, both requiring reform and not, does not alter the results. The time since granting 






























-.254   
(.841) 
-.065   
 (.820) 
.107    
(.663) 




-- -- -- -- 
Political 
Constraint 
-.110    
(.298) 
-.043    
(.290) 
-.083    
(.297) 




-.007   
(.004) 
-.006    
(.004) 
-.007    
(.004) 





-.058   
(.074) 
-.027    
(.073) 
-.066    
(.074) 
-.036     
(.072) 
Regime Type  -.086   
(.207) 
-.039    
(.201) 
-.147    
(.201) 




.048*   
(.020) 
.049*    
(.019) 
.047**    
(.017) 





-.015   
(.080) 








.073    
(.081) 
-.006    
(.079) 
.043   
 (.077) 
-.036    
(.076) 








-.228    
(.120) 




-.077   
(.065) 






-- -- -- .-- 
Total Pending 
Cases  
.039    
(.036) 





.038*   
(.018) 
.030    
(.017) 
.036*     
(.017) 
.029    
(.016) 
Foreign Aid (Net 
ODA) 





GDP per capita -.000   
(.000) 
-.000    
(.000) 
-.000    
(.000) 
-.000  
  (.000) 
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Constant .115    
(.662) 
.025    
(.646) 
-.153    
(.573) 
-.272    
(.563) 
N 79 79 79 79 
Number of 
Groups 
14 14 14 14 
Observations per 










Prob > F 0.115 0.168 0.090 0.170 
F(14,51) 1.59 1.44 -- -- 
F(11,54) -- -- 1.74 1.47 
R2 Within  0.303 0.284 0.262 0.231 
R2 Between 0.311 0.388 0.190 0.045 
R2 Overall 0.006 0.010 0.047 0.052 
Rho .641 .559 .477 .422 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
Dependent variable is the percentage level of compliance to IACHR judgments requiring domestic legal 
reform. Standard errors are listed in parentheses. Similar results also occur under random effect 
specifications, although Hausman tests suggest that fixed effect specifications are more appropriate. 
Judicial independence squared and pending cases requiring reform squared are not significant (or close to 
it) and therefore omitted from the model specifications. In the first column modeling overall compliance, 
political competition reaches a p level of .088. In the second column, previous compliance (whether full or 
partial) misses significance with a p level of .066, and foreign direct investment has a p value of .081. In 
the third column, predicting overall compliance, previous compliance narrowly misses statistical 
significance with a p value of .063. In the fourth column predicting full compliance, foreign direct 
investment misses significance with a p value of .089. While INGO number is omitted in these fixed effects 













APPENDIX E – RATIFIED INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS INCLUDED IN RIGHTS 
ENTRENCHMENT 
 
Supplementary Convention on Abolition of Slavery 
Geneva Convention, Treatment of Prisoners of War 
Convention Against Torture 
Convention on Genocide 
Geneva Convention, Protection of Civilians During Times of War 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking Persons 
Optional Protocol to Convention on Rights of Child (Armed Conflict) 
Optional Protocol to Convention on Rights of Child (Sale/Prostitution/Pornography) 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
Protocol Against Smuggling Migrants, Land Air Sea 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women 
Convention on Abolition of Forced Labor 
